September 2016 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

Randomness and Reason
Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, Sept. 13, 2016
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  Chance and randomness are commonly seen as the antithesis of reason. However, the discussion will show that in some circumstances the optimal path to rational resolution has to proceed by way of pure chance.

The Quiet Moments of Integration: G. Ledyard Stebbins, Historiography, and the Evolutionary Synthesis (1959-2000)
Vassiliki Betty Smocovitis
University of Florida, Depts. of Biology and History
Friday, Sept. 16, 2016
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  This paper focuses on the career of the American plant evolutionary biologist G. Ledyard Stebbins (1906-2000) with a focus on the last third of his career that saw him develop an integrative research program that included newer developments in plant developmental biology. It examines his part in the wider historical event known as the "evolutionary synthesis," with a historiographic critique of existing understanding driven primarily by a focus on dissensus and by an overemphasis on controversies in science.

Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models
Roberto Fumagalli
University of Bayreuth
Tuesday, Sept. 20, 2016
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In this paper, I draw on widely cited illustrations from economics and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to explicate in virtue of what properties or features minimal models supposedly prompt learning and for substantially overstating the epistemic import of minimal models. I then examine and refute several arguments one may put forward to demonstrate that consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In doing so, I illustrate the implications of my critique for the wider debate on the epistemology of scientific modelling.

A Case Study in the Metaphysics of Biological Practice: The Parts of the Human Genome
Marie Kaiser
University of Köln, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, Sept. 27, 2016
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  Under which conditions is a molecule, such as a particular DNA sequence, a real part of the human genome? Does the human genome have joints of nature that allow for a unique partitioning into parts? In this talk, I provide an answer to these questions by analyzing the scientific practices of individuating genomic parts and by critically reconstructing the metaphysical assumptions that underlie these practices. My analysis focusses on the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project which was planned as a follow-up to the Human Genome Project and which aims at interpreting the DNA sequence of the human genome by identifying all of its functional parts. For a metaphysician who tries to understand part-whole relations in the biological realm, the ENCODE Project constitutes an instructive case study because it is among the few cases in which biologists explicitly seek to individuate part-whole relations. My central claim will be that there are two necessary conditions for a molecule to be a part of the human genome:  first, it must have a causal-role function, that is, it must contribute to the capacity of the genome to provide information for the synthesis of proteins, and second, it must be an actual segment of the genome’s DNA sequence. This account of genomic parthood is an example of a metaphysics of biological practice because it analyzes the explanatory and investigative practices of the biological sciences to develop claims about what the world is ultimately like.

Skepticism about Causal Evidence in Macroeconomics
Tobias Henschen, Visiting Fellow
University of Konstanz
Friday, Sept. 30, 2016
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  The ultimate justification for the study of macroeconomics is to provide knowledge on which to base policy. Policy is about manipulating one quantity to influence another, and the study of causality is the study of the specific connections that permit manipulations of one thing to influence another. While knowledge on which to base policy is available in many other disciplines (including microeconomic disciplines like labor economics), it is unavailable to macroeconomists. The reason is that the evidence that macroeconomists can provide in support of specific causal connections (e.g. between the real interest rate and aggregate output) is too inconclusive in principle. It is too inconclusive in principle because it ultimately derives from the conditions that Woodward proposes for causal connections, and because the conjunction of these conditions is unlikely to be satisfied in macroeconomics.