Non est potestas Super Terram quæ Comparetur ei Iob 41. 24

LEVIATHAN

Or

THE MATTER, FORME and POWER of A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL and CIVIL.

By THOMAS HOBBES of MALMESBVRY.

London
Printed for Andrew Crooke
1651.

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Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon
in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

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TO
MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND
Mr *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN*
of *Godolphin.*

Honor'd Sir,

YOur moſt worthy Brother Mr *Sidney Godolphin*, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my ſtudies ſomething, and otherwiſe to oblige me, as you know, with reall teſtimonies of his good opinion, great in themſelves, and the greater for the worthineſſe of his perſon. For there is not any vertue that diſpoſeth a man, either to the ſervice of God, or to the ſervice of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendſhip, that did not manifeſtly appear in his converſation, not as acquired by neceſsity, or affected upon occaſion, but inhærent, and ſhining in a generous conſtitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your ſelfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my diſcourſe of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on thoſe that ſhall ſeem to favour it. For in a way beſet with thoſe that contend, on one ſide for too great Liberty, and on the other ſide for too much

Authority, 'tis hard to paſſe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, ſhould not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Beſides, I ſpeak not of the men, but (in the Abſtract) of the Seat of Power, (like to thoſe ſimple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyſe defended thoſe within it, not becauſe they were they, but there,) offending none, I think, but thoſe without, or ſuch within (if there be any ſuch) as favour them. That which perhaps may moſt offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpoſe than ordinarily they uſe to be by others. But I have done it with due ſubmiſsion, and alſo (in order to my Subject) neceſſarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power. If notwithſtanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleaſed to excuſe your ſelfe, and ſay I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I ſay, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have preſum'd on that, to aſſume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt obedient ſervant,

THO. HOBBES.

Paris. *April* $\frac{15}{25}$. 1651.

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PAge 48. In the Margin, for *love Praise*, read *love of Praise*. p. 75. l. 5. for *signied*, r. *signified*. p. 88. l. 1. for *performe*, r. *forme*. l. 35. for *Soveraign*, r. *the Soveraign*. p. 94. l. 14. for *lands*, r. *hands*. p. 100. l. 28. for *in*, r. *in his*. p. 102. l. 46. for *in*, r. *us*. p. 105. in the margin, for *ver.* 10. r. *ver.* 19. &c. p. 116. l. 46. for *are involved*, r. *are not involved*. p. 120. l. 42. for *Those Bodies*, r. *These Bodies*. p. 137. l. 2. for *in generall*. r. *in generall*,. p. 139. l. 36. for *were*, r. *where*. p. 166. l. 18. for *benefit*. r. *benefits*. p. 200. l. 48. dele *also*. l. 49. for *delivered*, r. *deliver*. p. 203. l. 35. for *other*, r. *higher*. p. 204. l. 15. for *and left*, r. *if left*. l. 39. for *write*, r. *writt*. p. 206. l. 19. for *of the*, r. *over the*. p. 234. l. 1. for *but of*, r. *but by mediation of*. l. 15. dele *and*. l. 38. for *putting*, r. *pulling*. p. 262. l. 19. for *tisme*, r. *Baptisme*. p. 268. l. 48. for *that the*, r. *that*. p. 271. l. 1. for *observe*, r. *obey*. l. 4. for *contrary the*, r. *contrary to the*. p. 272. l. 36. for *our Saviours of life*, r. *of our Saviours life*. p. 275. l. 18. for *if shall*, r. *if he shall*. l. 30. for *haven*, r. *heaven*. l. 45. for *of Church*, r. *of the Church*. p. 276. l. 38. dele *inter*. l. 46. dele *are*. p. 285. l. 11. for *he had*, r. *he hath*. p. 287. l. 10. dele *of*. p. 298. l. 36. for *to ay*, r. *to Lay*. p. 361. l. 36. for *him*, r. *them*.

THE INTRODUCTION.

NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the *Art* of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all *Automata* (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the *Heart*, but a *Spring*; and the *Nerves*, but so many *Strings*; and the *Ioynts*, but so many *Wheeles*, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? *Art* goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, *Man*. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the *Soveraignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The *Magistrates*, and other *Officers* of Judicature and Execution, artificiall *Joynts*; *Reward* and *Punishment* (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the *Nerves*, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The *Wealth* and *Riches* of all the particular members, are the *Strength*; *Salus Populi* (the *peoples safety*) its *Businesse*; *Counsellors*, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the *Memory*; *Equity* and *Lawes*, an artificiall *Reason* and *Will*; *Concord*, *Health*; *Sedition*, *Sickenesse*; and *Civill war*, *Death*. Lastly, the *Pacts* and *Covenants*, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that *Fiat*, or the *Let us make man*, pronounced by God in the Creation.

To

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First, the *Matter* thereof, and the *Artificer*; both which is *Man*.

Secondly, *How*, and by what *Covenants* it is made; what are the *Rights* and just *Power* or *Authority* of a *Soveraigne*; and what it is that *preserveth* and *dissolveth* it.

Thirdly, what is a *Christian Common-wealth*.

Lastly, what is the *Kingdome of Darkness*.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That *Wisedome* is acquired, not by reading of *Books*, but of *Men*. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, *Nosce teipsum*, *Read thy self*: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does *think*, *opine*, *reason*, *hope*, *feare*, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of *Passions*, which are the same in all men, *desire*, *feare*, *hope*, &c; not the similitude of the *objects* of the Passions, which are the things *desired*, *feared*, *hoped*, &c: for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.

But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.

OF MAN.

CHAP. I.

Of SENSE.

CONcerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first *Singly*, and afterwards in *Trayne*, or dependance upon one another. *Singly*, they are every one a *Representation* or *Apparence*, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an *Object*. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have else-where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because *Outward*, seemeth to be some matter without. And this *seeming*, or *fancy*, is that which men call *Sense*; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a *Light*, or *Colour figured*; To the Eare, in a *Sound*; To the Nostrill, in an *Odour*; To the Tongue and Palat, in a *Savour*; And to the rest of the body, in *Heat*, *Cold*, *Hardnesse*, *Softnesse*, and such other qualities, as we discern by *Feeling*. All which qualities called *Sensible*, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could not bee

ſevered from them, as by glaſſes, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee ſee they are; where we know the thing we ſee, is in one place; the apparence, in another. And though at ſome certain diſtance, the reall, and very object ſeem inveſted with the fancy it begets in us; Yet ſtill the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Senſe in all caſes, is nothing els but originall fancy, cauſed (as I have ſaid) by the preſſure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philoſophy-ſchooles, through all the Univerſities of Chriſtendome, grounded upon certain Texts of *Ariſtotle*, teach another doctrine; and ſay, For the cauſe of *Viſion*, that the thing ſeen, ſendeth forth on every ſide a *viſible ſpecies* (in Engliſh) a *viſible ſhew*, *apparition*, or *aſpect*, or *a being ſeen*; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is *Seeing*. And for the cauſe of *Hearing*, that the thing heard, ſendeth forth an *Audible ſpecies*, that is, an *Audible aſpect*, or *Audible being ſeen*; which entring at the Eare, maketh *Hearing*. Nay for the cauſe of *Underſtanding* alſo, they ſay the thing Underſtood ſendeth forth *intelligible ſpecies*, that is, an *intelligible being ſeen*; which comming into the Underſtanding, makes us Underſtand. I ſay not this, as diſapproving the uſe of Univerſities: but becauſe I am to ſpeak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I muſt let you ſee on all occaſions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongſt which the frequency of inſignificant Speech is one.

CHAP. II.

Of IMAGINATION.

THat when a thing lies ſtill, unleſſe ſomewhat els ſtirre it, it will lye ſtill for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unleſs ſomewhat els ſtay it, though the reaſon be the ſame, (namely, that nothing can change it ſelfe,) is not ſo eaſily aſſented to. For men meaſure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themſelves: and becauſe they find themſelves ſubject after motion to pain, and laſſitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and ſeeks repoſe of its own accord; little conſidering, whether it be not ſome other motion, wherein that deſire of reſt they find in themſelves, conſiſteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles ſay, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to reſt, and to conſerve their nature in that place which is moſt proper for them; aſcribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conſervation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, abſurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unleſs ſomething els hinder it) eternally; and whatſoever hindreth it, cannot in an inſtant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguiſh it: And as wee ſee in the water, though the wind ceaſe, the waves give not over rowling for a long

long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call *Imagination*, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it *Fancy*; which signifies *apparence*, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, aswell sleeping, as waking.

