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Team B Intelligence Coups

Gordon R. Mitchell

The 2003 Iraq prewar intelligence failure was not simply a case of the U.S. intelligence community providing flawed data to policy-makers. It also involved subversion of the competitive intelligence analysis process, where unofficial intelligence boutiques "stovepiped" misleading intelligence assessments directly to policy-makers and undercut intelligence community input that ran counter to the White House's preconceived preventive war of choice against Iraq. This essay locates historical precursors to such "Team B intelligence coups" in the original 1976 Team B exercise and the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report on ballistic missile threats. Since competitive intelligence analysis exercises are designed to improve decision-making by institutionalizing the learning function of debate, their dynamics stand to be elucidated through critique informed by argumentation theory. Such inquiry has salience in the current political milieu, where intelligence reform efforts and the investigations that drive them tend to sidestep the Team B intelligence coup phenomenon.

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The autumn 2004 rush to implement intelligence reform based on recommendations from the "9/11 Commission"[1] reminds some of Sancho Panza—Don Quixote's squire who dutifully "galloped off in all directions" before mapping out a clear route.[2] In the politically charged environment of a presidential election, leaders from both major U.S. political parties scrambled to embrace the 9/11 Commission's proposals for wholesale restructuring of the intelligence community.[3] Their hurried reform effort reached fruition with passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

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Prevention Act of 2004, legislation that implemented many of the 9/11 Commission's suggestions.[4]

While hasty intelligence reform may suffice as short-term political tonic, it offers little in the way of lasting policy solutions to the complex problems that plague U.S. intelligence. According to defense analyst Anthony Cordesman, the 9/11 Commission Report is an "exercise in tunnel vision with no explicit analysis of how the problems affecting 9/11 relate to the overall weaknesses in the intelligence community."[5] The 9/11 Commission developed sweeping reform recommendations by examining just one instance of intelligence breakdown—failure to anticipate and warn of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Conspicuously absent from the commission's diagnosis and prescription was any treatment of the intelligence failure associated with the 2003 Iraq War. This was like a doctor ordering a chest X-ray for a patient who comes in to the emergency room with broken toes, as a key locus of intelligence failure in the Iraq case was not the intelligence community itself, but rather outlier boutiques housed in peripheral shops largely independent of the official intelligence community structure. Disconcertingly, investigations of the Iraq prewar intelligence failure have also skirted this issue. Their narrow focus on the performance of the official intelligence community has obscured the role played by these outlier intelligence boutiques in shaping flawed policy judgments on pivotal issues such as Iraq's ties to al-Qaida, Saddam Hussein's arsenal of unconventional weaponry, and postwar reconstruction forecasts.[6]

One such boutique was the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), a Pentagon cell established shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The PCTEG was formed after White House political leaders rejected official intelligence community threat assessments of Iraq as too conservative. In response, Bush administration officials sought to stimulate internal debate on such assessments by tasking a freestanding team to study "the policy implications of relationships among terrorist groups and their sources of support."[7] Taking a page from the Cold War playbook, the White House modeled PCTEG after the 1976 "Team B" panel, an independent group of "outsiders" invited to debate against CIA analysts regarding Cold War intelligence estimates on Soviet military strength.

In intelligence circles, commitment to the process of argumentation as a driver of rigorous inquiry receives expression in "competitive analysis" exercises that pit analysts against each other in debating contests designed ostensibly to produce a superior intelligence product from the same pool of raw data. The idea is that "estimative processes" can be sharpened when they are driven by the clash of competing ideas in a structured format.[8] For former intelligence officials Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, "the virtue of competitive analysis resides primarily in allowing differing points of view to be expressed at high levels, thereby sharpening the debate."[9]

Occasionally, such competitive debate exercises take place within the official intelligence community, when professional analysts hone their skills and findings in the *dissoi logoi* of argumentative give-and-take. Other times, "outsiders," such as retired military officers or former politicians, are brought in to play the role of "devil's advocate" (as in the Team B and PCTEG cases). Those familiar with academic

debating may notice how these exercises resemble rituals of debating practice, where students sharpen their critical thinking skills in structured episodes of dialectical clash. Indeed, both activities share an overlapping set of normative assumptions that flow from a common commitment to the process of debate as a tool of learning and decision-making. What are these normative assumptions? A host of studies have engaged this question, explaining the process of argumentation from a variety of theoretical horizons including speech act theory,[10] informal logic,[11] and rhetoric.[12] One especially lucid and concise effort comes from Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, who propose that "the process of debate may be seen as trying to implement six directives":

1. Enter the competing views into full and fair competition to assess their relative worth.
2. Let this competition consist of two phases. First, set forth each view in its own right, together with the most convincing supporting proofs. Second, test each view by seeing how well it withstands the strongest attacks an informed opponent levels against it.
3. Delay a decision until both sides have been presented and subjected to testing.
4. Let the decision be rendered not by the contending parties themselves but by an external adjudicating agency.
5. Let this agency weigh the competing arguments and produce a decision critically.
6. Let the participants agree in advance to abide by such a decision.[13]

While it has been noted that the debate process can be adversarial to a fault,[14] the *telos* of Ehninger and Brockriede's set of directives is that argumentation is, at root, a cooperative enterprise. Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst emphasize this point by drawing on Paul Grice's "cooperative principle" to inform their "pragma-dialectical" theory of argumentation.[15] In this account, interlocutors initiate argumentation with the reciprocally shared assumption that the other will adhere to certain basic premises governing the exchange, with the idea that such an approach can maximize chances that the argument will leave both parties enriched by a better understanding of the issue at hand. This notion squares with Shulsky and Schmitt's description of how sound competitive intelligence exercises should "attempt to imitate" the "free marketplace of ideas," where cooperative argumentation can "expose the invalidity of positions the evidence doesn't support, while providing a greater chance that new, unconventional ideas will receive a serious hearing."[16]

Yet as critics of the "argument culture" point out convincingly, interlocutors can manipulate the process of argumentation. For example, one maneuver involves feigning initial commitment to the guiding norms of critical discussion, then later tossing the norms aside for strategic gain. This subversion resembles a political coup—the sudden seizure of power through unconventional means such as force or deception. In formal deliberative settings such as academic debate, remedies for such behavior are available, as when expert judges assess penalties against speakers who flout contest round conventions. However, similar remedies are lacking in the more

loosely structured and less tightly regulated competitive intelligence analysis setting, a fact that makes the process prone to abuse. This is a significant problem, since manipulation of the intelligence function can result in intelligence failures that lead to unnecessary war and bloodshed.[17]

Rather than survey every competitive intelligence exercise on record, this study focuses on instances where recurrent departures from norms of critical discussion result in subversion of the intelligence function—Team B intelligence coups. The lineage of this critical approach can be traced to Robert P. Newman's article, "Communication Pathologies of Intelligence Systems," which shows how intelligence failures ranging from the Bay of Pigs to Vietnam were rooted in systematic institutional pressures that distorted communication between intelligence analysts and policy-makers.[18] The complex dynamics that produced policy collapse in the 2003 Iraq War have prompted scholars of international relations to follow Newman in analyzing intelligence systems through the lens of communication practices. For example, Peter Neumann and M. L. R. Smith isolate "discourse failure" as a key factor accounting for faulty prewar decision-making on Iraq,[19] while Chaim Kaufmann explains the same intelligence breakdown as a "failure of the marketplace of ideas."[20] The analysis here draws from argumentation theory to elucidate how distortion in a particular component of the prewar decision-making process—competitive intelligence analysis—contributed to intelligence failure in the Iraq case. This upstream focus on the communication practices responsible for generating flawed intelligence stands to complement rhetorical studies that explain downstream dynamics of how official speeches and media coverage framed popular understanding of the intelligence once it began circulating in channels of public deliberation.[21]

In comparing competitive intelligence analysis exercises to academic debating contests, I do not mean to suggest that the two activities are precisely analogous, or that academic debating represents a kind of dialectical gold standard against which other forms of argumentation can be judged. Rather, my work is motivated by the more modest objective outlined in G. Thomas Goodnight's call for a "reunion of argumentation and debate theory," where forensic practice serves as a reservoir of applied experience supporting critique of argumentative discourse circulating in other contexts.[22] Specifically, I deploy a critical framework that enables thick description and evaluation of what Joseph Wenzel calls argument as "procedure"—a "cooperative method for making critical decisions."[23] To that end, this article examines competitive intelligence analysis as a form of cooperative argumentation, isolating the communicative moves made by participants and evaluating such moves against the benchmark norms of argumentative practice on which such exercises are premised. The original 1976 "Team B" experiment serves as a useful starting point, as this episode lends historical context for understanding more contemporary competitive intelligence exercises featuring several of the same key players (such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz). By tracing argument patterns in the work of more recent Team B entities—the Rumsfeld Commission (1998) and PCTEG/OSP (2001–2003)—the middle sections of this article explore how the dynamics of competitive intelligence analysis have evolved over time and continue to exert a

strong influence on the course of American foreign policy. The conclusion considers how the Team B intelligence coup phenomenon complicates ongoing efforts to achieve meaningful intelligence reform and, if left unaddressed, could ripen conditions for intelligence failure on U.S. policy toward Iran.

