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What is Philosophy of Science?"The field of philosophy of science encompasses the philosophical scrutiny of science, both in general and in its particular branches; and the scientific scrutiny of those issues in philosophy to which the content of scientific theories and their methods are relevant."This definition identifies two parts to philosophy of science. In one, the methods of philosophical analysis are applied to an understanding of science itself. These methods have no mysterious content or powers. They amount to an insistence on the clear statement of ideas and claims and that they be supported by cogent arguments. That one should proceed in this way is widely accepted. What distinguishes professional philosophers is that, even when the problems are tough and the going very murky, they will not compromise on clarity and cogency and still find ways of proceeding.
Mission statement, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
The second part of the definition reflects the fact that philosophy is
not a closed field. Its traditional problems--the nature of space, time
and matter; life; mind; experience; and so on--can overlap with the
concerns of the sciences. Indeed one should expect that a knowledge of
these sciences has something of use for the traditional problems.
These two parts roughly align with another division in philosophy of
science. On one side we have the treatment of issues common to all
sciences, so-called "general philosophy of science." Its concerns include
the structure of theories, the nature of experiment, induction and
confirmation, explanation, scientific realism and scientific change. On
the other side we have the analysis of problems peculiar to individual
sciences. It includes "philosophy of physics," "philosophy of biology,"
"philosophy of cognitive science" and so on.
What is Good Philosophy of Science?
Good philosophy of science is done this way:
Formulate
and state clearly an interesting and novel thesis and argue cogently for
it.
This recipe is easy to state as an abstract conception. We can point to
many excellent examples of it. We each have our own favorites. I am a
great fan of Carl ("Peter") Hempel and Wesley ("Wes") Salmon. They were
masters of the craft. Their writing is lucid. Their logic is precise. They
make it look easy. Consult any of their works and make emulating them your
goal.
There are, unfortunately, many ways that we can be distracted from writing good philosophy of science:
Mere science writing.
Proposing new science.
Purely historical studies.
Excesses of mathematical precision.
Pointless axiomatization.
Naming of parts.
Merely suggestive questioning.
Reductions to the more problematic.
These traps are elaborated individually in my (Norton's) Goodies page: How Not to Do Philosophy of Science: A Guide for Makers and Consumers.
The Point of Intractability
What should you seek when you start reading in a new topic in philosophy
of science? The emphasis should be on identifying the central theses and
arguments. But how deeply should you read? I have found one rule of thumb
very helpful. In any field, there are easy and obvious results. They are
typically picked up and published early. The sign of maturity of a field
is that none of them are left. Rather one develops a sense of a deep
intractability that blocks further progress. You should seek to read to
this point of intractability and try to find how that intractability
arises. It is generally manifested in a "damned if you do and damned if
you don't" dynamic. There will be a proliferation of different viewpoints,
each designed to circumvent the difficulty, but with none commanding
universal assent.
The classic philosophical problem, Hume's problem of induction,
illustrates this. How can inductive inference be justified? Any purported
justification must call upon other means of inductive justification, so
that they are circular or trigger an infinite regress. Or, if you accept
that no justification is admissible, then it would seem we have no reason
to believe inductive inference. So can you justify induction? You are
damned if you try; and damned if you don't.
The common experience in entering a new field in philosophy of science is
that you see lots of easy results. Exactly because they are easy, chances
are that they are widely known. When you find that progress has been
stalled by apparently intractable problems, rejoice! You have come to the
point where novel contributions are possible.
See "The
Point of Intractability," in my Goodies
pages.