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This *decaying sense*, when wee would expresse the thing it self, (I mean *fancy* it selfe,) wee call *Imagination*, as I said before: But when we would expresse the *decay*, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *Memory*. So that *Imagination* and *Memory*, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names. *Memory.*

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called *Experience*. Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is *simple Imagination*; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is *Compounded*; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a *Hercules*, or an *Alexander*, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction

of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense: As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams. The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call *Dreams*. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.

Apparitions or Visions. The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts,

thoughts, is then, when by ſome accident we obſerve not that we have ſlept: which is eaſie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whoſe conſcience is much troubled; and that ſleepeth, without the circumſtances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and induſtriouſly layes himſelf to ſleep, in caſe any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot eaſily think it other than a Dream. We read of *Marcus Brutus*, (one that had his life given him by *Iulius Cæſar*, and was alſo his favorite, and notwithſtanding murthered him,) how at *Philippi*, the night before he gave battell to *Auguſtus Cæſar*, hee ſaw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Hiſtorians as a Viſion: but conſidering the circumſtances, one may eaſily judge to have been but a ſhort Dream. For ſitting in his tent, penſive and troubled with the horrour of his raſh act, it was not hard for him, ſlumbering in the cold, to dream of that which moſt affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; ſo alſo it muſt needs make the Apparition by degrees to vaniſh: And having no aſſurance that he ſlept, he could have no cauſe to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Viſion. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and ſupperſtitious, poſſeſſed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are ſubject to the like fancies; and believe they ſee ſpirits and dead mens Ghoſts walking in Church-yards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of ſuch perſons, as make uſe of ſuch ſuperſtitious feare, to paſſe diſguiſed in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to diſtinguiſh Dreams, and other ſtrong Fancies, from Viſion and Senſe, did ariſe the greateſt part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time paſt, that worſhipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghoſts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any reall power; but yet that they are juſtly puniſhed, for the falſe beliefe they have, that they can do ſuch miſchiefe, joyned with their purpoſe to do it if they can: their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghoſts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpoſe, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the uſe of Exorciſme, of Croſſes, of holy Water, and other ſuch inventions of Ghoſtly men. Nevertheleſſe, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions: But that he does it ſo often, as men need to feare ſuch things, more than they feare the ſtay, or change, of the courſe of Nature, which he alſo can ſtay, and change, is no point of Chriſtian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are ſo bold as to ſay any thing when it ſerves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wiſe man, to believe them no further, than right reaſon makes that which they ſay, appear credible. If this ſuperſtitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognoſtiques from Dreams, falſe Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by

which

which, crafty ambitious perſons abuſe the ſimple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles: but they rather nouriſh ſuch doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senſes are), what they receive, they teach: ſome ſaying, that Imaginations riſe of themſelves, and have no cauſe: Others that they riſe moſt commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inſpired) into a man, by God; and Evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infuſed) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell. Some ſay the Senſes receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-ſenſe; and the Common Senſe delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing underſtood.

Underſtanding. The Imagination that is rayſed in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary ſignes, is that we generally call *Underſtanding*; and is common to Man and Beaſt. For a dogge by cuſtome will underſtand the call, or the rating of his Maſter; and ſo will many other Beaſts. That Underſtanding which is peculiar to man, is the Underſtanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the ſequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Underſtanding I ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

CHAP. III.

Of the Conſequence or TRAYNE *of Imaginations.*

BY *Conſequence*, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I underſtand that ſucceſſion of one Thought to another, which is called (to diſtinguiſh it from Diſcourſe in words) *Mentall Diſcourſe*.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatſoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether ſo caſuall as it ſeems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought ſucceeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Senſe, in whole, or in parts; ſo we have no Tranſition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senſes. The reaſon whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of thoſe made in the Senſe: And thoſe motions that immediately ſucceeded one another in the ſenſe, continue alſo together after Senſe: In ſo much as the former comming again to take place, and be prædominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in ſuch manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But becauſe in ſenſe, to one and the ſame thing perceived, ſometimes one thing, ſometimes another ſucceedeth, it comes to paſſe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is

no

no certainty what we ſhall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it ſhall be ſomething that ſucceeded the ſame before, at one time or another.

