Prof. Sandra Mitchell
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Main Office: 1017 Cathedral of Learning
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Phone: 412-624-5896
Philosophy of Social Sciences
Naturalist Critique of Interpretivism
Interpretivist Critique of Naturalism
Causal Reasoning in the Social Sciences
Function and Functional Explanation
Laws
The Individualism/ Holism Debate
The Ontology and Explanation of the Social World
Semantic Holism
Objectivity and Values
A perennial debate in the philosophy of social science is whether the social sciences should strive to emulate natural science methods, or whether understanding social phenomena is something essentially different from explanation in the natural sciences. The naturalists say that the social sciences should be like the natural sciences, while the interpretivists assert the contrary. Interpretivism can be roughly divided into two conceptual parts: a positive program for how to do social science and a set of arguments for why any attempt to implement natural science methods in the social sciences is doomed to failure. This segment of the seminar begins with two classic statements of the interpretivist perspective (Winch and Geertz). These are intended to provide an account of how interpretive social science would proceed and how it would be different from a naturalistic social science. Next, we look at some recent critiques of interpretive social science penned by naturalistically inclined philosophers (Martin and Jones), along with a brief response by a practicing interpretivist (Segal). Finally, we turn to an extended interpretivist argument against the possibility of naturalistic social science (Taylor) and two naturalistic replies (McIntyre and Faia).
1. Winch, Peter. The Idea of Social Science, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 1994. pp. 24-62.
2. Geertz, Clifford. “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books 1973. pp. 3-32.
3. Little, Daniel. Varieties of Social Explanation, Boulder : Westview Press, 1990. chapter 4.
4. Kincaid, Harold.”Issues and Arguments”.
In Philosophical foundations of the social sciences: analyzing controversies
in social research, Cambridge University Press, 1996. chapter 1.
1. Martin, Michael. “Geertz and the Interpretive Approach in Anthropology”, Synthese 97 (1993): 269-286.
2. Jones, Todd. “Interpretive Social Science and the “Native’s Point of View”: A Closer Look”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1998), 28: 32-68.
3. Segal, Daniel. “A Response to Jones’s Critique of Interpretive Social Science”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1999) 29: 306-9.
4. Geertz, Clifford. “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight”, in The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books 1973. pp. 412-454.
1. Taylor, Charles. “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, Cambridge University Press, 1985. pp. 15-57.
2. Kincaid, Harold. ”A science of interpretation”. In Philosophical foundations of the social sciences: analyzing controversies in social research, Cambridge University Press, 1996. chapter 6.
3. Faia, Michael. What's wrong with the social sciences: the perils of the postmodern. University Press of America, 1993. pp.6-8.
Causal Reasoning in the Social Sciences
Some have argued that the social sciences cannot explain events by causes because they cannot capture all the complex contributing factors, because there is no material constitution to social facts (like marriage or money), or because human reason is necessarily involved. But if science has the goal of providing the means for explanation, prediction, and intervention, then social science to be science must also be able to do this. Causal relations (and laws) are the basis of this type of reasoning.
1. Kincaid, Harold. ”Causes, confirmation and explanation”. In Philosophical foundations of the social sciences: analyzing controversies in social research, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapter 3.
2. Bennett. Andrew “Causal Inference in Case Studies: From Mill's Methods to Causal Mechanisms” http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/bennetta/APSA99.html.
3. Scheines “An Introduction to Causal Inference” in Causality in Crisis: Statistical Methods for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences, edited by V. R. McKim and S. P. Turner, Notre Dame Press 1997.
4. Glymour, C. “A Review of recent work on Foundations of Causal Inference” in Causality in Crisis: Statistical Methods for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences, edited by V. R. McKim and S. P. Turner, Notre Dame Press 1997.
5. Humphries “A Critical Appraisal of Causal Discovery Algorithms”. In Causality in Crisis: Statistical Methods for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences, edited by V. R. McKim and S. P. Turner, Notre Dame Press 1997.
6. Woodward “Causal Models, Probabilities and Invariance”. In Causality in Crisis: Statistical Methods for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences, edited by V. R. McKim and S. P. Turner, Notre Dame Press 1997.
7. Glymour “ Representations and Misrepresentations: Reply to Humphries and Woodward” all from Causality in Crisis: Statistical Methods for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences, edited by V. R. McKim and S. P. Turner, Notre Dame Press 1997.
Function and Functional Explanation
Description:
When the function of an artifact or practice is identified (the function of the
Hindu taboo on eating cattle is to provide traction animals for farming, the
function of Potlatch is to redistribute food, etc.) what is explained? Hempel
argued that functions cannot explain why the functional item is present
(why the Hindu’s have the taboo, why the Kwakiutl have the Potlatch). But
identifying functions is ubiquitous in social science (and biology!) and
functions seem to be playing an explanatory role. Philosophers have taken up
the challenge to analyze how and what function ascription explain.
