January 2017 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: The Early RAND (An Extraordinary Venture in the Incubation of Talent)
Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, January 17, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: The first decade in the history of the RAND Corporation (a science-oriented Californian think-tank launched in 1948) proved to be a successful venture in talent incubation which exceeded beyond any reasonable expectation in this unforeseen regard. The reasons it did so invite reflection and analysis.



::: Comparing and Individuating the Same Parts: Towards a Practice-Based Metaphysics for Homology
Catherine Kendig
Visiting Fellow, Michigan State University
Tuesday, January 24, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Traditional philosophy of science often articulates meaning through critical analysis of the definitions of concepts. A philosophy of science in practice approach focuses on the meaning of concepts by analyzing how they are used and how the activities of practitioners using them contributes to their meaning. I investigate the activities which lead to the comparison of two or more biological parts as being homologous—what we might refer to using the verb “homologizing”. Homologizing can be understood as tracking the sameness in structure, sequence, or orientation in a variety of different organisms from a shared origin. Homology has been understood to be a natural kind concept, but one that has been notoriously elusive to pin down. With some notable exceptions, the continued debate over its meaning within philosophy of biology has focused on defining homology rather than on its use in practice. I propose that the practices of homologizing are kinds of rule following, the satisfaction of which demarcates a category—that of being a homologue. Individuating, comparing, and identifying are exchanges that connect practice to concept through the performance of a rule by practitioners. I suggest the activities of homologizing are constitutive of what I call “natural kinding activities” and precipitate what Ereshefsky (2012) refers to as “homology thinking”.



::: On the Explanatory Relevance of Neuroeconomics
Mikael Cozic
Visiting Fellow, University Paris-Est and IUF
Tuesday, January 31, 2017
12:05 pm
817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: The field of neuroeconomics emerged about ten years ago (see Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). Neuroeconomics is commonly viewed as a study of decision making which combines the concepts, methods, and tools from three main disciplines: neuroscience, psychology, and economics. Since its very beginning, neuroeconomics has given rise to intense methodological discussions involving economists (e.g., Gul & Pesendorfer 2005/2008, Harrison 2008, Bernheim 2009), neuroeconomists (e.g., Camerer, 2007, 2008, 2013; Krabjich & Dean, 2015) and also philosophers of science and/or economics (e.g., Hausman 2008, Economics and Philosophy 2008, Journal of Economic Methodology 2010, Clarke 2014). Several aspects of neuroeconomics have been tackled in these discussions. The main issue at stake is to determine the potential and relevance of neuroscience for economics. ‘Relevance” can mean several things. One may wonder whether neuroscience can help to predict economic phenomena (predictive relevance), to measure economics’ constructs, to explain economic phenomena (explanatory relevance) or to confirm and disconfirm economic hypotheses and models (confirmational relevance). This paper deals specifically with the issue of explanatory relevance. Upholders of neuroeconomics (the ‘neuro-enthusiasts’, for short) repeatedly argue that neuroeconomics has an explicit explanatory ambition and may improve the existing explanations of economic phenomena (i.e., is explanatory relevant). The inference from explanatory ambition to explanatory relevance is typically justified by the fact that neuroeconomics investigates the (neural) causes of choices and by the widespread view of economics as the study of choices (under scarcity) – see, e.g. Camerer (2013). This type of argument, and the explanatory relevance thesis more generally, have been criticized by philosophers of sciences and/or economics (Kuorikoski & Ylikoski 2010; Fumagalli 2014, sec.4). The debate is difficult to settle, for two reasons at least. Firstly, there is hardly a consensus, in general philosophy of science, as to what are explanatory progress and depth, and how explanatory progress and depth are related to the level at which explanation takes place (see Weslake 201). Secondly, the role and functioning of explanations in standard (micro-)economics are not as clear as it is often supposed. Our approach will consist in having a careful look at each of these two issues, in the first two parts of the talk, before dealing with the explanatory relevance thesis in the third one.