GINIEUIE UNICEF Child and Young Adult Soldiers

Methods & Practices 


Recruitment Prevention, Demobilization Procedures & Reintegration



source: UNICEF/John Chaisson
"Recruitment is the defining moment.  Without recruitment of children, there would be no child soldiers.  Many child soldiers are invisible because they grow into, and become demobilized as, adult soldiers."  -Brett & McCallin (1996)

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Recruitment Prevention

Demobilization Procedures Reintegration (or Recovery) and Rehabilitation

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source: UNICEF/ Yann Gamblin




Recruitment Prevention

Prevention strategies must reflect the multitude of ways in which youth come to participate in hostilities, dealing with the issues of conflict, as well as the cultural and individual needs of the youth involved.  For more information about typical recruitment practices click here.

Institutional Interventions
In August 1988, UNHCR issued Guidelines on Refugee Children, which confirmed its policy to intervene with governments to ensure they protect the rights, safety, and freedom of refugee children and youth.  UNHCR offices were instructed to promote conditions, such as the location of refugee camps at a safe distance from their country's border in order to protect them from attack and forced recruitment.  They were also instructed to report all incidents of recruitment by State armies or guerilla or insurgent forces, both to the government of the asylum countries and the UNHCR headquarters.

Governments and other institutions can institute the following policies and procedures (summarized from Goodwin-Gill & Cohn, 1994):

(a) Required provision of birth records.  Where systems for records are not in place, UNICEF, UNHCR, and other agencies and NGOs should help individuals and families establish ages and obtaining appropriate documentation.

(b) Assistance agencies should inform themselves about the age(s) for compulsory and or voluntary recruitment under the relevant national law, and ensure that it conforms with international law, persons they are assisting know their rights, including minimum ages and exemption rules, if any, and what recourse they have to resolve problems with unlawful recruitment.

(c) Assistance agencies should be sure the law is being practiced and if not, should take this up with appropriate national authorities and UN mechanisms such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child and Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, among others.

(d) Governments should not attack or subject to violent harassment, children themselves, their families and their homes; where children are involved in armed opposition groups, to treat them in accordance with recognized international standards on capture, and also with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and allow regular access to all child detainees by the International Committee of the Red Cross; they should provide access to education and vocational training for all children; and they should address the economic, social and political causes of the conflict.

(e) Assisting agencies such as UNHCR and NGOs should make provisions for education and vocational training for children and young adults, including refugee and internally displaced children in order to reduce volunteering.

 (f) The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the UN Commission on Human Rights should monitor, respond to and report on violations of the rights of children and young adults who are soldiers.

 (g) Consideration should be given to the need for and the advisability of a specific UN mechanism, such as Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, to address the issue of child and young adult soldiers.

 (h) The UN sub commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities should undertake a study of the treatment of recruits in government armed forces with a view to examining its compatibility with human rights standards, as well as the consequences of inhuman and degrading treatment for the recruits and for the subsequent behavior of the armed forces.

(i) The Committee on the Rights of the Child should consider the questions of applicability to youth of emergency and anti terrorism legislation; military law, punishment and discipline and the age of criminal responsibility, in particular in relation to situations of armed conflict, states of emergency and terrorism, and their compatibility with the Convention on the Rights of the Child; governments should review their legislation to ensure its conformity with the Convention and other international standards.

(j) Governments should regulate the flow of lightweight automatic weapons, and other small arms.

Unrecognized armed opposition groups have no 'right' to conscript soldiers, but they are still subject to national and  international law.  In practice, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce compliance with legal standards.  In some cases, negative media publicity can put pressure on armed opposition groups to conform, in fact sometimes they will then adhere to higher standards in order to garner positive, rather than negative publicity.  Concerned local NGOs, religious and community leaders will need to appeal to armed opposition leaders on the basis of local values, custom, and practice in order to be effective.  International donors, in turn, can consider strengthening such local initiatives when the armed groups seem to rely heavily on the local civilian population for support and protection.  Foreign aid donors supporting armed groups can often have the greatest influence on their clients not to recruit youth under the age of 18.

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Structural Reforms
Interventions to minimize voluntary participation can tackle the issue indirectly, by targeting structural problems.  Local people and organizations may be at risk if they address such issues, but international donors, financial lending institutions, and international aid agencies are better able to promote structural reform by making compliance with international law and public opinion conditional for receipt of aid.  It is also most advantageous to connect any large scale reforms with local initiatives if at all possible.