1. Hempel: "The Logic of Functional Analysis” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
2. Cohen “Functional Explanation: In Marxism” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
3. Elster “Functional Explanation In Social Science” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994
4. Kincaid “Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences” PSA 1990, Vol. 1, 341-354. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), pp.415-429.
5. Kincaid, Harold. ”Functionalism Defended”. In Philosophical foundations of the social sciences: analyzing controversies in social research, Cambridge University Press, 1996. chapter 6.
The role of laws as essential to explanation has been defended by Hempel and formalized in his deductive-nomological model of explanation. The argument is that if they are necessary in physical science, then they must be necessary also in social science. The problem then arises that there appear to be no laws in social science. Hence there cannot be explanations in social science. While Scriven and Fay argue that there are no social scientific laws, Kincaid and McIntyre defend laws in social science.
1. Hempel, C. “The Function of General Laws in History” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
2. Scriven. “A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behavior” in Martin and McIntyre (eds.) Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
3. Fay. “General Laws and Explaining Human Behavior” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
4. Kincaid, H. “Defending Laws in the Social Sciences” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1990): 56- 83 Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
5. McIntyre. “Complexity and Social Scientific Laws” ” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
Description:
The individualism/holism debate is often dated back to Durkheim’s formulation of
the holistic position and Weber’s definition of the individualist position.
Today the discussion of the two positions is typically divided into three
different issues: 1) The ontological issue: Are there any irreducible social
phenomena? The holist’s answer is yes, the individualist’s no. 2) The
explanatory issue: Are there any explanations which are irreducible to the
individual level? Again the holist says yes, the individualist no. And finally
3) The semantic issue: Are there social concepts which cannot be defined by
reference to individuals only? Once more the semantic holist says yes, the
semantic individualist no. It is important to note that a holist or
individualist stance on one issue does not necessarily commit to the
corresponding stance with respect to another issue. For instance, once can
perfectly well be an ontological individualist, yet explanatory holist, though
the opposite position, i.e. ontological holism plus explanatory individualism,
seems very strange. One of the most important questions to focus on in the
following is exactly how the three areas of debate more precisely relate to each
other. An answer to this question seems to hinge on the answer to another
important question: How is the distinction between individualist and holist
positions within the three areas of debate to be understood?
This area within the individualism/holism debate is the least clearly defined and explicitly discussed. Social phenomena, such as schools, nations, classes etc. are typically only defined through examples. As such it is also rarely discussed in more detail how social phenomena relate to individuals and in what sense, if any, they may be reduced to individual beliefs and actions. Questions like these are not only of general social scientific interest: what kind of thing are you investigating when you do research on, say, the American school system. Their answer is also of importance for the other areas of the of the individualist/holist debate since ontological holism seems to imply explanatory holism. Searle and Gilbert provide two fairly recent accounts of how social phenomena are created. The question to consider is whether they allow for the reduction of social phenomena to individual intentions and actions.
1. Searle. The Construction of Social Reality, Penguin Books: London., 1995. p. 13-29-37-51-79-90.
2. Gilbert. “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1990, Vol XV:1-14.
3. Gilbert, Margaret. “Concerning ‘individualism’ versus ‘holism;” in On Social Facts, Routledge: 1989. pp. 427-431.
4. Watkins. “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences". In Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
5. Kincaid, H. “Reduction, Explanation and Individualism” in Harold Kincaid, Individualism and the Unity of Science: Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and the Special Sciences. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.
6. Petit. “For individualism, against Collectivism” from The Common Mind Oxford University Press, 1994.
7. Kincaid, Harold (1996),”The failures of Individualism” In Philosophical foundations of the social sciences: analyzing controversies in social research, Cambridge University Press, 1996. chapter 5.
Description:
This semantic debate can be seen as an attempt to decide the explanatory issue
through an examination of the language used to describe social reality.
Mandelbaum’s article is a classic attempt to this effect – Collin’s article is a
more recent attempt. Note that Kincaid referred to Mandelbaum’s famous bank
example in his defense of anti-reductionism. And note how Collin also relies on
considerations from philosophy of mind. The more general question to consider
here is how social and individual concepts are distinguished and how the
semantic issue relates to the explanatory issue.
1. Mandelbaum, M. 1973 “Societal Facts” Philosophy of Social Explanation, ed. Alan Ryan.
2. Collin 1998 “Semantic Holism in Social Science” in Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action. Vol.1(3).
Objectivity and Values
Description:
Is Social Science value free? Weber say no and Nagel says yes. How do values
influence the kind of scientific questions and conclusions that are arrived at?
In the last two readings, Weisstein and Wylie argue that there is room for
criticizing the values that structure social science practices.
1. Weber, Max. “’Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
2. Nagel, Ernest. “The Value-Orientation Bias of Social Inquiry” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
3. Weisstein, Naomi. “Pyschology Constructs the Female” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994)
4. Wylie, Alison. “Reasoning about Ourselves: Feminist Methodology in the Social Sciences” Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. L. McIntyre and M. Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).