with Kristóf Madarász and Stephanie W. Wang,
We study the structure of biased social cognition which involves not simply one's belief about the beliefs of others, but also one's belief about their beliefs of one's own belief. We find that while people naively project their information onto differentially-informed others, they also anticipate differentially-informed others' projection onto them. In a principal-agent setting, we directly test the tight one-to-one structural relationship between the partial extent to which the typical person projects her information onto others, ρ, and the extent to which she anticipates but partially underestimates the projection of others onto her, ρ2. The data is remarkably consistent with the parsimonious link implied by the model of projection equilibrium. Furthermore, the majority of subjects both think that others are partially biased, but they also partially underestimate the extent of their bias. The result lends support to the notion of biased social cognition arising as a combination of a biased, but coherent fully ego-centric belief anchor with a partial probabilistic adjustment to the truth.