The practical problems associated with preventing recruitment and providing protection for youth soldiers are many.  Even if governments or armed groups comply with regulations, the circumstances of war can make implementation difficult or impossible.  In some cases these children and youth are orphans of war and have few, if any, potential benefactors or caregivers.  Also, in some cases where opposition forces control territory with some stability, it may be difficult for governments to fulfill their responsibilities because they may not have access to providing education or training in opposition group controlled zones.  In addition, if the people blame the government for rights violations or previous poor treatment, they may not be open to assistance from the government.  Thus, local and international NGOs have a responsibility to address the needs of populations and child soldiers in zones under non government entity control and the non government entities should also not limit access to the population needing support.

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Community Interventions and Changing Perceptions of Children and Youth
Recruitment of children and youth can be influenced directly by working to change the perceptions of the value of participation by youth and those around them.  Interventions aimed at how children appraise the decision to participate in a conflict include strengthening those who can influence children and young adults'  perceptions, such as immediate and extended family and the community.  Interventions must also combat cultural beliefs about war and the propaganda value of youth soldiers.

Often it is just as difficult to overcome parents' feelings of inevitability of their children's' participation and the belief in that the dangers to children are outweighed by the urgency of the conflict situation as it is to convince them of the negative consequences of youth participation as soldiers.  Psychologists have stressed the importance of emotional and material support of the extended family and community that serves as a support system for adults who, in turn, help children cope with stressful events.  How adults respond to childrens' questions about macro social, economic or justice issues, often determines how children will cope.  Also in conflicts that are caused primarily by ethnic and group hatreds or prejudice it is important also to address adults' and childrens' perceptions of the root causes of the conflict.  It is vital to support mothers, families and communities in shielding children from the most harmful psychosocial consequences of conflict and to maintain a reassuring environment that may help prevent youth from joining armed conflict voluntarily.

It may be possible to argue against the use of youth soldiers on the basis of legal standards.  The Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 states that a young person's physical integrity is violated or unduly at risk by allowing him or her to participate in hostilities.  A declaration of minimum standards applicable to all parties in internal armed conflicts and civil strife, as was adopted in Turko\Abo in 1990, could include a prohibition on the participation of  youth under age 18; it would also help international donors make compliance a condition of aid.
 

Click here
to read more about the 
Development of International Law
Ultimately, arguments on the basis of values must be developed that are sensitive to the local culture, values, religion and history.  An argument can also be made that those in control of territory have a responsibility to the local populations to protect the rights of its children regardless of their own military or political agendas.  But this approach is always difficult after the conflict has already broken out.  What would be most helpful in that case would be to mount arguments that very young soldiers will be a military or strategic detriment to the cause of the conflict.  Strategies also have to developed to counteract the phenomenon whereby both sides in a conflict use the death of young soldiers as a propaganda tool against the opposing side.

There is also a need to bolster the feelings of empowerment and security among children and youth.  Feelings of helplessness and lack of security are often not perception problems, but very real.  In this case, it is important to actually reduce repression and improve the young person's capacity to enact change without guns.  This may involve a variety of interventions, such as international denunciation or pressure on governments that commit or sanction disappearances, torture, and intimidation; legal assistance to pursue claims of rights violations; and internationally monitored security in conflict zones, refugee and displaced persons camps.  Part of this response includes alternative activities for children and youth in war zones.  If schools even maintain minimal recreational activities, children might be less bored, frustrated or desperate.  There is little empirical evidence supporting this strategy, but there have also been few, if any, systematic attempts to accomplish it.  Also, there is still a need to guard against the possibility that armed groups can use schools as an effective means to access youth for recruitment.

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The Regulation of Recruitment
All governments and armed opposition groups who currently have persons under 18 years of age in their armed forces should be urged to demobilize them immediately, and to refrain from recruiting under 18s in the future.  In current conflicts all parties should be urged to make local agreements to this effect.  The mutual nature of such agreements should encourage parties to keep to them and, in addition to reducing the actual participation of under 18s, should help to protect all children in the affected areas from harassment and detention (by reducing the suspicion of participation).  Governments, as well as relevant international and regional organizations, specialized agencies and international and national NGOs, can assist in advocating for and negotiating such agreements.  Governments should introduce proper recruitment procedures for their armed forces:

 (a) Where conscription exists, it must be given a legal basis with a clear minimum age not less than 18.  The law should be publicized widely.  Proper safeguards, including requirement of proof of age, and military disciplinary or criminal penalties for infringements, should be available and enforced to ensure that under-age recruitment does not take place.

