March 2015 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: Maturationally Natural Cognition Impedes Science and Facilitates Religion
Robert N. McCauley
Emory University
Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture
Friday, March 6, 2015
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Natural cognition, which operates instantly, intuitively, and (largely) unconsciously, comes in two varieties. Practiced naturalness concerns abilities resulting from extensive experience in some domain. Maturational naturalness concerns cognition that arises spontaneously, that does not depend upon instruction, artifacts, or culturally distinctive inputs, and that addresses fundamental problems for survival. Maturationally natural cognition plays very different roles in science and religion, whether we focus on their cognitive products or the cognitive processes each engages. Science’s cognitive products reliably traffic in representations that are incompatible with maturationally natural cognition. Science requires cognitive tools that are hard to acquire and employ, and maturationally natural predilections persistently intrude in human judgment. By contrast, religious thought and action arise as by-products of opportunistic cuing of maturationally natural dispositions, which motivate and shape religious materials the world over. Thus, maintaining the social arrangements necessary for science is difficult and expensive, and it poses no threat to religion’s persistence.



::: Why Science?
Maralee Harrell
Carnegie Mellon University
Department of Philosophy
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: This talk is on a work in progress. With the coming presidential election in the U.S. will come another round of questions for the Republican candidates: do you believe in evolution? They almost certainly will dodge the question, but they might say we should teach both evolution and intelligent design in schools. The critics will say that ID is not science. And so on it goes. My central question is: why should we believe what science tells us? Feyerabend famously raises this question in Against Method, but I have yet to find an answer, or even the attempt, in the philosophical literature. I want to argue that this should be a central, if not foundational question, for philosophy of science.




::: Causal and Non-Causal Probabilities in Applied Population Genetics
Marshall Abrams
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Department of Philosophy
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: I argue that scientific practice often depends on an implicit distinction between what I call causal probabilities and probabilities in other roles. Roughly, when we can manipulate frequencies by manipulating the characteristics of a chance setup that determines probabilities' numeric values, the probabilities can be considered causal probabilities. Philosophers often assume that only propensities and closely related kinds of probability play this kind of role. Even putting aside standard objections to propensities, it's doubtful that propensities can play all of the roles required by causal probability. Moreover, other causal probability interpretations have been proposed in recent years by Rosenthal, Strevens, and myself. In this talk I focus on elaborating and clarifying the concept of causal probability apart from any particular interpretation of probability, though. I use examples from applied population genetics to illustrate distinctions between causal probability and other, non-causal roles for probability. My discussion addresses roles played by probabilities in computer simulations and mathematical models as well as in the systems modeled. I also discuss evidential criteria for the existence of causal probability. Finally, I show how trying to make the concept of causal probability precise by generalizing Woodward's analysis of manipulation clarifies a difficulty in spelling out the sense in which frequencies can be affected by manipulating chance setups. This problem, though difficult, is rooted in assumptions central to scientific practice, and I suggest strategies for addressing it.



::: Can a Good Experiment Fail?
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
Department of Physics
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: In this talk I will briefly discuss the criteria for a good experiment including the different ways in which an experiment can be good and the various roles that experiment can play in science. I will also discuss several ways in which experiments can fail. I will then present three illustrations of good experiments which can reasonably be regarded as failures. These will be Peter Thieberger’s experiment on the Fifth Force, the Michelson-Morley experiment, and the experiment on electron polarization by Richard Cox and his collaborators, the nondiscovery of parity nonconservation. If time permits I will present a case of a methodologically flawed experiment that gave a correct result.