February 2017 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: How to be a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist
Greg Frost-Arnold, Center Visiting Fellow
Hobart & William Smith Colleges
Tuesday, February 7, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism.  I argue for two claims: first, one should not adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version of anti-realism.  Second, a different version of historically motivated anti-realism enjoys the virtues of Stanford’s account, without suffering its shortcomings.  Specifically, Stanford claims that the 'Problem of Unconceived Alternatives' best explains why past scientists accepted theories that are not approximately true.  I argue that the following explanation is better: the evidence available to historical scientists in their time was unrepresentative or otherwise misleading.  For example, Ptolemy was completely rational to claim the Earth is stationary, because (inter alia) he observed no stellar parallax; we should not think of his view as the result of a cognitive problem, such as an inability to conceive of relevant alternatives.   

::: Political Science Methodology: A Plea for Pluralism
Sharon Crasnow, Center Visiting Fellow
Norco College, California
Friday, February 17, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  Methodology has epistemological implications. Political science research provides an example of how this can play out. Much of political science research focuses on seeking evidence for causal claims. Contemporary research practice in the discipline emphasizes producing such evidence through statistical (observational) and experimental methods and in so doing understands causality in terms of average treatment effects. Case study research, once a preferred methodology, has come to be seen as an inferior method since what is revealed from a single or even several cases cannot support causal claims understood as average effects.  However, case studies have not entirely vanished from political science and are frequently used together with other methods in support of causal conclusions. What roles do such case studies play?  While sometimes they merely serve as examples, I argue that their cognitive value can and often does go beyond this. First, case studies serve a heuristic role in research and crucially inform research design. Second, case study research produces evidence for causal mechanisms. Third, even when evidence for average effects causality is strong, using such knowledge to implement policy requires an understanding of context that cases provide. The methodological assumption that political science knowledge is produced through evidence for average effects biases the choice of methods and thus limits the search for information that is important for understanding political phenomena, improving research design, and implementing policy. 

::: Forces on Fields
Charles Sebens
U. of California, San Diego, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, February 21, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  In electromagnetism, as in Newton's mechanics, action is always equal to reaction.  The force from the electromagnetic field on matter is balanced by and equal to an opposite force from matter on the field.  Although one rarely sees talk of fields experiencing forces, as opposed to exerting them, we should not be hesitant to speak this way.  The electromagnetic field closely resembles a relativistic fluid and responds to forces in the same way.  Analyzing this analogy sheds light on the inertial role played by the field's mass, the status of Maxwell's stress tensor, and the nature of the electromagnetic field.

::: Methodological Individualism and Collectivism in the Social Sciences
Wang Wei
Tsinghua U., Inst. of Science, Technology, and Society
Friday, February 24, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  The debate of individualism and collectivism has been a central issue in the philosophy of social science for decades. The paper will focus on methodological individualism and collectivism in the social sciences. On the one hand, methodological individualism, especially the method of game theory, is dominant in social inquiries; on the other hand, many schools such as network theory, structural sociology, sociological realism, and neofunctionalism in sociology insist on methodological collectivism. Borrowing research in the philosophy of mind, Keith Sawyer proposes nonreductive individualism (NRI) which accepts that only individuals exist, but rejects methodological individualism. Appealing to non-reductive arguments in the philosophy of biology, the author argues for methodological pluralism, which tries to integrate methodological individualism and collectivism in the social sciences.