(b) The role of local militias and civil defense forces as recruiting agents should be eliminated.  Their recruitment ages and procedures should be brought in line with legal guidelines and those for regular government armed forces, and the provisions of the UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994\67 implemented.  The resolution recommends:

            "(a) Civil defense forces shall only be deployed for the purpose of self-defense; (b) Recruitment into them shall be voluntary and shall be effectively controlled by public authorities; (c) Public authorities shall supervise their training, arming, discipline and operations; (d) Commanders shall have clear responsibility for their activities; (e) Civil defense forces and their commanders shall be clearly accountable for their activities; (f) Offenses involving human rights violations by such forces shall be subject to the jurisdiction of civil courts."
(c) Where there is conscription, provision should be made for exemption from military service on grounds of conscience and for an alternative, non-military, non punitive, service for conscientious objectors to military service which is compatible with the reasons for the objection, in accordance with UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995\83.

(d) Voluntary recruitment should require appropriate safeguards both in relation to age and to voluntariness with the obligation on the recruiter to obtain confirmation of the full and informed consent of the individual and any persons (such as parents) with legal responsibility for the individual volunteering.

(Recommendations summarized from Brett & McCallin (1996), Chapter 9; International Save the Children Alliance, 1998)

Underage recruitment is unlawful in many countries, but there are few cases of real punishment or consequences being implemented.  In July 1998 the majority of world governments agreed upon the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court that will prosecute persons charged with war crimes, genocide, etc.  The use of underage (under 15) youth soldiers is included in the list of war crimes.  Article 8 of the statute specifically enables prosecution for conscription or use of under 15s as in armed forces.  As soon as 60 nations ratify the Statute, the hope is that it will be effectively and formally implemented worldwide.
 

Click here
to view information about the 1998 ICC Statute

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Lessons Learned about Prevention of Recruitment From Seven UNICEF Cases

a.Need to establish methods of documentation and age identification, especially in rural areas.  It is important to gather documentation and establish accessible, centralized databases of information regarding recruitment practices and lists of identified child soldiers.

b. It is important to establish accurate documentation of the social histories of ex-child soldiers so they may be returned safely to their own families or communities.

c. If the rights of children are not respected as a political priority by all parties, the practicalities of enforcing international humanitarian law will be difficult, if not impossible.  If the relationships among the government, the military, and outside organizations is unstable, progress can be slow or non-existent.  The issue of child soldier recruitment needs to be a priority or a prominent national issue and there must be a mechanism in place for monitoring Army recruitment.

d. There is a need to establish good liaisons among UNICEF and NGOs.  There has been some reluctance from NGOs to provide information to UNICEF fearing it would compromise their ability to continue their programmes.

e. Education and training are vital in order to provide children with an alternative means of gaining economic security for themselves.

f. The prevention of re-recruitment of demobilized children should be given priority.  The high risk of continuous recruitment of minors in armed groups must be monitored.  Children who were reunified with their family after demobilization were sometimes recruited again as part of national conscription.  This points to the need for documentation of official demobilization and advocacy at the highest levels of government.

g. UNICEF needs to advocate at an earlier stage for the demobilisation of child soldiers.

h. NYHQ should provide clear advice to country offices on the possible need to confront the government on specific issues.

i. Need to strengthen preventive measures such as interim care centers for street children, educational opportunities for all children and providing alternative viewpoints to the glorification of war.

j. Hard data is needed on child rights violations in order for actions to be taken; the establishment of  investigation and enforcement capacity must be supported.

k. Advocacy with local organizations, media, former child soldiers, teachers, health workers, religious and community leaders is vital.

l. It is vital to work toward the increased awareness of families regarding recruitment of young boys and the children’s right to get minimum education.  There is a need to increase community opposition to forced recruitment and to decrease the number of abductions of children in school.

m. It is important for UNICEF and NGOs to remain neutral in the ongoing conflict.  Also Churches were reluctant to become involved for fear of offending the movements or being seen as partisans.

n. Emphasize the importance of binding together humanitarian assistance and the protection of the civilians as inseparable parts (humanitarian aid and human rights.  Minimum standards based on the CRC must be established and accepted as legal norm.

o. Family reunification and provision of basic education are effective means to prevent child recruitment.

p. Capacity building is a sine qua non for the success of humanitarian principles programme.

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Demobilization Procedures

There have been only a few cases in which child soldiers have been demobilized during an armed conflict.  Usually, they are not demobilized until the end of the conflict, when a peace accord has been achieved.  Even so, armed forces may try to hide the fact that they have used child soldiers and so the children often are not included in formal demobilization procedures.  In some cases, this means that former child soldiers could be re-conscripted when they are older because there is no record of their prior military service (International Save the Children Alliance, 1998).