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Diſcourſe, is of two ſorts. The firſt is *Vnguided, without Deſigne*, and inconſtant; Wherein there is no Paſſionate Thought, to govern and direct thoſe that follow, to it ſelf, as the end and ſcope of ſome deſire, or other paſſion: In which caſe the thoughts are ſaid to wander, and ſeem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thonghts of men, that are not onely without company, but alſo without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as buſie as at other times, but without harmony; as the ſound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Diſcourſe of our preſent civill warre, what could ſeem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohærence to me was manifeſt enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Chriſt; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treaſon: and thence eaſily followed that malicious queſtion; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick. *Trayne of Thoughts unguided.*

The ſecond is more conſtant; as being *regulated* by ſome deſire, and deſigne. For the impreſſion made by ſuch things as wee deſire, or feare, is ſtrong, and permanent, or, (if it ceaſe for a time,) of quick return: ſo ſtrong it is ſometimes, as to hinder and break our ſleep. From Deſire, ariſeth the Thought of ſome means we have ſeen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and ſo continually, till we come to ſome beginning within our own power. And becauſe the End, by the greatneſſe of the impreſſion, comes often to mind, in caſe our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which obſerved by one of the ſeven wiſe men, made him give men this præcept, which is now worne out, *Reſpice finem*; that is to ſay, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it. *Trayne of Thoughts regulated.*

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee ſeek the cauſes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beaſt. The other is, when imagining any thing whatſoever, wee ſeek all the poſſible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to ſay, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time ſeen any ſigne, but in man onely; for this is a curioſity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Paſſion but ſenſuall, ſuch as are hunger, thirſt, luſt, and anger. In ſumme, the Diſconrſe of the Mind, when it is governed by deſigne, is nothing but *Seeking*, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call *Sagacitas*, and *Solertia*;

Solertia; a hunting out of the cauſes, of ſome effect, preſent or paſt; or of the effects, of ſome preſent or paſt cauſe. Sometimes a man ſeeks what he hath loſt; and from that place, and time, wherein hee miſſes it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to ſay, to find ſome certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of ſeeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the ſame places and times, to find what action, or other occaſion might make him loſe it. This we call *Remembrance*, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it *Reminiſcentia*, as it were a *Re-conning* of our former actions.

Remembrance.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compaſſe whereof he is to ſeek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the ſame manner, as one would ſweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a ſent; or as a man ſhould run over the Alphabet, to ſtart a rime.

Prudence.

Sometime a man deſires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of ſome like action paſt, and the events thereof one after another; ſuppoſing like events will follow like actions. As he that foreſees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has ſeen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Priſon, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called *Foreſight*, and *Prudence*, or *Providence*; and ſometimes *Wiſdome*; though ſuch conjecture, through the difficulty of obſerving all circumſtances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things paſt, than another; by ſo much alſo he is more Prudent, and his expectations the ſeldomer faile him. The *Preſent* onely has a being in Nature; things *Paſt* have a being in the Memory onely, but things *to come* have no being at all; the *Future* being but a fiction of the mind, applying the ſequels of actions Paſt, to the actions that are Preſent; which with moſt certainty is done by him that has moſt Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event anſwereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Preſumption. For the foreſight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whoſe will they are to come. From him onely, and ſupernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The beſt Prophet naturally is the beſt gueſſer; and the beſt gueſſer, he that is moſt verſed and ſtudied in the matters he gueſſes at: for he hath moſt *Signes* to gueſſe by.

Signes.