Competitive Intelligence Analysis and the Team B Concept

The most infamous competitive intelligence analysis exercise began in 1975, during a period of great turmoil for both the intelligence community and U.S. President Gerald Ford. With the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under siege after bruising congressional hearings on botched covert operations and the Ford administration's conciliatory policy of détente with the Soviet Union becoming a lightning rod for criticism from right-wing hawks, President Ford reshuffled his cabinet on November 3, 1975. In what became known as the "Halloween massacre," Donald Rumsfeld was appointed Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney rose to Chief of Staff, and George H. W. Bush took over as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Shortly thereafter, DCI Bush approved a novel study of Soviet Cold War strategy. In this exercise, a "Team A" group of "insider" analysts, drawn from the ranks of the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was presented with classified intelligence data and asked to generate an assessment of the Soviet Union's strategic military objectives. Another group, comprised of academics, retired military officers, and other "outsiders," was designated "Team B" and tasked to generate its own independent assessment by sifting through the same data set. Advocates of the competitive analysis exercise suggested that by engaging in dialectical clash, the competing groups could push each other to improve the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) process and produce a more accurate assessment of Soviet strategic military objectives.[24] The notion that constructive disagreement and debate among analysts could sharpen intelligence assessments seems benign, until one considers how the idea was put into practice.

During the exercise, Team A and Team B reached dramatically different conclusions regarding the Soviet military threat. While Team A largely reproduced the trajectory of analysis featured in previous NIEs, Team B argued that these NIEs "substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope and implicit threat."[25] Specifically, in formulating its predictions Team B looked beyond "hard" evidence of Soviet military capabilities and focused more on "soft" evidence derived from perceptions regarding Soviet intentions. This methodological difference yielded dramatically more alarmist estimations of Soviet military spending, bomber production, anti-ballistic missile capability, and technical progress in non-acoustic anti-submarine engineering. The split on this latter issue is telling. While Team A saw little risk of Soviet breakout in anti-submarine warfare capability, as Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados point out, "Team B's failure to find a Soviet non-acoustic anti-submarine system was evidence that there could well be one."[26] According to the Team B report, even though no hard intelligence data existed to establish extant

Soviet capability in this area, "the implication could be that the Soviets have, in fact, deployed some operational non-acoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few years."[27]

The gulf between the two assessments is understandable in light of the fact that Team B was stacked with military hard-liners. In addition to Richard Pipes, key B-Teamers included William von Cleave, Daniel Graham, Paul Nitze, and Paul Wolfowitz, several of whom were holdovers from the influential Committee on the Present Danger, an ideological pressure group that succeeded in implementing many extremist planks of NSC-68 (the blueprint for U.S. Cold War defense) during the 1950s.[28] As a general matter, this wide difference of opinion between the competing teams need not have jeopardized the integrity of the exercise. In fact, one of the great strengths of the debate process is that its cooperative *telos* encourages interlocutors to participate constructively even when argumentation unfolds across multiple axes of difference.[29] However, Team B participants departed from Ehninger and Brockriede's normative guideline of "full and fair competition" in the debate process. As CIA official Sidney Graybeal reflected, "it was like putting Walt Whitman High versus the Redskins. I watched poor GS-13s and -14s [middle-level analysts] subjected to ridicule by Pipes and Nitze. They were browbeating the poor analysts. Team B was not constructive."[30] According to former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, while the ideological bent of Team B members fueled their advocacy, it was also a key factor that contributed to the eventual failure of the competitive analysis exercise:

> Team B was composed of outsiders with a right-wing ideological bent. The intention was to promote competition by polarizing the teams. It failed. The CIA teams, knowing that the outsiders on B would take extreme views, tended to do the same in self-defense. When B felt frustrated over its inability to prevail, one of its members leaked much of the secret material of the proceedings to the press.[31]

In the official CIA history of the episode, Donald Steury writes that "the B-Team abandoned the formula agreed upon for the experiment, in favor of a detailed critique of the assumptions and methodologies that underlay strategic forces NIEs produced over the previous decade or so."[32] Former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline labeled the exercise a "subversion" of the official estimative process by a "kangaroo court of outside critics all picked from one point of view."[33] B-Teamers such as Graham exerted extraordinary "peer pressure" on CIA analysts to slant their intelligence findings,[34] while fellow panelists including George Keegan colored media coverage and primed public fear of the Soviet Union with selective leaks of alarmist and uncoordinated data.[35]

Richard Lehman, former Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence, comments that Team B members "were leaking all over the place . . . putting together this inflammatory document."[36] The practice of strategically leaking incendiary bits of intelligence to journalists, before final judgments were reached in the competitive intelligence exercise, constituted another departure from Ehninger and Brockriede's guidelines for "decision by debate." Here, Team B members stepped out of their roles as "contending parties" to the dispute and acted

as adjudicators, judging their own analyses to be sufficiently correct as to warrant early and unauthorized release to public spheres of deliberation, prior to formal completion of the competitive intelligence exercise. This maneuver undermined the cooperative dynamic of argumentation, complicating greatly the challenge of producing a coordinated intelligence product that would reflect the outcome of constructive exchange between the competing panels.

Team B's hijacking of the argumentative process had lasting effects on public opinion and U.S. Cold War policy. According to Senator Gary Hart (D-CO),

> The Pro-B Team leak and public attack on the conclusions of the NIE represent but one element in a series of leaks and other statements which have been aimed as fostering a "worst case" view for the public of the Soviet threat. In turn, this view of the Soviet threat is used to justify new weapons systems.[37]

The leaks roused the Committee on the Present Danger from its Vietnam-era doldrums, giving the organization a platform to bully advocates of superpower détente into submission. According to Hart, the Team B exercise "did not promote dissent. To the contrary, it intimidated and stifled the expression of more balanced estimates of the Soviet threat."[38] Ironically, all of this took place while the Soviet empire continued to crumble and Team B's alarmist prognostications about Kremlin Backfire bomber production, antimissile research, and military spending were being disproved on the ground:

> In retrospect, Team B's conclusions were wildly off the mark. Describing the Soviet Union, in 1976, as having "a large and expanding Gross National Product," it predicted that it would modernize and expand its military at an awesome pace. For example, it predicted that the Backfire bomber "probably will be produced in substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by early 1984." In fact, the Soviets had 235 in 1984.[39]

The 1976 Team B episode began as a novel experiment in competitive intelligence analysis, premised on the value of cooperative argumentation as a mechanism for improving the accuracy of coordinated National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet military power. As the experiment unfolded, however, Team B members left the spirit of cooperation behind, using selective leaks of classified intelligence to build public support for their ideological (and exaggerated) assessments of Soviet military strength. The resulting historical record presents a vivid illustration of how the techniques of heavy-handed argumentation and selective leaking can transform a competitive intelligence exercise into a Team B intelligence coup.

Team B Returns

After the fall of the Berlin wall, commentators wrote glowingly about the Team B episode and called periodically during the Clinton administration for follow-on exercises in competitive intelligence analysis. As defense analyst Frank Gaffney opined in 1990, "now is the time for a new Team B and a clear-eyed assessment of the abiding Soviet (and other) challenges that dictate a continued, robust U.S. defense

posture."[40] Similarly, *New York Times* columnist William Safire urged in 1994 that "a prestigious Team B" be formed "to suggest an alternative Russia policy to Mr. Clinton."[41] From his academic post at Johns Hopkins University in 1996, Wolfowitz restated the rationale for using dialectical argumentation as a tool of intelligence assessment:

> The idea that somehow you are saving work for the policymaker by eliminating serious debate is wrong. Why not aim, instead, at a document that actually says there are two strongly argued positions on the issue? Here are the facts and evidence supporting one position, and here are the facts and evidence supporting the other, even though that might leave the poor policymakers to make a judgment as to which one they think is correct.[42]

Wolfowitz soon found himself in position to act on such suggestions when he was tapped to join the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, a panel of intelligence community "outsiders," chaired by another major player in the original 1976 Team B exercise, Donald Rumsfeld.[43] In a replay of Cold War history, the Rumsfeld Commission was set up by military hard-liners to challenge CIA estimates of foreign military threats. In congressional hearings convened to discuss the release of the commission's report in July 1998, Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC) reflected on how the Team B legacy colored the Republican argument for establishment of the commission:

> When I was working on the commission charter back in 1996, my efforts were repeatedly resisted by senior Administration officials who argued that taking a "Team B" approach to the issue of the ballistic missile threat was not needed and would prove unproductive. I am glad I did not listen, because once again, competitive intelligence assessments have proven to be essential to the identification of problems.[44]

