February 2016 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: What is a Complex Problem?
Mael Pegny, Visiting Fellow
University of Paris
Tuesday, February 2, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  I will try to tackle that classic problem from the perspective of computational complexity theory. Not so surprisingly, the answer will be complex and problematic. The talk will be aimed at the philosophical community in the broad sense, and no previous knowledege of computational complexity or advanced logic  is required.

::: Biological Organization and the Naturalization of Teleology
Leonardo Bich, Visiting Fellow
University of Chile, Biology of Cognition Lab
Tuesday, February 9, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  In this talk I will provide a philosophical justification of biological teleology in organisational terms. The core of the argument consists in establishing a connection between organisation and teleology through the concept of self-determination. Specifically, a biological organisation determines itself in the sense that the effects of its own activity contribute to establish and maintain a subset of the crucial constraints that constitute its conditions of existence. By relying on this circular relationship of mutual dependence between the causes and effects of the activity of a living system, it can be argued that the conditions of existence on which the organism exerts a causal influence can be interpreted as the telos of a biological organisation, which therefore can be legitimately conceived of as an intrinsically teleological causal regime.
          Yet, that not any kind of circular regime realises self-determination, understood as a form of self-constraint. On the basis of this naturalised account, it is possible to address the question whether or not teleology in this specific sense can be attributed to supra-biological systems like ecosystems, and to self-maintaining biochemical systems such as dissipative structures, which are below the threshold of organisational complexity that characterises living systems.



::: Two Types of Ceteris Paribus Laws
Matthias Unterhuber, Visiting Fellow
University of Bern, Switzerland
Tuesday, February 16, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  The literature on ceteris paribus (cp) laws – laws of nature that are hedged by provisos due to potential exceptions – has focused on exceptions that are too heterogeneous to be accounted for within a discipline, most typically a special science (e.g., biology, psychology). I shall argue that there is a second type of cp law that is of a different sort yet is pervasive in the special sciences and permeates into physics and mathematics. The second notion of ceteris paribus law differs from the traditional conception of cp law inasmuch as the exceptions are explicitly specified within the discipline and describe exceptional sub-regularities rather than classes of inhomogeneous exceptions. Since the second notion of cp law is so dominant in the special sciences, this seems to suggest that there are cp laws of the second sort that qualify as proper laws of nature. However, the second type of cp law requires a conceptual change of how we think about laws of nature. Such cp laws are not the result of a mere hedging but describe the result of careful theoretical considerations striving for a coherent account of the regularities at hand, much in alignment with scientific and everyday inductive practices as studied by cognitive scientists.

::: Meshed Control in Skilled Action
Wayne Christensen*
Macquarie University
Friday, February 19, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: I present and defend a theory of skill called Mesh. According to this account cognitive control continues to play a prominent role in advanced skills, contrary to common views that expert action is largely automatic. I discuss several classical theories of skill learning and control, including those of Fitts & Posner, Anderson, and Dreyfus & Dreyfus, together with the more recent internal models account of motor control and Pacherie’s hierarchical extension of the internal models approach. I argue that these theories are unable to explain the flexibility and fluency of evident in many advanced forms of skilled action. I outline an alternative model which proposes that there is a transformation of cognitive control during skill learning that enhances control-relevant forms of awareness, attentional control and action control, and a close integration between higher cognitive and lower order motor processes. The theory is illustrated with a case study of expert mountain biking, and I conclude by examining some implications of the account for philosophical views of agency, skill and reflective awareness.
*This paper is co-authored with John Sutton and Kath Bicknell, Macquarie University.

::: Blur, Visual Consciousness, and Empirical Friction
Wayne Wu
Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition
Carnegie Mellon University
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: The science and philosophy of perceptual consciousness is driven by introspective data. Oddly, such data is accorded a privilege that might not be deserved. Rather, as with any data, the conditions and means by which it is collected matters to its reliability. Further, the nature of the introspective channel delivering this data has not been subject to sufficient empirical scrutiny, and when so subject, a different picture of introspection emerges. In this talk, I address these broader issues indirectly by considering the specific phenomenon of blurry vision. Philosophers have made strong claims, on the basis of introspection, about the nature of “phenomenal blur”, but I shall present an alternative to these claims from a cognitive science perspective. In the background is skepticism concerning a set of common claims about consciousness and our access to it that might not stand up to empirical scrutiny. I apply empirical friction to demonstrate how our conception of introspection and certain “obvious” claims about blur and perceptual consciousness might be strikingly mistaken.