A *Signe*, is the Event Antecedent, of the Conſequent; and contrarily, the Conſequent of the Antecedent, when the like Conſequences have been obſerved, before: And the oftner they have been obſerved, the leſſe uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has moſt experience in any kind of buſineſſe, has moſt Signes, whereby to gueſſe at the Future time; and conſequently is the moſt prudent: And ſo much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of buſineſs, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Nevertheleſſe it is not Prudence that diſtinguiſheth man from beaſt.

beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

As Prudence is a *Præsumtion* of the *Future*, contracted from the *Experience* of time *Past*: So there is a Præsumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine; upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience. *Conjecture of the time past.*

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is *Finite*. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of any thing we call *Infinite*. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of *God* is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is *Incomprehensible*; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.

CHAP. IV.

Of SPEECH.

Originall of Speech.

THe Invention of *Printing*, though ingenious, compared with the invention of *Letters*, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into *Greece*, men say was *Cadmus*, the sonne of *Agenor*, King of Phænicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of *Names* or *Appellations*, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was *God* himself, that instructed *Adam* how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that *Adam* was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as *Generall*, *Speciall*, *Affirmative*, *Negative*, *Interrogative*, *Optative*, *Infinitive*, all which are usefull; and least of all, of *Entity*, *Intentionality*, *Quiddity*, and other insignificant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by *Adam* and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of *Babel*, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The use of Speech.

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring

giſtring of the Conſequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to ſlip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by ſuch words as they were marked by. So that the firſt uſe of names, is to ſerve for *Markes*, or *Notes* of remembrance. Another is, when many uſe the ſame words, to ſignifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and alſo what they deſire, feare, or have any other paſſion for. And for this uſe they are called *Signes*. Speciall uſes of Speech are theſe; Firſt, to Regiſter, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cauſe of any thing, preſent or paſt; and what we find things preſent or paſt may produce, or effect: which in ſumme, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to ſhew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counſell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purpoſes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to pleaſe and delight our ſelves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleaſure or ornament, innocently.

To theſe Uſes, there are alſo foure correſpondent Abuſes. Firſt, when men regiſter their thoughts wrong, by the inconſtancy of the ſignification of their words; by which they regiſter for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and ſo deceive themſelves. Secondly, when they uſe words metaphorically; that is, in other ſenſe than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they uſe them to grieve one another: for ſeeing nature hath armed living creatures, ſome with teeth, ſome with horns, and ſome with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuſe of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unleſſe it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend. *Abuſes of Speech.*

The manner how Speech ſerveth to the remembrance of the conſequence of cauſes and effects, conſiſteth in the impoſing of *Names*, and the *Connexion* of them.

Of Names, ſome are *Proper*, and ſingular to one onely thing; as *Peter*, *Iohn*, *This man*, *this Tree*: and ſome are *Common* to many things; as *Man*, *Horſe*, *Tree*; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheleſs the name of divers particular things; in reſpect of all which together, it is called an *Univerſall*; there being nothing in the world Univerſall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individuall and Singular. *Names Proper & Common.* *Univerſall.*

One Univerſall name is impoſed on many things, for their ſimilitude in ſome quality, or other accident: And wheras a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Univerſals recall any one of thoſe many.

And of Names Univerſall, ſome are of more, and ſome of leſſe extent; the larger comprehending the leſſe large: and ſome again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name *Body* is of larger ſignification than the word *Man*, and comprehendeth it; and the names *Man* and *Rationall*, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee

must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, *Hee that in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country*, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, *Just*.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes, *Every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles*. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as an Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true *here*, and *now*, to be true in *all times* and *places*.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as *one*, *two*, and *three*, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to adde, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, *A man is a living creature*; or thus, *if he be a man, he is a living creature*, If the later name *Living creature*, signifie all that the former name *Man* signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence

quence is *true*; otherwiſe *falſe*. For *True* and *Falſe* are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither *Truth* nor *Falſhood*. *Errour* there may be, as when wee expect that which ſhall not be; or ſuſpect what has not been: but in neither caſe can a man be charged with Untruth.

