Tuesday, 2 November 2004
On the Ontological Aspects of a Consistent Relativistic
Conception of Truth
Lorenz Puntel
University of Munich
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning
Abstract: If truth is relative to specific perspectives
or conceptual schemes (theoretical frameworks) and if truth unavoidably
has ontological aspects and implications, then the problem announced
by the paper’s title straightforwardly emerges. In Part 1
I shall sketch, in all brevity, the theory of truth on which my
reflections will be based; with comparable brevity, I shall show
that a consistent form of relativism with respect to truth can be
maintained. In Part 2 I shall sketch a solution to the ontological
problem that emerges. The step decisive with respect to answering
the question involves two theses. The first is that one must naturalize
or ontologize the entire theoretical dimension or sphere (this concept
will be explained in detail). The second thesis is that the strictly
ontological interrelations among ontological disclosures within
the multiple theoretical frameworks can and must be clarified by
means of three criteria: (1) depth of structure (shallow to deep),
(2) grainedness of structure (more finely or coarsely grained),
(3) degree of coherence (lesser or greater).
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