It is understandable why Republicans such as Spence were pleased with the Rumsfeld Commission's report. It directly indicted the official intelligence community's more conservative assessments of the ballistic missile threat posed to the United States, by implying that nations such as Iran and North Korea were only five years away from developing multi-staged intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of threatening the U.S. homeland with unconventional weaponry.[45] Such findings unleashed a wave of bureaucratic momentum behind the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, a key facet of the Republican party's foreign policy agenda. In public spheres of deliberation, activist Phyllis Schlafly observed that Rumsfeld's report "provided Congress with enough talking points to win the argument [on missile defense] both in the strategic arena and in the 20-second soundbite television debates."[46] Just as the original Team B laid the political foundation for Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s,[47] the Rumsfeld Commission paved the way for the Republican full-scale push for BMD during the late 1990s.[48]

Other parallels indicate an emerging trend. The Rumsfeld Commission's dire predictions turned out to be false alarms, just as many of the threat assessments provided by the original Team B were eventually exposed as exaggerations. As former

State Department intelligence officer Greg Thielmann observes, "time has proven Rumsfeld's predictions dead wrong."[49] The Rumsfeld Commission's five-year time-table for North Korea and Iran to develop ICBMs by 2003 worked as a convenient political tool for missile defense advocates in 1998, but today it is apparent that such predictions were based on fundamental errors in intelligence assessment.[50]

This second case study shows that by 1998, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had honed the art of intelligence manipulation through use of competitive intelligence analysis. Retrospective assessments revealing serious flaws in the Team B work products came long after political officials had already converted the alarmist reports into political support for favored military policies.

Team B Sweeps the Series

Smoke was still billowing out of the Pentagon on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, when Rumsfeld began pondering how the suicide airline attacks might enable the United States to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. According to notes taken by his staff, Rumsfeld wondered whether the 9/11 disaster would allow the United States to "hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] @ same time—not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]."[51] Cheney, Wolfowitz, and other "Vulcans," influential White House advisors who had long envisioned war with Iraq as the centerpiece of a bold gambit to reshape the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape, shared Rumsfeld's proclivities.[52]

However, the post-9/11 strategy of folding Iraq into the nascent "war on terrorism" was confounded by official intelligence community reporting that found a dearth of credible evidence linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist organizations of global reach such as al-Qaida. It was in this context that British intelligence chief Sir Richard Dearlove visited the U.S. for meetings where the possibility of war against Iraq was discussed. Regarding developments in Washington, Dearlove briefed Prime Minister Tony Blair on July 23, 2002,

> [T]here was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.[53]

One strategy Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Pentagon deputy Douglas Feith deployed to "fix" the intelligence was to create a Team B-type "Iraqi intelligence cell" within the Pentagon. This cell, the PCTEG, was tasked to study policy implications of connections between terrorist organizations.[54] As George Packer notes, the PCTEG concept "went all the way back to 1976 and Team B, the group of CIA-appointed outside experts, including Wolfowitz, that had come to much more alarmist conclusions about the Soviets than the intelligence agencies."[55] Initially, Wolfowitz and Feith staffed PCTEG with Michael Maloof and David Wurmser, two colleagues Feith knew from working on the 1996 "Clean Break" report that called for preventive war against Iraq to bolster Israeli security.[56]

In October 2001, Maloof and Wurmser set up shop in a small room on the third floor of the Pentagon, where they went to work developing a "matrix" that charted connections between terrorist organizations and their support infrastructures. Since both men had security clearance, they were able to draw data from raw and finished intelligence products available through the Pentagon's classified computer system. Sometimes, when they were denied access to the most sensitive material through this channel, Maloof returned to his previous office, where he could download more data. "We scoured what we could get up to the secret level, but we kept getting blocked when we tried to get more sensitive materials," Maloof recounted. "I would go back to my office, do a pull and bring it in."[57] As Packer explains the B-Team's *modus operandi*: "Wurmser and Maloof were working deductively, not inductively: The premise was true; facts would be found to confirm it."[58]

Early PCTEG work included a critical review of a CIA report entitled *Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship*. In its critique, PCTEG lauded the CIA report for mentioning numerous pieces of evidence linking Iraq to al-Qaida, but noted disappointingly that the force of these citations was blunted by "attempts to discredit, dismiss, or downgrade much of this reporting, resulting in inconsistent conclusions in many instances." PCTEG advised policy-makers to overlook such equivocation and dismiss the CIA's guarded conclusions, recommending that "the CIA report ought to be read for content only—and *CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored*."[59]

It was 1976 redux, with the same players deploying competitive intelligence analysis to sweep away policy obstacles presented by inconvenient CIA threat assessments. As defense analysts Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon observe, "several members of George W. Bush's inner circle had established themselves as perennial critics of the nation's intelligence community. The roots of this disdain stretched back at least as far as the mid-1970s."[60] Only this time, unlike 1976, they were firmly entrenched in the corridors of power. Control over the levers of White House bureaucracy enabled Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to embed a Team B entity within the administration itself. The stage was set for a new kind of Team B intelligence exercise—a stealth coup staged by one arm of the government against the other.

The coup began to take shape on July 22, 2002, when a PCTEG staffer sent an email reporting that a senior advisor to Wolfowitz had told an assistant that he wanted him "to prepare an intel briefing on Iraq and links to al-Qaida for the SecDef and that he was not to tell anyone about it."[61] PCTEG went secretly to work, supplementing its earlier critique of the CIA's *Murky Relationship* report by drawing on "both raw and finished IC [intelligence community] products."[62]

Government entities such as PCTEG are able to access raw intelligence data because of recent efforts to improve "connectivity"—meaning that policy officials can "connect" directly to the data streams that flow through intelligence community channels. As former CIA analyst James Steiner notes,

> [B]ecause most senior policymakers and their staffs now have access to raw reporting and finished intelligence on their desktops, they are less reliant on

traditional analytic centers at CIA, DIA, and State to tell them what the massive body of intelligence reporting means.[63]

The original 1976 Team B exercise needed formal approval to get off the ground. Today, connectivity enables policy-makers and their staff to tap the classified intelligence community data stream by clicking a switch in a SCIF (Secure Compartmented Information Facility).

Operating largely independently of the intelligence community, PCTEG used this method to assemble its own intelligence findings and produce briefing slides that were presented to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002.[64] One slide read, "Summary of Known Iraq–al-Qaida Contacts, 1990–2002," and included a controversial item: "2001: Prague IIS [Iraq Intelligence Service] Chief al-Ani meets with Mohammed Atta in April." A slide later in the presentation developed this incendiary claim (see Figure 1), asserting that during one visit, Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani ordered a colleague to "issue funds to Atta," and that "several workers at Prague airport identified Atta." These data points were not corroborated by official intelligence analysis. As *Newsweek*'s Mark Hosenball reports,

> [F]our former senior intel officials who monitored investigations into Atta's alleged Iraqi contacts say they never heard the airport anecdote. One official (all asked not to be named while discussing intel issues) says intel analysts had "rejected" the anecdote about al-Ani's giving Atta money.[65]


Figure 1. Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group briefing slide. Declassified government document reprinted in "9/11: A Special White House Slide Show," *Newsweek*, January 4, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10663343/site/newsweek/

A "findings" slide in the PCTEG briefing summed up the Iraq–al-Qaida relationship as "More than a decade of numerous contacts ... Multiple areas of cooperation ... Shared interest and pursuit of WMD ... [and] some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11." As James Bamford observes, "the Wurmser intelligence unit would pluck selective bits and pieces of a thread from a giant ball of yarn and weave them together in a frightening tapestry."[66] However, since the PCTEG officials lacked formal training in the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, their work products were about as sophisticated as "a high school biology student's reading of a CAT scan."[67]

Another slide entitled, "Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information" took direct aim at "Team A" assessments (see Figure 2). Here, the PCTEG faulted official intelligence analysts for their use of "juridical evidence" standards, and, borrowing a refrain from the 1976 Team B report, criticized the intelligence community for its "consistent underestimation" of efforts by Iraq and al-Qaida to hide their relationship, contending that "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."[68] The original Team B logic that curiously turned a lack of intelligence data on Soviet acoustic technology into proof of possible U.S.S.R.


Figure 2. Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group briefing slide. Declassified government document reprinted in "9/11: A Special White House Slide Show," *Newsweek*, January 4, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10663343/site/newsweek/

antisubmarine warfare breakout capability had returned, this time to bolster the case for preventive war against Iraq.

Following the briefing, Wolfowitz sent an encouraging note to the PCTEG staffers:

> That was an excellent briefing. The Secretary was very impressed. He asked us to think about some possible next steps to see if we can illuminate the differences between us and CIA. The goal is not to produce a consensus product, but rather to scrub one another's arguments.[69]

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's institutional support for the ongoing competitive intelligence activity was framed in the logic of cooperative argumentation. However, the limits of institutional commitment to those norms became apparent on August 15, 2002, when the PCTEG team gave its briefing again, this time for DCI Tenet and CIA analysts. Tellingly, this briefing *did not include* the slide criticizing the intelligence community for "consistent underestimation" by using "juridical evidence" standards. This was a crucial exclusion, given Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's justification that the dialectical exchange should work as a forum for competing analysts to "scrub one another's arguments."