Seeing then that *truth* conſiſteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that ſeeketh preciſe *truth*, had need to remember what every name he uſes ſtands for; and to place it accordingly; or elſe he will find himſelfe entangled in words, as a bird in limetwiggs; the more he ſtruggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleaſed God hitherto to beſtow on mankind,) men begin at ſettling the ſignifications of their words; which ſettling of ſignifications, they call *Definitions*; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. *Neceſſity of Definitions.*

By this it appears how neceſſary it is for any man that aſpires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently ſet down; or to make them himſelfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themſelves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into abſurdities, which at laſt they ſee, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that they which truſt to books, do as they that caſt up many little ſumms into a greater, without conſidering whether thoſe little ſummes were rightly caſt up or not; and at laſt finding the errour viſible, and not miſtruſting their firſt grounds, know not which way to cleere themſelves; but ſpend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themſelves incloſed in a chamber, flutter at the falſe light of a glaſſe window, for want of wit to conſider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the firſt uſe of Speech; which is the Acquiſition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the firſt abuſe; from which proceed all falſe and ſenſleſſe Tenets; which make thoſe men that take their inſtruction from the authority of bookes, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall ſenſe and imagination, are not ſubject to abſurdity. Nature it ſelfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiouſneſſe of language; ſo they become more wiſe, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it poſſible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wiſe, or (unleſs his memory be hurt by diſeaſe, or ill conſtitution of organs) excellently fooliſh. For words are wiſe mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an *Ariſtotle*, a *Cicero*, or a *Thomas*, or any other Doctor whatſoever, if but a man.

Subject to Names, is whatſoever can enter into, or be conſidered in an account; and be added one to another to make a ſumme; or ſubſtracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called *Subject to Names.*

Accounts

Accounts of mony *Rationes*, and accounting, *Ratiocinatio*: and that which we in bills or books of account call *Items*, they called *Nomina*; that is, *Names*: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word *Ratio*, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word λόγος, for both *Speech* and *Reason*; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called *Syllogisme*; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for *Matter*, or *Body*; as *living*, *sensible*, *rationall*, *hot*, *cold*, *moved*, *quiet*; with all which names the word *Matter*, or *Body* is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for *being moved*, for *being so long*, for *being hot*, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for *living* put into the account *life*; for *moved*, *motion*; for *hot*, *heat*; for *long*, *length*, and the like: And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called *names Abstract*; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is *Seen* by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the *sight*, the *Colour*, the *Idea* of it in the fancy: and when any thing is *heard*, wee reckon it not; but the *hearing*, or *sound* onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to *Names* themselves, and to *Speeches*: For, *generall*, *universall*, *speciall*, *æquivocall*, are names of Names. And *Affirmation*, *Interrogation*, *Commandement*, *Narration*, *Syllogisme*, *Sermon*, *Oration*, and many other such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety of Names *Positive*; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Use of Names Positive.

There be also other Names, called *Negative*; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words *Nothing*, *no man*, *infinite*, *indocible*, *three want foure*, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Negative Names with their Vses.

All other Names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.

Words insignificant.

ſorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and puſled Philoſophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whoſe ſignifications are contradictory and inconſiſtent; as this name, an *incorporeall body*, or (which is all one) an *incorporeall ſubſtance*, and a great number more. For whenſoever any affirmation is falſe, the two names of which it is compoſed, put together and made one, ſignifie nothing at all. For example, if it be a falſe affirmation to ſay *a quadrangle is round*, the word *round quadrangle* ſignifies nothing; but is a meere ſound. So likewiſe if it be falſe, to ſay that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words *In-powred vertue*, *In-blown vertue*, are as abſurd and inſignificant, as a *round quadrangle*. And therefore you ſhall hardly meet with a ſenſleſſe and inſignificant word, that is not made up of ſome Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman ſeldome hears our Saviour called by the name of *Parole*, but by the name of *Verbe* often; yet *Verbe* and *Parole* differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

Underſtanding.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath thoſe thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and conſtituted to ſignifie; Then he is ſaid to underſtand it: *Underſtanding* being nothing elſe, but conception cauſed by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Underſtanding peculiar to him alſo. And therefore of abſurd and falſe affirmations, in caſe they be univerſall, there can be no Underſtanding; though many think they underſtand, then, when they do but repeat the words ſoftly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches ſignifie the Appetites, Averſions, and Paſſions of mans mind; and of their uſe and abuſe, I ſhall ſpeak when I have ſpoken of the Paſſions.