Click here
for an article on 
Demobilization and Reintegration 
by Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

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Strategies for Accomplishing Demobilization and Disarmament
Structural or macro issues are of central importance in demobilization.  Improved socio-economic conditions will often be a factor in persuading some young soldiers to demobilize.  When there are no jobs, no food, and no infrastructure, there is little incentive to demobilize and disarm.  Fear of retribution and uncertainty about the future are also deterrents to demobilizing.  Also, the prospect of disarming and demobilizing far from family and community support can be daunting.  Programs that offer incentives for youth soldiers to demobilize and disarm are essential.  Ex-combatants must be provided with a means of income or employment.  Because they have been with the military for long periods of time, they may not have had access to learning the traditional skills and means of employment which support the economy within the community to which they are returning.

One of  the only case studies available as an example of the official demobilization of youth soldiers is the Case of Liberia.  Nearly six hundred youth under the age of 17 were demobilized with an adult relative.  This situation meant that the majority of the demobilized youth returned directly to their own communities.  However, in most cases of general demobilization there are not provisions or plans for the special reintegration needs of children and youth.   Several factors regarding youth come into play when planning procedures for demobilization:  number of children involved, in which faction; political sensitivity; available resources; needs of other war-affected children.  Unless the needs of children and youth are incorporated into general plans for reconstruction following a conflict, the needs of ex-child soldiers will not be given priority status.

Click here 
to read more about the Case of Liberia
There are many factors that may mitigate against the demobilization of youth soldiers.  Any plans for demobilization of youth must be sensitive to the culture and values of the young person's social community.  For example, certain social environments may implicitly or explicitly approve of child participation in the armed conflict.  Therefore advocacy for demobilization of children may be interpreted as a challenge to the local cultural beliefs.   Also, families may feel their child's participation affords them some material or security advantage and so they may be reluctant to support the demobilization of their own youth.  Sometimes, even if a community does not approve of  the use of youth soldiers, these beliefs are subjugated in times of war.  In cases where youth have no family, demobilization requires some alternative source of care.  In any case, demobilization is just the first step.  The hardest work comes in trying to rehabilitate and reintegrate the former child soldiers.
 
Click Here
to read about good examples of 
Demobilization and Reintegration Practice

Lessons Learned about Demobilization From Seven UNICEF Cases

a. When children were kept under military umbrella during demobilization phase, sometimes this caused unecessary delays before effective reunification with family.  Protracted demobilization periods should be avoided.

b. Demobilization in a state of crisis is absolutely not successful, above all because there is no Government support.  It is really difficult to go against a National Political will in the case of latent war.

c. Until the demobilization is official there is no guarantee of it.  It is definitely important to obtain an official demobilization.

d. Demobilization specialists are necessary for the well being of the process.  It is important that the personnel involved are well-trained in the area of demobilization.

e. It is necessary to organize demobilization in a specific way, training children and reflecting child soldier needs and problems.

f. Girl soldiers should be targeted as a special group during demobilization.  Situations of girls should be assessed and specific protection measures implemented that are sensitive to the culture.

g. Care and consideration should be given to the issue of documenting the military activity of the children in the same way as the activity of  demobilized adults.

h. Special protection measures and services provided to the children must be consistent and represent a viable alternative to military life.

i. When children were directly involved in the management of the transit centers this had a positive effect.  Programmes should involve children in programme planning, implementation and monitoring.

j. Need to build capacity of the Government to work with NGOs and also need intra-governmental coordination among ministries.

k. Donor’s pressure was often an important factor influencing programme set-up.

l. UNICEF should be careful not to support  government initiatives without defining minimum conditions to its participation (such as non-institutionalization, gender equity, priority to family reunification, children participation).

m. Lack of assessment led to the implementation of a demobilization programme for children who had not served as child soldiers.

n. High risk to see UNICEF engaged in supporting the establishment of a cadet academy.
Demobilization programmes should not be initiated nor carried out by the Ministry of defense but by the Ministry of Social Welfare.

o. Programme set-ups that confine the children into a boarding school and keep them isolated from society should be avoided.

p. Reliable data on children can be obtained only after creating the conditions for trust.

q. Specific monitoring indicators should be defined within the planning process to assess progress made by the programme.  There is a need to evaluate the impact of the activity of the demobilization centers and programmes and to act accordingly.

r. Need to identify channels of contact with non-governmental armed groups.

s. In some cases assessment of children needs and their participation in programme implementation was inconsistent.  As a consequence many children vanished from the programme.
 
