Gabriel Vasquez-Peterson
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, advised by Jed Lewinsohn. I work primarily in normative ethics, bioethics, and moral psychology, but I also have interests in political philosophy, metaethics, and the history of philosophy. My dissertation is on the ethics of intimate relationships, with a particular focus on the different ways in which such relationships are, and are not, conditional.
Before starting my Ph.D., I completed my BA in Philosophy at the University of Florida in Gainesville.
Research
We often speak of our love and concern for our intimates (the people with whom we have intimate relationships) as unconditional. Yet the language of unconditionality can be misleading. How you feel about and act toward a given intimate will normally depend, at least to some extent, on a variety of conditions, including the way they treat you, their moral character, and even your desire to continue your relationship with them. In this dissertation, I investigate these three forms of conditionality, examine the normative considerations at play in each of them, and attempt to determine the extent to which they are normatively appropriate or even required. More specifically, I identify one important and unappreciated way in which our love for our intimates is appropriately dependent on how they treat and relate to us, show that it is often admirable and even required for us to make our relationships with our friends (and others) contingent on their meeting certain moral standards, and investigate the idea that romantic relationships come with a built-in ‘exit option.’
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Love and Reciprocationdraft available on requestIn this paper, I argue that the fact that someone has played what I call a loving role in your life is a reason for you to love them.
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Associating With Bad Peoplein progressIn this paper, I investigate the idea that those who knowingly maintain friendship or friendly associations with people they know to be morally bad in very serious ways thereby reveal and express an insufficient commitment to important moral values.
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Informed Consent, Bodily Autonomy, and the Social Significance of BodiesIn ProgressIn this paper, I argue twe should take the requirement to be justified by our interest in a specific form of autonomy: bodily autonomy. I further argue that this interest, and its ethical significance, is grounded—at least in part—in the social significance our bodies have.
Teaching
I consider teaching to be one of the most important parts of my work as an academic. Please see the materials below for more information on my teaching experience and approach to pedagogy.