Tenet faced a double whammy—an independent Pentagon cell beyond his control was undermining the integrity of his intelligence analysis in top policy circles, and the cell denied him the chance to respond by concealing the attack. As Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) explains,

> [T]he differences between the judgments of the IC [intelligence community] and the DOD policy office [PCTEG] might have been addressed by a discussion between the IC and DOD of underlying assumptions and the credibility and reliability of sources of raw intelligence reports. However, the IC never had the opportunity to defend its analysis, nor point out problems with DOD's "alternative" view of the Iraq–al Qaeda relationship when it was presented to the policymakers at the White House.[70]

Levin spells out the upshot: "Unbeknownst to the IC [intelligence community], policymakers were getting information that was inconsistent with, and thus undermined, the professional judgments of the IC experts. The changes included information that was dubious, misrepresented, or of unknown import."[71]

PCTEG's omission of the "Fundamental Problems" slide from the August 15, 2002 briefing raises serious questions about the genuineness of the Pentagon's commitment to legitimate competitive intelligence analysis in this case, since it is obviously difficult to have a frank and productive dialectical exchange when one side withholds its most powerful argument—here a frontal assault on the A Team's analytical methodology (recall Ehninger and Brockriede's dictum that the process of critical debate obliges interlocutors to "test each view by seeing how well it withstands the strongest attacks an informed opponent levels against it").[72]

With the incendiary slide removed, it is not surprising that Tenet said he "didn't see anything that broke any new ground" in the PCTEG briefing.[73] Although Tenet did agree to postpone release of the CIA's new report—*Iraq and Terrorism*—to give

time for PCTEG staffers to confer again with official intelligence analysts, the analysts who subsequently met with the Team B briefers were unmoved.

In response to this setback, the PCTEG sought to buttress the Bush administration's case for war by redoubling its "stovepiping" efforts. In intelligence parlance, stovepiping involves the inappropriate transmission of raw information to intelligence consumers. This transmission occurs through channels that circumvent institutionalized vetting procedures used to validate and coordinate intelligence assessments amongst the intelligence community's numerous institutional entities producing official reporting. While Tenet held back release of the new CIA report on Iraq's ties to terrorism, the Pentagon intelligence cell turned around and stovepiped its incendiary findings directly to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Vice President Chief of Staff Lewis Libby in a September 16, 2002 briefing that pre-empted release of the CIA report by two days. According to an internal memorandum, "the briefing went very well and generated further interest from Mr. Hadley and Mr. Libby," who requested a number of items, including a "chronology of Atta's travels."[74]

Two aspects of the Hadley/Libby briefing deserve careful attention. First, the "Fundamental Problems" slide criticizing CIA interpretive methodology curiously reappeared. Second, DCI Tenet was not aware that the briefing even took place until March 2004, when members of Congress informed him during hearings on Capitol Hill.[75] Tenet's testy response reflected one of the most daunting challenges facing the leader of the intelligence community in an era when the "red line" separating policy-makers and official intelligence analysts is continuously eroded by connectivity. As one group of former intelligence officers observed,

> [T]his increased intelligence/policy proximity, combined with revolutionary growth in information management capacity and data mining tools, has given today's policymaker the capability to conduct his or her own fairly sophisticated analysis, independent of the traditional intelligence analysis prepared, vetted, and presented by CIA, DIA, and INR.[76]

According to Thielmann, these developments "greatly facilitate intelligence cherry picking, enabling policy officials to generate any kind of report through word searches that look juicy, no matter what the intelligence officials might say."[77]

The PCTEG case shows how connectivity ripens bureaucratic conditions for Team B intelligence coups. Policy-makers and their aides can informally access secure intelligence community databases and use powerful data mining techniques to cherry-pick intelligence. They can then bolster the persuasive power of such data by packaging them as "talking points" that carry the patina of finished intelligence assessments. The credibility of such B-Teamed intelligence can be bolstered further by stovepiping—funneling the data directly to policy-makers, skirting peer review institutionalized in the official intelligence community. Stovepiping turns a competitive intelligence exercise into a Team B coup, something qualitatively different from an exchange of competing viewpoints (recall Grice's "cooperative

principle") designed to simply "sharpen the debate" or "scrub the arguments" among contending intelligence entities.[78]

Strong evidence indicates that such informal B-Teaming activity was rife within the Bush administration during the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, at the State Department, Undersecretary of State John Bolton pressed hard for his political staff to get electronic access to Top Secret Secure Compartmented Information.[79] Additionally, it appears that by August 2002, the small PCTEG cell had evolved into a more elaborate Pentagon entity, the Office of Special Plans (OSP). The manager of the OSP operation, Abram Shulsky, was familiar with competitive intelligence analysis, having worked on the staff of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that reviewed the original Team B exercise during the Cold War. Shulsky's cell stovepiped dubious intelligence purchased from Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress to senior administration officials, fundamentally distorting policy-making on topics ranging from the threat of Saddam Hussein's nuclear program to the cost of postwar reconstruction in Iraq.[80] According to Kenneth Pollack,

> The Bush officials who created the OSP gave its reports directly to those in the highest level of government, often passing raw, unverified intelligence straight to the Cabinet level as gospel. Senior Administration officials made public statements based on these reports—reports that the larger intelligence community knew to be erroneous.[81]

Commenting on how the stovepipe phenomenon contributed to flawed decision-making, Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim suggest:

> The [stovepipe] metaphor is apt, for it suggests not only the rapid elevation of materials from the kitchen of intelligence gathering to the higher regions of policymaking but also the fact that what comes out of the stovepipe is smoke—not hard data and carefully processed analyses but smoke, propaganda, informational pollution.[82]

While such stovepiping practices are difficult to square with the basic philosophy of sound competitive intelligence analysis, they reflect Wolfowitz's views on the need for new approaches to managing the intelligence–policy seam in the post-9/11 security milieu. In 2002 congressional testimony, Wolfowitz suggested,

> [W]e must also accelerate the speed with which information is passed to policymakers and operators. We cannot wait for critical intelligence to be processed, coordinated, edited and approved—we must accept the risks inherent in posting critical information before it is processed.[83]

In a concrete manifestation of this normative guideline, PCTEG's breakaway from the established intelligence community jettisoned the dialectical checks built into the competitive intelligence assessment process and shut down constructive dialogue within the intelligence community prior to Operation Iraq Freedom. Despite the fact that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is supposed to be an "all source" agency, with access to the full range of intelligence materials circulating throughout the U.S. government, INR's Thielmann says, "I didn't know about its [PCTEG's] existence. They were cherry picking intelligence and packaging it

for Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to take to the president. That's the kind of rogue operation that peer review is intended to prevent."[84]

Coup-proofing Competitive Intelligence Analysis

The competitive intelligence exercises examined in the preceding sections each had major policy impacts, although the intelligence data produced by all three Team B panels eventually proved to be spectacularly wrong. Despite this, it would be a hasty generalization to conclude that in the world of intelligence analysis, competition is sure-fire recipe for failure. Indeed, the concept of competitive analysis remains a central feature of the official intelligence community's *modus operandi*. Consider that the 2002 NIE on Iraq was shaped by input from six official intelligence entities within the federal bureaucracy, with some agencies providing sharp dissents that were included in the final draft forwarded to the president.[85] As Tenet notes, the NIE "is an open and vigorous process that allows for dissent to be registered by individual agencies in the final product. Indeed, alternative views are encouraged."[86] In fact, this commitment to dialectical exchange within Team A produced an NIE that "was heavily qualified with caveats about some of its more important conclusions about Iraq's illicit weapons programs," even though these caveats were largely stripped from prewar public arguments made by Bush administration officials.[87]

A decision to allow independent Team B entities from outside the official intelligence community to participate in this dialectical process need not *necessarily* compromise the integrity of intelligence analysis, which is already competitive by nature.[88] Problems arise, however, when Team B panels, created under the guise of competitive intelligence exercises, circumvent the dialectical process by strategically withholding assessments, stovepiping reports directly to policy-makers, and leaking uncoordinated, alarmist data to media sources. When intelligence agencies act in this manner, they undermine the constructive goals of competitive analysis and stage Team B intelligence coups.

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, both veterans of the original Team B exercise in 1976, have honed the political art of using Team B intelligence coups to control public argument and drive policy formulation for nearly 30 years. Under the façade of legitimate competitive intelligence analysis, they have worked with outlier intelligence panels to generate alarmist threat data sufficient to manipulate public discussion and pave the way for hawkish foreign policy outcomes including the derailment of détente with the Soviet Union,[89] disruption of the SALT arms control process,[90] massive funding for SDI,[91] ABM Treaty withdrawal,[92] and, most recently, a preventive war of choice against Iraq.[93] Whatever the merit of these policies, the fact that they were formulated with flawed intelligence data generated by Team B entities is disconcerting.