Inconſtant names.

The names of ſuch things as affect us, that is, which pleaſe, and diſpleaſe us, becauſe all men be not alike affected with the ſame thing, nor the ſame man at all times, are in the common diſcourſes of men, of *inconſtant* ſignification. For ſeeing all names are impoſed to ſignifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the ſame things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the ſame; yet the diverſity of our reception of it, in reſpect of different conſtitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different paſſions. And therefore in reaſoning, a man muſt take heed of words; which beſides the ſignification of what we imagine of their nature, have a ſignification alſo of the nature, diſpoſition, and intereſt of the ſpeaker; ſuch as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth *wiſdome*, what another calleth *feare*; and one *cruelty*, what another *juſtice*; one *prodigality*, what another *magnanimity*; and one *gravity*, what another *ſtupidity*, &c. And therefore ſuch names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of ſpeech: but theſe are leſs dangerous, becauſe they profeſs their inconſtancy; which the other do not.

CHAP. V.

Of REASON, and SCIENCE.

Reaſon what it is.

WHen a man *Reaſoneth*, hee does nothing elſe but conceive a ſumme totall, from *Addition* of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from *Subſtraction* of one ſumme from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the conſequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in ſome things, (as in numbers,) beſides *Adding* and *Subſtracting*, men name other operations, as *Multiplying* and *Dividing*; yet they are the ſame; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equall; and Diviſion, but Subſtracting of one thing, as often as we can. Theſe operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and ſubſtract in *numbers*; ſo the Geometricians teach the ſame in *lines*, *figures* (ſolid and ſuperficiall,) *angles*, *proportions*, *times*, degrees of *ſwiftneſſe*, *force*, *power*, and the like; The Logicians teach the ſame in *Conſequeuces of words*; adding together *two Names*, to make an *Affirmation*; and *two Affirmations*, to make a *Syllogiſme*; and *many Syllogiſmes* to make a *Demonſtration*; and from the *ſumme*, or *Concluſion* of a *Syllogiſme*, they ſubſtract one *Propoſition*, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together *Pactions*, to find mens *duties*; and Lawyers, *Lawes*, and *facts*, to find what is *right* and *wrong* in the actions of private men. In ſumme, in what matter ſoever there is place for *addition* and *ſubſtraction*, there alſo is place for *Reaſon*; and where theſe have no place, there *Reaſon* has nothing at all to do.

Reaſon deſined.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to ſay determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word *Reaſon*, when wee reckon it amongſt the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this ſenſe, is nothing but *Reckoning* (that is, Adding and Subſtracting) of the Conſequences of generall names agreed upon, for the *marking* and *ſignifying* of our thoughts; I ſay *marking* them, when we reckon by our ſelves; and *ſignifying*, when we demonſtrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

Right Reaſon where.

And as in Arithmetique, unpractiſed men muſt, and Profeſſors themſelves may often erre, and caſt up falſe; ſo alſo in any other ſubject of Reaſoning, the ableſt, moſt attentive, and moſt practiſed men, may deceive themſelves, and inferre falſe Concluſions; Not but that Reaſon it ſelfe is alwayes Right Reaſon, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reaſon, nor the Reaſon of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well caſt up, becauſe a great many men have unanimouſly approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controverſy in

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an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after ttump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth. *The use of Reason.*

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called *Error*, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or sensless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call *Absurd*, *Insignificant*, and *Non-sense*. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a *round Quadrangle*; or *accidents of Bread in Cheese*; or *Immateriall Substances*; or of *A free Subject*; *A free-will*; or any *Free*, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd. *Of Error and Absurdity.*

I have ſaid before, (in the ſecond chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatſoever, he was apt to enquire the conſequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the ſame excellence, that he can by words reduce the conſequences he findes to generall Rules, called *Theoremes*, or *Aphoriſmes*; that is, he can Reaſon, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or ſubſtracted from another.

But this privedge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Abſurdity; to which no living creature is ſubject, but man onely. And of men, thoſe are of all moſt ſubject to it, that profeſſe Philoſophy. For it is moſt true that *Cicero* ſayth of them ſomewhere; that there can be nothing ſo abſurd, but may be found in the books of Philoſophers. And the reaſon is manifeſt. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to uſe; which is a method that hath been uſed onely in Geometry; whoſe Concluſions have thereby been made indiſputable.

