

Tohannes Locke.

AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

In Four Books.

Written by JOHN LOCKE, Gent.

The TWELFTH EDITION.

VOLUME I.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

As thou knowest not what is the Way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: Even so thou knowest not the Works of God who maketh all Things.

Quam bellum 'est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!

Cic. de Natur. Deor. l. 1.

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M DCC XLI.

The Epistle to the Reader.

I should tell thee, that five or fix Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a Stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every Side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong Course; and that, before we set ourselves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see what Objects our Under standings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, subo all readily affented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. Some hasly, and undigested Thoughts on a Subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave the first Entrance into this Discourse, which baving been thus begun by Chance, was continued by Intreaty; written by incoherent Parcels; and, after long Intervals of Neglett, resum'd again, as my Humour or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a Retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me Leisure, it was brought into that Order thou now feest it.

This discontinued Way of Writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any Thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have writ gives thee any Desire, that I should have gone farther: If it scems too much to thee, thou mayst blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one Sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the Bulk it now appears in. I will not dem, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower Compass than it is; and that some Parts of it might be contrasted; the Way it has been writ in, by Catches, and many long Intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy to make

it Shorter.

The Epistle to the Reader.

felf the Trouble to confider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most Places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct Men's Thoughts to my Meaning in this Matter. By those Denominations, I mean some Object in the Mind, and consequently determined, i.e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined Idea, when such as it is at any Time objectively in the Mind, and so determined there, it is annex'd, and without Variation determined to a Name or articulate Sound, which is to be steddily the. Sign of that very same Object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.

Simple and complex ideas.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple Idea, I mean that simple Appearance which the Mind has in its View, or perceives in itself, when that Idea is said to be in it: By determinate, when applied to a complex Idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate Number of certain simple or less complex Ideas, join'd in such a Proportion and Situation, as the Mind has before its View, and fees in it self when that Idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a Mangives a Name to it: I say should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to make it the Sign of. The Want of this, is the Cause of no small Obscurity and Confusion in Men's Thoughts and Discourses.

I know there are not Words enough in any Language, to answer all the Variety of Ideas that enter into Men's Discourses and Reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any Term, he may have in his Mind a determined Idea, which he makes it the Sign of, and to which he should keep it steddily annex'd, during that present Discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do

this,

§. 7. Though our *Idea* of Infinity arise from the Contemplation of Quantity, and the endless Increase the Mind is able to make in Quantity, by the repeated Additions of what Portions

Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space Infinite.

Idea of inbnity from mental processes.

thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great Confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the Mind can be thought to have, and fo discourse or reason about an infinite Quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: For our Idea of Infinity being, as I think, an endless growing Idea, but the Idea of any Quantity the Mind has, being at that Time terminated in that Idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join Infinity to it, is to adjust a standing Measure to a growing Bulk; and therefore I think it is not an infignificant Subtilty, if I fay, that we are carefully to diffinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a supposed endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated Ideas of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the Idea of a Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and actually to have a View of all those repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endless Repetition can never totally represent to it: Which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

§. 8. This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we confider it in Numbers. The Infinity of Numbers, to the End of whose Addition every

We have no Idea of infinite Space.

one perceives there is no Approach, eafily appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear foever this Idea of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual Idea of an infinite Number. Whatsoever positive Ideas we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible Remainder, from which we remove all Bounds, and wherein we allow the Mind an endies Progression of Thoughts, without ever compleating the Idea, there we have our Idea of Infinity; which though it feems to be pretty clear, when we confider nothing else in it but the Negation of an End, yet when we would frame in our Minds the Idea of an infinite Space or Duration, that Idea is very obscure, and consused, because it is made up of two Parts, very different, if not inconfistent. For let a Man frame in his Mind an Idea of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain, the Mind rells and terminates in that Idea; which is contrary to the Idea of Infi-

Objection to infinity is that mental processes cannot form it.