Remarkably, this historical record has been largely excluded from official investigations conducted to explain the prewar intelligence failure on Iraq. In limiting the scope of their probes to the official intelligence community, the Silberman-Robb Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

overlooked the role that Team B intelligence activity played in contributing to intelligence failure. The potential danger of this blind spot is compounded by the fact that at the same time that the Team B intelligence coup phenomenon remains understudied, blue-ribbon commissions call for *more* competitive intelligence analysis as a bulwark against future intelligence failures. Consider this recommendation from the Silberman-Robb Commission: "The Community should institute a formal system for competitive—and even explicitly contrarian—analysis. Such groups must be licensed to be troublesome."[94] As senior CIA official John Kringen explains, this recommendation has been institutionalized:

> Our newest analysts—and all first-line supervisors—also have completed classes on alternative analysis and other analytic techniques. . . . We have established analytic tradecraft units across the directorate, including the office drafting our WMD assessments, that promote the use of alternative and competitive analysis techniques.[95]

Indeed, it appears that the intelligence community is attempting to refurbish its analytic tradecraft by hitching its wagons to the heuristic engines of argumentation and debate. Such efforts are being propelled not only by recommendations from official committees and legislative decrees, but also by expert commentary. Consider Douglas Hart and Steven Simon's proposition that one major cause of the intelligence community's misjudgments on Iraq was "poor argumentation and analysis within the intelligence directorate." As a remedy, Hart and Simon recommend that intelligence agencies encourage analysts to engage in "structured arguments and dialogues" designed to facilitate "sharing and expression of multiple points of view" and cultivate "critical thinking skills."[96]

As the preceding case studies suggest, however, any analytical benefits flowing from this redoubled commitment to argumentation skill building within the official intelligence community can be washed out if the underlying dynamics that enable Team B intelligence coups remain unaddressed. After all, the official intelligence community assessments on each issue examined in this article (Soviet military power, foreign ballistic missile capability, and Iraq's ties to al-Qaida) eventually proved more accurate than those generated by Team B entities. Yet by operating outside of official intelligence community channels, B-Teamers were still able to shape policy decisions with flawed assessments.

This historical context may provide valuable reference points for political decision-makers facing future choices about whether to approve proposals for competitive intelligence analysis exercises that include actors from outside the official intelligence community. One notable aspect of the historical record in this regard is that proposals for competitive intelligence exercises are difficult to assess at face value. What begins as a seemingly benign debate to "scrub the arguments" can quickly evolve into a politicized campaign to manipulate public opinion. Hence it may be prudent for decision-makers to greet calls for the establishment of new Team B panels with healthy skepticism. Given that A-Team deliberative processes are already designed to encourage competitive analysis amongst the numerous agencies that

make up the official intelligence community, arguments that Team B panels should be convened merely to provide an incremental benefit in the form of a "fresh look at data" deserve particular scrutiny.

Upstream Remedies

Perhaps Team B advocates should be required to overcome a rebuttable presumption that analytical processes within Team A already provide for robust debate. Such a burden of proof would force Team B proponents to isolate specific shortcomings in Team A assessment procedures that cultivate "groupthink"—weaknesses that invite intelligence errors born from a lack of exposure to critical ideas.[97] Using this standard, only those competitive intelligence proposals that clearly met this burden of proof would be pursued. If improvement of deliberative processes within official intelligence circles was seriously endorsed as the central principle guiding Team B interventions, more robust deliberative standards for competitive intelligence analysis might emerge.

Preparatory dialogues of this sort hold promise as tools to bolster normative checks against Team B intelligence coups by locking in the deliberative norms that govern competitive intelligence exercises before they begin. It is more difficult to imagine Team B panelists engaging in brazen stovepiping if a condition of their participation in competitive intelligence analysis was fidelity to deliberative standards (such as Ehninger and Brockriede's or van Eemeren and Grootendorst's) that are designed to facilitate critical discussion and debate, regardless of the outcome of such deliberation.

Of course, there is no guarantee that outside analysts will honor such deliberative commitments once competitive intelligence analysis exercises get underway. This is why real-time oversight of Team B activities is essential. As the person charged with overall responsibility for intelligence gathering and analysis, new National Director of Intelligence (NDI) John Negroponte would seem well-placed to coordinate oversight efforts in this context. Indeed, Negroponte's predecessor as leader of the intelligence community, George Tenet, seemed to embrace this very responsibility during his Georgetown University speech in February 2004. In response to a question about OSP's stovepiping activities, Tenet insisted, "I can tell you with certainty that the president of the United States gets his intelligence from one person and one community: me."[98] Yet Tenet sounded much less confident during March 2004 congressional testimony, when he admitted that prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom he was unaware of private prewar intelligence briefings conducted by OSP's Douglas Feith for Cheney, and that he never pressed the issue of "whether the Department of Defense Policy Office run by Mr. Feith might be bypassing normal intelligence community channels."[99]

Tenet's troubles raise questions about the ability of NDI Negroponte to coup-proof the competitive intelligence analysis process. Connectivity enables a form of B-Teaming that is difficult to detect and control, especially in real time. Ironically, this dilemma could become even more daunting if the 9/11 Commission's recommenda-

tions for more classified data sharing result in increased intelligence community connectivity for policy-making staffs.[100] A near-term test of Negroponte's effectiveness on this count may involve public deliberation on the proper policy response to Iran's nuclear program. In 2005, the intelligence community completed a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear capability. That estimate, reflecting the consensus view of all official U.S. intelligence agencies, forecasts that even with a full-scale effort that does not encounter significant technical obstacles, "Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before 'early to mid-next decade.'"[101] This finding conflicts with statements that Iran's atomic bomb program is "very advanced and near completion, so that they might soon perform a nuclear test."[102] This latter statement, from Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), is based on unofficial, uncoordinated intelligence passed to Weldon by an anonymous Iranian informant that Weldon identifies as "Ali."

The wide discrepancy between the worst-case NIE timeline of 5–10 years and the Weldon/Ali imminent acquisition scenario should provide rhetorical leverage for interlocutors to argue that advocates of quick-trigger force must acknowledge that their assertions regarding the imminence of the Iranian nuclear threat are Team B assessments rife with uncertainty. Such yellow-light admissions may be pivotal in slowing down the momentum of a drive for preventive war and winning more time for the type of preventive nonproliferation diplomacy that Alexander Montgomery suggests can work to minimize possible security threats stemming from Iran's nuclear program.[103] As David Albright and Corey Hinderstein argue,

> [E]stimates of Iran's nuclear capabilities, accomplishments, and timelines need far greater public and Congressional scrutiny than they are currently receiving. This scrutiny becomes even more important as those in the Bush Administration who favor confronting Iran and pressing for regime change may be hyping up Iran's nuclear threat and trying to undermine intelligence assessments that Iran is several years from having nuclear weapons.[104]

In February 2006 congressional testimony, DNI Negroponte reaffirmed the consensus intelligence community timeline, stating that "if it continues on its current path . . . [Iran] will likely have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon within the next decade."[105] Negroponte's ability to defend this timeline against Team B assessments generated from competitive intelligence exercises may emerge as a key factor determining the pacing of arguments for possible military strikes against Iran.

Downstream Remedies

The preceding "upstream" remedies focus on prudent measures taken early in the policy-making process to reduce the likelihood of Team B intelligence coups from occurring in the first place. But there are also "downstream" solutions with the potential to ameliorate distortions in public debate should Team B panels disregard norms of critical discussion and attempt to manipulate public deliberation. This category of remedy boils down to policy-makers, journalists, and citizens embracing

the principle of *caveat emptor* (buyer beware) when it comes to using intelligence data produced by Team B entities.[106]

At a most basic level, consumers of Team B intelligence data should bear in mind that, however convincingly such materials are presented, they are likely to be controversial. In fact, Team B findings may only be noteworthy to the extent that they contravene conventional wisdom within the official intelligence community. For example, the alarming predictions of Soviet military spending patterns made by the 1976 Team B panel were generated by embracing very controversial assumptions regarding Soviet plans for world conquest that were not shared by CIA analysts. The Rumsfeld Commission's ominous estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. were made possible by a worst-case proliferation model that was rejected by both the official intelligence community and an earlier team of outside analysts. Numerous professional intelligence analysts and agencies dismissed the main sources for PCTEG and OSP's analysis of the Iraqi threat.

These controversial subtexts shed important light on the probative value of intelligence data produced by Team B panels, since the credibility of such data is tied to subsidiary judgments on frequently contentious assumptions undergirding intelligence analysis. The more these controversial subtexts can be made transparent, the more consumers of intelligence will be able to resist attempts by Team B entities to manipulate public deliberation. Journalists have an important role to play here. Rather than reporting Team B intelligence findings as presumptive facts, it would be more informative to frame them against the subtexts of controversy that produce differing intelligence assessments in competitive analysis exercises. Doing so might enable consumers to discount appropriately the credibility of judgments coming from Team B entities that generate assessments using highly politicized analytical assumptions.

