March 2016 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: How Einstein did not Discover
John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh
Ctr. for Philosophy of Science/Dept. of HPS
Tuesday, March 22, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: I will present an intemperate survey of some myths.



::: Explanation, Conditions and Causes
Carsten Held
University of Erfurt
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: A theory of explanation I find promising assumes that an explanation offers a proposition that is a necessary and, given the circumstances, sufficient condition of the explanandum. I will sketch the theory in three steps. In the first step, I propose an account of conditionship, in general. In the second step, I show how this account can be put to work in the context of explanation. I focus on the classic counterexamples to Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of explanation and on problem cases having to do with causal explanation and, accordingly, causation (preemption cases). The claim, implied in the theory, that an acceptable explanation minimally presents a necessary condition of the explanandum, will be shown to handle both kinds of cases. Time permitting, I will in a third step take up Hempel’s idea that an ideal scientific explanation is a sound argument for the explanandum. A way to integrate this assumption into the present theory is to assume that an ideal explanation presents an argument such that one premise presents a necessary condition of the explanandum, while the second says that that condition, given the circumstances, is sufficient for the explanandum.