 

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Reintegration (or Recovery) and Rehabilitation

Education and Vocational Training
Because many ex-combatants have spent their school-age years as child soldiers, they may be more interested in earning an income once they are no longer soldiers.  This makes the problem of the use of child soldiers also a problem in the adult population in peacetime.  However, for those still of school age, standard education programs may still be an option.  In some cases, young soldiers have no families or community to return to, so they opt to stay in the military.  In such cases, the military can provide basic literacy training and basic vocational training.  Another option is to provide transitional education after disarming and prior to demobilization.  In some countries such programs have been launched by local universities with financial assistance from abroad.  Some demobilization packages have also offered scholarships for those over 18 with prior education who tested into the university level, and vocational, civil service, agricultural or industrial skills training for those testing at lower levels.  In general, young combatants receive little training or education while in military service, so they lack this when they demobilize and attempt to return to society.  Without some education, they are likely to become part of the unemployed or unemployable underclass of society.

The child's right to education in a situation of conflict raises practical issues regarding responsibility.  Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right of the child to education and obligates the State to ensure that right is achieved with equal opportunity for all.  However in times of conflict the State may not have control over all its territories.  In such cases, compliance can be excused if the State can show it has made its best effort.  It is less clear whether the non government entities in control of a territory are obligated to assume the responsibility of the State, indeed, they do not often have the infrastructure and resources needed to fulfill such a responsibility.

In addition to standard school programs, there is also a need to provide ex-combatants and the entire community with a program of  Peace Education.  This may include Land Mine Awareness Education , Trauma and Disability Education, and HIV/AIDS Awareness.      Another aspect that is less directly applied to the ex-combatants themselves, but is supportive of  literacy education  is ecological literacy, or producing a literate environment.  This involves supporting the development of a strong and free press and improving the mass communication capacities in the local environments.
 

For a comprehensive resource on 
Education as an Humanitarian Response 
click here:
Humanitarian Response

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Addressing Psychosocial Consequences, Health Care, and Basic Needs
Dealing with psychosocial consequences of childrens' involvement in conflict mostly and necessarily happens at the national and community levels.  However there do exist a set of applicable international guidelines.  Article 77 of Additional Protocol I requires the parties to the conflict to provide children 'with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or any other reason.'    This can be interpreted to include the trauma resulting from involvement in combat or accompanying abuse, and as therefore implying an obligation to provide appropriate counseling or other rehabilitation services.  This view is also supported by Article 39 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child.

Some Important Principles:
However, the psychosocial consequences of suffering a war related injury might vary depending on whether or not the victim is an ex-combatant.  A volunteer might even react differently than someone who was forced to fight.  The reaction of  family or community might also affect how the injured person copes with a handicap or injury.  Community attitudes and misconceptions about youth soldiers must be addressed.  Issues of  loss and separation plague both youth ex-combatants and the families to which they return.   The nature of childrens' physical injuries may also serve to marginalize them if the community has not the capacity to understand their special needs.  The effects of sexual abuse and the attached stigma in nearly all societies may be particularly problematic for girls depending upon the cultural beliefs of the society.  Less is known about the effects of long term sexual abuse on boys, but clearly this is a psychosocial issue to be attended to.  On the flip side, the independence and authority experienced by some females may also hinder their reintegration into a community where they are required to be submissive and soft spoken.  All the above issues should be taken into account when designing programs to address psychosocial issues, with special caution taken to avoid the inappropriate use or overuse of Western therapeutic approaches.
 
Click here 
to view a report on strategies for 
promoting psychosocial well-being 
among youth affected by armed conflict
Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires governments to take all appropriate measures to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social re-integration of a child victim of armed conflict, 'in an environment which fosters the health, self respect and dignity of the child.'  This article should apply equally to youth who are ex-combatants as those who are not.

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Family/Community Search
The preamble to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child contains statements in support of the family as the fundamental building block of society and haven for growth and development of children.  Therefore the family "should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, (and) that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding."  One of the most significant factors in a young person's return to society is reunification with his or her family or community of origin.  Ex-combatants need to learn how to live again in society as young people and to re-establish trust in others.
 

