Friday, 12 September 2003
The Use and the Study of Scientific Analogies
Daniela Bailer-Jones, University of Bonn
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning
Abstract: Two extreme theses can be formulated with regard to analogies:
1. Analogies have a temporary and a purely heuristic function.
2. All our thinking is conducted in terms of analogies.
The first thesis probably has its natural locus
in 1950s and 1960s philosophy of science (and before), the second
in cognitive science and the mental models literature. I will argue
that both theses are wrong in their own way, while I certainly do
not want to deny that analogies play a very significant role in
scientific reasoning. One difficulty is that there are easily a
number of different candidates for what the role of analogies in
science is. There is, for instance, a peripheral use of analogy
merely to illustrate points, and there are other cases where analogies
are crucial to the development of a scientific account. While analogies
are sometimes the path to new insight, they are at other times a
tool for the continuing thought about a scientific subject. I shall
illustrate these different uses with examples and then review the
methods of examining analogy use in science. My conclusion with
regard to the above theses is located somewhere in the middle between
the two extremes. While it is impossible to imagine, in practical
terms, how science could survive without analogies, it is also not
possible to make the argument that science requires analogies.
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