While the elaborate classification laws designed to protect confidential "sources and methods" of intelligence gathering often make it difficult for citizens to participate in public debates on the credibility of specific intelligence *sources*, it may be easier to enter public dialogue at the level of intelligence *analysis*. Consider the example of Vice President Cheney's claim on March 16, 2003 that upon invading Iraq, U.S. forces would be "greeted as liberators."[107] Hindsight reveals that this important claim was not based on any coordinated intelligence analysis conducted by authorized experts in the U.S. intelligence community, but rather on unofficial defector testimony stovepiped to Cheney by Iraqi National Congress chief Ahmad Chalabi.[108] One could imagine a series of questions posed to Cheney during the *Meet the Press* appearance where he made this statement:

- *Is your claim that U.S. forces will be "greeted as liberators" personal opinion, or is it based on coordinated intelligence analysis?* (Since arguments for war based on personal conjecture have marginal appeal, this question establishes a burden of proof on the interlocutor to outline a specific intelligence analysis underwriting the substantive claim in question.)

- *On what basis do you judge the credibility of intelligence analysis supporting your claim that U.S. forces will be "greeted as liberators"?* (This question isolates the credibility of the relevant intelligence analyses as a topic of deliberation.)
- *Have agencies of the U.S. intelligence community conducted any official analyses that assess the strength of intelligence data backing your claim that U.S. forces will be "greeted as liberators"?* (This question opens discussion of the stovepiping possibility, couched in a way that can proceed without the interlocutor necessarily being forced to reveal "sources and methods.")

In future settings, deliberators might adapt variants of the above questions as creative tools to focus public discussion on the origins and strength of intelligence analyses backing claims for war (or the fact that supporting intelligence analysis is absent). These lines of argument eschew *ad hominem* attacks and focus instead on bringing the substance of specific details regarding the nature of intelligence *analysis* (not necessarily specific *sources*) to the surface of public debate.[109] Such opportunities may come sooner rather than later; as Joseph Cirincione notes regarding the relationship between the Bush administration's approach to Iraq in 2003 and Iran in 2006, "the parallels are striking . . . the unfolding administration strategy appears to be an effort to repeat its successful campaign for the Iraq war."[110] If Cirincione's observation plays out, it will be crucial to track how the pattern of Cheney's "greeted as liberators in Iraq" argument unfolds in the context of fresh justifications for preventive use of force against Iran.

A possible preview of this argument comes from a former defense official who still deals with sensitive issues for the Bush administration. This source told Seymour Hersh that current Pentagon planning for limited military strikes against Iran was premised on a belief that "a sustained bombing campaign in Iran will humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public to rise up and overthrow the government."[111] It remains to be seen whether this assumption actually serves as a guiding premise for the Bush administration's preventive war plans. But if it does, journalists and citizens would be wise to follow the *caveat emptor* principle and insist on learning the origin of intelligence analysis backing up the assumption in question, and whether the official U.S. intelligence community has weighed in on the intelligence assessment supporting the rosy prediction of a jubilant response to American bombing of Iran. Such optimism, reminiscent of 2002 predictions that "liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk,"[112] is contradicted by expert analysis that "outright U.S. hostility [toward Iran] instead of weakening the regime, is more likely to strengthen the die-hard conservatives."[113] Limited bombing, in this view, would enable Iran's ruling clerics to consolidate political power and crush dissent by invoking popular memory of Operation Ajax in 1953, when U.S. and British secret agents conspired to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.[114] Support for this theory comes from unexpected quarters. Reza Pahlavi, whose father was installed as the shah of Iran following the 1953 U.S.–U.K. coup, warned in March 2006 that a military strike against Iran "will rally nationalistic sentiments which will work to the regime's advantage, and consequently, give the theocracy a much longer lease on life."[115] At a

minimum, a thorough vetting of this possibility would raise Michael Walzer's concept of *jus post bellum* (justice in the aftermath of war) as a topic worthy of deliberation prior to the onset of hostilities, something that did not occur in the Iraq case.[116]

Progress in the challenge of coup-proofing competitive intelligence analysis is not only necessary to redeem the 9/11 Commission's promise of improving security by upgrading the quality of intelligence. For the U.S. to regain the credibility it lost as a result of the Iraq "WMD" fiasco, the rest of the world must be convinced that the U.S. government is taking credible measures to address the root causes of intelligence failure. "Iraq is not going to be the last foreign-policy challenge in which we must make choices based on ambiguous evidence," says Pollack. "When the United States confronts future challenges, the exaggerated estimates of Iraq's WMD will loom like an ugly shadow over the diplomatic discussions. . . . The only way that we can regain the world's trust is to demonstrate that we understand our mistakes and have changed our ways."[117]

Notes

[1] United States, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004).

[2] The Sancho Panza reference is made in Anthony Cordesman, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Strengths and Weaknesses*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Issue Briefing, August 2, 2004, http://www.csis.org/features/911commission.pdf, 3 (accessed June 17, 2005).

[3] The "intelligence community" is "a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States." It includes the following entities: Air Force Intelligence; Army Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; Coast Guard Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency; Department of Energy; Department of Homeland Security; Department of State; Department of the Treasury; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Marine Corps Intelligence; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; and Navy Intelligence. See the United States Intelligence Community website, http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members.shtml (accessed May 7, 2006).

[4] See *Congressional Record*, December 7, 2004, pp. H10930–H10993. For background analysis see Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Michael A. Turner, "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18 (2005): 383–97; and Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, "The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18 (2005): 609–37.

[5] Cordesman, *9/11 Commission Report*, 3.

[6] The Silberman-Robb Commission's charge, as spelled out in President Bush's February 6, 2004 executive order, was to investigate the U.S. "intelligence community," which the order defines operationally as the set of official intelligence entities within the U.S. federal government. Notably, intelligence boutiques such as the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and its offshoot entity the Office of Special Plans (OSP) fall outside of this definition and hence were not covered in the commission's report. See United States, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President*, March 2005, http://www.wmd.gov/report/

(accessed April 12, 2005); George W. Bush, Executive Order, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 6, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040206-10.html (accessed March 14, 2004). The scope of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's initial investigation of the Iraq prewar intelligence failure (completed in July 2004) was similarly circumscribed, focusing only on activities within the official intelligence community. A "Phase II" component of that investigation was scheduled to probe PCTEG and OSP's role in the intelligence failure, but it proved extremely difficult for the committee to complete work on this portion of its investigation. One major sticking point involved access to documents and witnesses related to the intelligence activity of Pentagon deputy Douglas Feith and others associated with PCTEG and OSP. Democrats pushed for information on these subjects, but were denied by committee chairperson Senator Pat Roberts (R-KA). See United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq*, July 7, 2004, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf (accessed July 21, 2004); Paul Kerr, "Three Years Later, Iraq Investigations Continue," *Arms Control Today* (April 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/iraqinvestcont.asp (accessed April 21, 2006); and Letter by John D. Rockefeller IV, Carl Levin, and Dianne Feinstein to Bill Frist and Harry Reid, November 14, 2005, http://thinkprogress.org/wp-images/upload/intel_letter.pdf (accessed March 16, 2006).

[7]   U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 307.

[8]   Mark M. Lowenthal, *U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 47–9.

[9]   Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 2nd ed. (London: Brassey's, 1993), 80; cf. Kevin P. Stack, "A Negative View of Competitive Analysis," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 10 (Winter 1997–8): 456–64.

[10]   Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (Dordrecht: Foris, 1984); Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-dialectical Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, *Analysing Complex Argumentation: The Reconstruction of Multiple and Coordinatively Compound Argumentation in a Critical Discussion* (Amsterdam: SicSat, 1992).

[11]   Trudy Govier, *A Practical Study of Argument*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992); Ralph H. Johnson, *Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000); and Douglas N. Walton, *Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[12]   Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1969); Charles A. Willard, *A Theory of Argumentation* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1989).

[13]   Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 13. For an earlier rendering of the same set of principles, see Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963), 15; see also Douglas Ehninger, "Decision by Debate: A Re-Examination," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 45 (1959): 282–7; Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, its Limitations and its Uses," *Speech Monographs* 37 (1970): 101–10.

[14]   See Deborah Tannen, *The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue* (New York: Random House, 1998).

[15]   See van Eemeren and Grootendorst, *Speech Acts*, 119–23; Paul Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 28–31.

[16]   Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 80.

[17]   Willard C. Matthias, *America's Strategic Blunders* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

[18] Robert P. Newman, "Communication Pathologies of Intelligence Systems," *Speech Monographs* 42 (1975): 273–90.

[19] Peter R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, "Missing the Plot? Intelligence and Discourse Failure," *Orbis* (Winter 2005): 95–107.

[20] Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29 (Summer 2004): 5–48.

[21] Examples of such "downstream" analyses include Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, *Globalization and Empire: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Free Markets, and the Twilight of Democracy* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2006); G. Thomas Goodnight, "Strategic Doctrine, Public Debate and the Terror War," in *Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy*, ed. William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 93–114; Robert L. Ivie, *Democracy and America's War on Terror* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005); Deepa Kumar, "Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 3 (March 2006): 48–69; and Carol K. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006).