Cauſes of abſurditie.

1. The firſt cauſe of Abſurd concluſions I aſcribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from ſettled ſignifications of their words: as if they could caſt account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, *one*, *two*, and *three*.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers conſiderations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) theſe conſiderations being diverſly named, divers abſurdities proceed from the confuſion, and unfit connexion of their names into aſſertions. And therefore

2. The ſecond cauſe of Abſurd aſſertions, I aſcribe to the giving of names of *bodies*, to *accidents*; or of *accidents*, to *bodies*; As they do, that ſay, *Faith is infuſed*, or *inſpired*; when nothing can be *powred*, or *breathed* into any thing, but body; and that, *extenſion* is *body*; that *phantaſmes* are *ſpirits*, &c.

3. The third I aſcribe to the giving of the names of the *accidents* of *bodies without us*, to the *accidents* of our *own bodies*; as they do that ſay, the *colour is in the body*; *the ſound is in the ayre*, &c.

4. The fourth, to the giving of the names of *bodies*, to *names*, or *ſpeeches*; as they do that ſay, that *there be things univerſall*; that *a living creature is Genus*, or *a generall thing*, &c.

5. The fifth, to the giving of the names of *accidents*, to *names* and *ſpeeches*; as they do that ſay, *the nature of a thing is its definition*; *a mans command is his will*; and the like.

6. The ſixth, to the uſe of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in ſtead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to ſay, (for example) in common ſpeech, *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither*, *The Proverb ſayes this or that* (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs ſpeak;) yet in reckoning, and ſeeking of truth, ſuch ſpeeches are not to be admitted.

7. The ſeventh, to names that ſignifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned

learned by rote from the Schooles, as *hypoſtatical*, *tranſubſtantiate*, *conſubſtantiate*, *eternal-Now*, and the like canting of Schoolemen.

To him that can avoyd theſe things, it is not eaſie to fall into any abſurdity, unleſſe it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reaſon alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is ſo ſtupid, as both to miſtake in Geometry, and alſo to perſiſt in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that Reaſon is not as Senſe, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is; but attayned by Induſtry; firſt in apt impoſing of Names; and ſecondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Aſſertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and ſo to Syllogiſmes, which are the Connexions of one Aſſertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Conſequences of names appertaining to the ſubject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Senſe and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing paſt, and irrevocable; *Science* is the knowledge of Conſequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can preſently do, we know how to do ſomething elſe when we will, or the like, another time: Becauſe when we ſee how any thing comes about, upon what cauſes, and by what manner; when the like cauſes come into our power, wee ſee how to make it produce the like effects. *Science.*

Children therefore are not endued with Reaſon at all, till they have attained the uſe of Speech: but are called Reaſonable Creatures, for the poſſibility apparent of having the uſe of Reaſon in time to come. And the moſt part of men, though they have the uſe of Reaſoning a little way, as in numbring to ſome degree; yet it ſerves them to little uſe in common life; in which they govern themſelves, ſome better, ſome worſe, according to their differences of experience, quickneſſe of memory, and inclinations to ſeverall ends; but ſpecially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for *Science*, or certain rules of their actions, they are ſo farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and ſome progreſſe in them, that they may ſee how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and ſiſters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no *Science*, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by miſ-reaſoning, or by truſting them that reaſon wrong, fall upon falſe and abſurd generall rules. For ignorance of cauſes, and of rules, does not ſet men ſo farre out of their way, as relying on falſe rules, and taking for cauſes of what they aſpire to, thoſe that are not ſo, but rather cauſes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perſpicuous Words,

but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; *Reason* is the *pace*; Encrease of *Science*, the *way*; and the Benefit of man-kind, the *end*. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, with their difference.

As, much Experience, is *Prudence*; so, is much Science, *Sapience*. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did alwayes distinguish between *Prudentia* and *Sapientia*; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures præsumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

Signes of Sceince.

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; becaus to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

CHAP. VI.