Click here 
for a report on 
Children in Armed Conflict and Displacement 
by the International Save the Children Alliance
Family tracing programs need to be put into place as soon as possible following disarmament and demobilization in order to facilitate reintegration into society.   One of the challenges in this process lies with the youth themselves.  They may be reluctant to give up their identity as a soldier, especially if they feel they have contributed to any ills perpetrated on their own community or family.  They may also be mourning the loss of their armed group which for a long period of time served as their protector or provider, and in essence their community.  Reattachment to family and community is not a trivial process.  Simply putting youth back with their families is not enough because not only has the youth been drastically affected by their armed participation, but they may be returning to a family that is also radically changed from what they once knew.  Thus, families must be helped to rebuild family life.  Another challenge for family tracing is the fact that many families have been displaced during the conflict and it may be difficult, if not impossible to locate them.  In some cases also, families in post crisis situations do not have the means to provide the needed care for their returning children or youth.  Finally, sometimes military groups can be of  help in the process of family tracing (because they may know where the children were taken from), especially if they can be convinced that their cooperation would be viewed as a positive contribution by the government, the public, or the international community.

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Community Social Support
In practice, conflict is often accompanied by the breakdown of community programs and support systems, with limited access to those in need of services, and suspicion of those seeking to provide assistance where parties are polarized by politics or race.  Some strategies that might be of use in the process of building up community support networks include:

For children and youth who have no family to return to, or whose families are not in a position to take them back, alternative means of providing care must be developed.  This is particularly crucial for older children and young adults who have been in military service for several years.  The creation of special institutions is not enough and such institutions are more appropriately thought of as transition environments while individual needs are assessed.  It must be made clear to all that the ultimate goal of such institutions is to facilitate the youth's return to his or her own community.  Capacities must be built within the communities to take responsibility for the recovery and rehabilitation of its youth.  The capacity for communities to recover economically from a conflict can be crucial in the entire process.  Government, NGOs and other assistance agencies can be of great help in seeding programs to rebuild community facilities, educational institutions, and invest in relevant training and outreach programs within the communities.

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Lessons Learned about Reintegration From Seven UNICEF Cases




a. Priority must be given to family and community reintegration as early as possible.  In some cases, the provision of basic services at the boarding center overtook the stated objective to reintegrate the children with their families and communities.  Family reunification policies must not be overlooked. However, it is important to identify the appropriate option of reintegration for each child.

b. Need for effective follow-up that will not make ex-child soldiers vulnerable to re-recruitment.

c. Family and community reintegration and educative-economic opportunities for the child and their family are the determinants of successful social reintegration and factors in preventing re-recruitment and a return to using violence to gain basic life needs.

d. Psychological recovery requires the support of the social network supporting the child's development and rights on a daily basis.

       -learning through games, recreation and other activities facilitating
            expression provides an important role in psychosocial recovery

       -social reintegration must emphasize family and community acceptance.

e. There is a need to follow up on the wherabouts and activities of children following demobilization.  Special support is needed to be sure that childrens' capacity to be reintegrated into civil society is developed.  Sometimes special incentives are needed to keep children on track in their reintegration programs.

f. Reintegration of the children depends of family behavior.  Preparing the family members to deal with the ex-soldier is vital for successful reintegration.

g. During reunification, it is important to give particular attention to proper registration of the name and location of the family to facilitate follow-up.

h. Cannot underestimate the importance of local traditions for reintegration programmes.

i. Need to avoid stigmatization of former child soldiers .  High risk of institutionalization of the children and subsequent stigmatization must be avoided.

j. Provision of services was sometimes of higher standards than primary caregivers communities were able to support.  Programmes must be sensitive to these conditions.

k. Failure to mainstream psychosocial programme and target priority groups leads to inefficacy of these services.

l. The education curriculum must be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education.

m. Reintegration of former child soldiers requires to ensure access to viable employment opportunities through subsides and credit.

n. Need to collect more systematic data on situation of children after family reunification.

o. Yearly evaluation of the programme should be carried out.

p. It is important to establish trust with children before engaging dialogue on their future.

q. Reunification with relatives other than parents should be considered.

r. Importance of community sensitization programs.

s. It is vitally important to tie the humanitarian values and principles to the traditional cultural values.  Also, it is important to build the capacity of local communities and leaders to initiate and carry out demobilization and reunification programmes.
 


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Selected information summarized from the following sources:
Brett, R.  & McCallin, M.  (1996).  Children:  The invisible soldiers.  Stockholm: Rädda Barnen.
Goodwin-Gill, G. & Cohn, I. (1994).  Child soldiers:  The role of children in armed conflicts.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press.
International Save the Children Alliance (1998).  Stop Using Child Soldiers!  London:  Author.
 
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