[22] G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Re-Union of Argumentation and Debate Theory," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argument*, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), 415–31.

[23] Joseph W. Wenzel, "Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic," in *Perspectives on Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede*, ed. Janice Schuetz and Robert Trapp (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1990), 9–26.

[24] This Team B exercise tasked three separate groups of outside analysts to assess intelligence in the areas of Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities, Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) accuracy, and Soviet strategic policy and objectives. The exchanges on this latter issue yielded the most divisive and influential argumentation and hence receive the bulk of my critical attention.

[25] United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strategic Objectives, an Alternate View: Report of Team "B"* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976). Declassified September 16, 1992.

[26] Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados, "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49 (April 1993): 22–31.

[27] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Intelligence Community Experiment*.

[28] On the key players responsible for shaping and implementing NSC-68, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); Robert P. Newman, "NSC (National Insecurity) 68: Nitze's Second Hallucination," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, ed. Martin. J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), 55–94; and Steven Casey, "Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950–51," *Diplomatic History* 29 (September 2005): 655–90. Regarding the historical connection between NSC-68 and Team B, see Gordon R. Mitchell and Robert P. Newman, "By 'Any Measures' Necessary: NSC-68 and Cold War Roots of the 2002 National Security Strategy," in Keller and Mitchell, *Hitting First*, 70–90.

[29] For example, see Michael A. Gilbert, *Coalescent Argumentation* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997).

[30] Sidney Graybeal, quoted in Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (College Station, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998), 158.

[31] Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 251.

[32] Donald P. Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), 335.

[33] Ray Cline, quoted in Matthias, *America's Strategic Blunders*, 305–6.

[34] Murray Marder, "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions," *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977, p. A1.

[35] Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), 199–200.

[36] Richard Lehman, quoted in Richard Kovar, "An Interview with Richard Lehman," *Studies in Intelligence* 9 (Summer 2000): http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/summer00/art05.html (accessed June 5, 2003).

[37] Gary Hart, "Separate Opinion," *The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives*, Committee Print, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 8.

[38] Hart, "Separate Opinion," 7.

[39] Fareed Zakaria, "Exaggerating the Threats," *Newsweek*, June 16, 2003, p. 33; see also Cahn, *Killing Détente*, 192–6.

[40] Frank Gaffney, "Second Opinion on Defense," *Washington Times*, May 8, 1990, p. F2.

[41] William Safire, "Needed: A 'Team B,'" *New York Times*, March 10, 1994, p. 25.

[42] Paul Wolfowitz, quoted in Jack Davis, "The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence-policy Relations," *Studies in Intelligence* 39 (1996): http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/davis.htm (accessed July 14, 2003).

[43] I am indebted to Janne Nolan for pointing out that it may be more appropriate to call the Rumsfeld Commission a "Team C," given that it was created after an earlier Team B entity, the Gates Commission on Intelligence Assessments of Ballistic Missile Threats, produced findings that largely corroborated extant CIA estimates of the ballistic missile threat posed to the U.S.

[44] Floyd D. Spence, "Prepared Statement," *Hearing on the Report of the Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, United States House of Representatives, National Security Committee, July 16, 1998, Federal News Service, Lexis-Nexis Congressional Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed August 14, 2004).

[45] Michael Dobbs reports on part of the commission's methodology for generating the five year figure:

> According to commission members, the five-year estimate was based largely on briefings from missile engineers at major U.S. defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The commission asked the American rocket builders how long it would take them to build an ICBM, from the starting point of a Third World country such as Iran.

Michael Dobbs, "How Politics Helped Redefine Threat," *Washington Post*, January 14, 2002, p. A1.

[46] Phyllis Schlafly, "ABM Should Be Republicans' Unifying Issue," *Eagle Forum Column* (November 1998), http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1998/nov98-11-11.html (accessed April 4, 1999).

[47] As Robert Reich observes, "Reagan's decision to emphasize nuclear defense as well as nuclear offense can be seen as growing out of the debate caused by Team B. . . . SDI would not have developed without the arguments embodied in reports like Team B's." Robert C. Reich, "Re-examining the Team A–Team B Exercise," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence* 3 (Fall 1989): 391.

[48] See John Holum's comments in Tom Raum, "GOP, Democrats Agree on Defense," *Associated Press News Feed*, June 29, 1999, Lexis-Nexis All News database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed April 4, 1999).

[49] Greg Thielmann, "Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report that Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy," *Arms Control Today* (July/August 2003): 3.

[50] See Thielmann, "Rumsfeld Reprise?," 3–8.

[51] Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 25.

[52] James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 234–8; Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 264–5; and U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, 335–6.

[53] *Sunday Times* (U.K.), "The Secret Downing Street Memo," May 1, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html (accessed June 3, 2005). According to National Security Archive Senior Fellow John Prados, the Dearlove memo makes clear, "with stunning clarity," that "the goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein was set at least a year in advance," and that "President Bush's repeated assertions that no decision had been made about attacking Iraq were plainly false." John Prados, "Iraq: When was the Die Cast?" *Tom Paine Commentary*, May 3, 2005, http://www.tompaine.com/articles/iraq_when_was_the_ die_cast.php (accessed June 3, 2005).

[54] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 307.

[55] George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005), 106.

[56] Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser, *A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm*, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies Paper, July 8, 1996, http://www.aaiusa.org/news/must_read_feith.htm (accessed August 14, 2004).

[57] Michael Maloof, quoted in James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April 28, 2004, p. A1; see also James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 61–85.

[58] Packer, *Assassins' Gate*, 107.

[59] Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 308, emphasis mine.

[60] Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 165.

[61] Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

[62] See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 307.

[63] James E. Steiner, "Overview," in *Challenging the Red Line Between Intelligence and Policy*," Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Report, 2004, http://cfdev.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/redline.pdf, 1 (accessed September 16, 2004).

[64] In January 2006, *Newsweek* obtained and published original images of several declassified slides presented during PCTEG briefings. See "Iraq and al Qaeda Selected Slides from a 2002 Briefing Prepared by the Pentagon," *Newsweek*, January 2, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10652305/site/newsweek/ (accessed March 21, 2006); see also U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

[65] Mark Hosenball, "9/11: A Special White House Slide Show," *Newsweek*, January 4, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10663343/site/newsweek/ (accessed March 21, 2006). More generally, the substance of PCTEG claims sharply contradicted intelligence reporting by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which warned in a February 2002 document that it was possible that Libyan detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a key PCTEG source, "was intentionally misleading the debriefers" regarding alleged Iraq–al-Qaida ties (DIA's analysis proved correct—al-Libi later recanted). "Just imagine," Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) said, "the public impact of that DIA conclusion if it had been disclosed at the time. It surely could have made

a difference in the congressional vote authorizing the war." See United States, Defense Intelligence Agency, *DITSUM #044-02* (February 2002), declassified in Kathleen P. Turner, Letter to Hon. John Rockefeller, October 26, 2005; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Al Libi's Tall Tales," *Newsweek*, November 10, 2005, Web exclusive, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9991919/site/newsweek/ (accessed May 6, 2006); and Walter Pincus, "Newly Released Data Undercut Prewar Claims Source Tying Baghdad, Al Qaeda Doubted," *Washington Post*, November 6, 2005, p. A22.

[66] James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 290.

[67] Benjamin and Simon, *The Next Attack*, 170.

> A group of civilians under the direction of Douglas Feith and William Luti was culling through raw data on Saddam's possible ties to al-Qaeda in order to produce the desired result that the established intelligence community, including the Pentagon's own Defense Intelligence Agency, would not provide (Packer, *Assassins' Gate*, 62).

[68] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

[69] Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

[70] Carl Levin, *Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq–al Qaeda Relationship*, October 21, 2004, http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2004/102104inquiryreport.pdf (accessed December 3, 2005), 24.

[71] Levin, *Alternative Analysis*, 22–3.

[72] Ehninger and Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, 2nd ed., 13.

[73] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 310.

[74] Memorandum of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, quoted in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Prewar Assessments*, 311.

[75] See exchange between Senator Levin and DCI Tenet, *Future Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security*, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2004, Lexis/Nexis Congressional Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed August 8, 2004).

[76] Georgetown University, *Challenging the Red Line*, 5.

[77] Greg Thielmann, personal communication to Gordon Mitchell, Pittsburgh, PA, July 16, 2004.

[78] Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 80.

[79] For details on the efforts of Bolton's office to acquire control of Secure Compartmented Information Facilities in State Department offices, see Alex Bolton, "Report Could Hurt Bolton," *The Hill*, May 11, 2005, http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/thehill/news/frontpage/051105/report.html (accessed June 15, 2005); Henry Waxman, Letter to Christopher Shays, March 1, 2005, http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/documents/20050301112122-90349.pdf (accessed June 15, 2005); and United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Interview of Ms. DeSutter with Regard to the Bolton Nomination*, May 5, 2005, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/desutter%20interview.pdf (accessed June 15, 2005).

[80] Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong," *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004): 88–90; see also Benjamin and Simon, *The Next Attack*, 167–74; Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 203–48; and W. Patrick Lang, "Drinking the Kool-Aid," *Middle East Policy* 11 (Summer 2004): 49–53.

[81] Pollack, "Spies, Lies and Weapons," 8. On the role played by the White House Information Group in systematically publicizing such B-Teamed intelligence, see Bamford, *Pretext for War*, 317–31.

[82] Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, "'The Whole Operation of Deception': Reconstructing President Bush's Rhetoric of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Cultural Studies—Critical Methodologies* 4 (2004): 178.

[83] Paul Wolfowitz, prepared testimony, *Joint Inquiry Hearing on Counterterrorist Center Customer Perspective*, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, September 19, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020919-depsecdef1.html (accessed March 14, 2004).

[84] Greg Thielmann, quoted in Sidney Blumenthal, "There Was No Failure of Intelligence: U.S. Spies Were Ignored, or Worse, if they Failed to Make the Case for War," *The Guardian* (U.K.), February 5, 2004, p. 26.

[85] Such doubts were communicated directly to President Bush in the one-page October 2002 President's Summary of the NIE, which indicated that although "most agencies judge" that the use of the aluminum tubes was "related to a uranium enrichment effort . . . INR and DOE believe that the tubes more likely are intended for conventional weapons uses." Murray Waas reports that the one-page summary was written specifically for Bush, was handed to the president by then-CIA Director George Tenet, and was read in Tenet's presence. See Murray Waas, "What Bush was Told About Iraq," *National Journal*, March 2, 2006, http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0302nj1.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).

[86] *Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, CIA Press Release, August 11, 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm (accessed March 18, 2004).

[87] Jonathan S. Landay, "Doubts, Dissent Stripped from Public Version of Iraq Assessment," *Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services*, February 10, 2004, http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/special_packages/iraq/intelligence/11901380.htm (accessed May 6, 2006); see also John Prados, *Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War* (New York: New Press, 2004), 32–93; Patrick J. Fitzgerald, "Government's Response to Defendant's Third Motion to Compel Discovery," *United States v. Libby*, filed April 5, 2006, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 05-394 (RBW); and David E. Sanger and David Barstow, "Iraq Findings Leaked by Aide Were Disputed," *New York Times*, April 9, 2006, p. 1.

[88] See Greg Thielmann, "Intelligence in Preventive Military Strategy," in Keller and Mitchell, *Hitting First*, 153–74.

[89] Cahn and Prados, "Team B."

[90] Cahn, *Killing Détente*.

[91] Reich, "Team A–Team B Exercise."

[92] Thielmann, "Rumsfeld Reprise?," 3.

[93] Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich (with Alexis Orton), *WMD in Iraq Evidence and Implications* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation"; Rodger A. Payne, "Deliberate Before Striking First?" in Keller and Mitchell, *Hitting First*, 115–36*;* and Prados, *Hoodwinked.*

[94] U.S. Commission on Intelligence Capabilities, *Report to the President*, 170. Section 1017 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also calls for a redoubled commitment to "red team" intelligence analysis as a key reform plank. See *Congressional Record*, December 7, 2004, pp. H10930–H10993.

[95] John A. Kringen, "How We've Improved Intelligence; Minimizing the Risk of 'Groupthink,'" *Washington Post*, April 3, 2006, p. A19.

[96] Douglas Hart and Steven Simon, "Thinking Straight and Talking Straight: Problems of Intelligence Analysis," *Survival* 48 (Spring 2006): 50.

[97] On "groupthink," see Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (New York: Houghton and Mifflin, 1972).

[98] George Tenet, quoted in "George Tenet Delivers Remarks on Intelligence Gathering and Iraq's WMD programs," February 5, 2004, Federal Document Clearing House Transcripts, Lexis-Nexis Congressional Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed August 13, 2004).

[99] George Tenet, response to question by Carl Levin, *Future Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security*, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2004, Federal News Service, Lexis-Nexis Congressional Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed August 13, 2004).

[100] Paul Pillar recommends one institutional reform that could bolster the proclivity of analysts to correct official mischaracterizations of intelligence reporting by political leaders:

> On this point, the United States should emulate the United Kingdom, where discussion of this issue has been more forthright, by declaring once and for all that its intelligence services should not be part of public advocacy of policies still under debate. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair accepted a commission of inquiry's conclusions that intelligence and policy had been improperly commingled in such exercises as the publication of the 'dodgy dossier,' the British counterpart to the United States' Iraqi WMD white paper, and that in the future there should be a clear delineation between intelligence and policy. An American declaration should take the form of a congressional resolution and be seconded by a statement from the White House. Although it would not have legal force, such a statement would discourage future administrations from attempting to pull the intelligence community into policy advocacy. It would also give some leverage to intelligence officers in resisting any such future attempts.

Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March 2006): 13–28.

[101] Dafna Linzer, "Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb," *New York Times*, August 2, 2005, p. A1. Following disclosures that Iran resumed uranium enrichment in 2006, experts posited a "highly uncertain," worst-case, timeline that estimates 2009 as the earliest date that Iran could conceivably acquire a nuclear weapon. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, *Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant*, Institute for Science and International Security Issue Brief, January 12, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irancascade.pdf (accessed May 8, 2006). For additional commentary on the technical obstacles likely to delay any Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons, see Jeffrey Lewis and Paul Kerr's informative Web log, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com.

[102] Curt Weldon, *Countdown to Terror* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2005), 5.

[103] Alexander H. Montgomery, "Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network," *International Security* 30 (2005): 153–87; see also Ashton Carter and Stephen A. LaMontagne, "A Fuel-cycle Fix," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 62 (January/February 2006): 24–5; Colin Dueck, "Strategies for Managing Rogue States," *Orbis* 50 (Spring 2006): 223–41; and Abbas Maleki and Matthew Bunn, *Finding a Way Out of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Paper (March 2006), http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/whatsnew.cfm?program =stpp&nt =top&pb_id =523 (accessed May 8, 2006).

[104] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, *The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?*, Institute for Science and International Security Issue Brief, March 27, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf (accessed May 8, 2006).

[105] John Negroponte, Statement, *Worldwide Threats to the United States*, Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006, Federal News Service, Lexis-Nexis Congressional Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 8, 2006).

[106] For an extended treatment of this theme, see William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell, "Preventive Force: Untangling the Discourse," in Keller and Mitchell, *Hitting First*, 239–63.

[107] Richard Cheney, quoted in "Vice President Dick Cheney Discusses a Possible War with Iraq," *Meet the Press*, March 16, 2003, NBC News Transcripts, Lexis-Nexis News Wire Database, http://www.lexis-nexis.org (accessed February 12, 2006).

[108] Lang, "Drinking the Kool-Aid," 42–8; Benjamin and Simon, *The Next Attack*, 183.

[109] One example of how the *caveat emptor* approach can produce results involves public argument regarding Iran's alleged role in moving improvised explosive devices into Iraq. On March 13, 2006, President Bush claimed that "Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-coalition attacks by providing Shia militia with the capability to build improvised explosive devices in Iraq." The next day, journalist Charlie Aldinger pressed Pentagon officials to proffer evidence supporting Bush's claim:

> You said that Revolutionary Guards and IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and weapons are moving across the border from Iran. What you have not said conclusively is whether the government of Iran and the mullahs are sponsoring that activity. Do you have proof that they are, indeed, behind this, the government of Iran?

After Secretary Rumsfeld handed off Aldinger's probing question to General Peter Pace, Pace admitted: "I do not, sir." See George W. Bush, *President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Iraq*, George Washington University, Washington, DC, March 13, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060313-3.html (accessed May 1, 2006); Donald H. Rumsfeld and Peter Pace, *DoD News Briefing*, Pentagon, Washington, DC, March 14, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060314-12644.html (accessed May 1, 2006).

[110] Joseph Cirincione, "Fool Me Twice," *Foreign Policy* (March 27, 2006), Web exclusive, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id = 3416 (accessed May 8, 2006).

[111] Seymour Hersh, "The Iran Plans," *The New Yorker*, April 8, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060417fa_fact (accessed May 8, 2006).

[112] Kenneth Adelman, "Cakewalk in Iraq," *Washington Post*, February 13, 2002, p. A27.

[113] Ervand Abrahamian, "Empire Strikes Back: Iran in U.S. Sights," in *Inventing the Axis of Evil*, ed. Andre Schiffrin (New York: New Press, 2004), 147.

[114] On the enduring significance of Operation Ajax in Iran's collective memory, see Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2003); Dan De Luce, "50 Years Later, Iranians Remember US–UK Coup," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 22, 2003, p. 8.

[115] Reza Pahlavi, *Statement at the National Press Club*, Washington, DC, March 1, 2006, http://www.rezapahlavi.org/npc2006.html; see also Joseph Cirincione, "Controlling Iran's Nuclear Program," *Issues in Science and Technology* 22 (Spring 2006): 80.

[116] Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 163.

[117] Pollack, "Spies, Lies and Weapons," 92.