April 2018 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

 
What is Philosophy of Biology?: A Data-Driven Account
Phillip Honenberger, Postdoctoral Associate
University of Pittsburgh, History and Philosophy of Science
Tuesday, April 3, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning
 
Abstract:  As an evolving discipline with ambiguous and contestable boundaries, the philosophy of biology is a challenging object for historical analysis. Here I use a variety of data sources and methods to reconstruct the history of the philosophy of biology as a globally distributed network of more than 4000 individuals, hundreds of institutions, and 50,000 publications, as well as a dynamic entity with shifting membership and research programs. The approach gives new representations of such features as individual authors’ contributions to the field (through publication counts and citation counts); breakdown of geographical, disciplinary, and institutional affiliations of contributors; extent and form of collaboration between biologists and philosophers; and topical breakdown as manifest in publication keywords, conference presentations, textbooks, and syllabi. The results also provide data-based perspectives on oft-made claims about the field – for instance, that it has been especially male, especially American, especially interdisciplinary, especially collaborative, or especially useful to biologists – and raise the methodological bar for HOPOS (“history of the philosophy of science”) accounts in general.

Perspectivism: Methods, Models and Representation
Sandra D. Mitchell, U. of Pittsburgh, HPS
Tuesday, April 10, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: I will consider some implications for realism of perspectives that are encoded in the experimental methods, the theoretical models and the forms of representation associated with each that constitute scientific practice. Many philosophers have argued that the convergent results of multiple experiments provide reasons beyond any one experiment for confidence in the reality of the results. I will argue that in addition, and somewhat counter intuitively, that divergent results arising from different types of experimental procedures can also be both accurate and mutually informative about the real character of their target phenomena. I will illustrate this argument with a case student of X-ray crystallography and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy experiments to determine protein structure.

The Prospects for Amodal Concepts
Fernando Martínez-Manrique, U. of Granada, Philosophy
Tuesday, April 17, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: The possibility of amodal concepts –roughly, content-involving representational structures that are not linked to perceptual modalities– is a controversial issue in cognitive science. In this talk I examine the prospects for amodal conceps in the context of hybrid views of concepts –i.e., concepts as constituted by a heterogeneity of representational kinds. First, I distinguish amodality from closely related notions, arguing that typical attempts at defending amodality are unable to go further than crossmodality. Second, I examine an innatist route to amodality through Susan Carey’s theory of representational primitives; in particular, I deal with the problems that her claims of iconicity and discontinuity pose for an amodal theorist. Then I motivate the view of innate amodal representational primitives as functional components of heterogeneous concepts. Finally, I address the question –put forward as a challenge by Lawrence Barsalou– whether these putative amodal components can be processed in a stand-alone manner.

HPS Talk
Inclusive fitness: dissecting a scientific controversy
Jonathan Birch, London School of Economics
Friday, April 27, 2018
1:00 PM, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: W. D. Hamilton's concept of inclusive fitness is a longstanding source of controversy in evolutionary biology. For some social evolution researchers, it is the insight of a genius and an essential concept for understanding social adaptation. For others, it is an arcane, obsolete construct, based on lazy approximations and implausible assumptions, that holds back progress in the field. What's going on here, and who is right? In this talk I draw together some of the main threads from my book The Philosophy of Social Evolution (OUP, 2017) to make sense of the controversy. I explain the roots of the disagreement, offer a path to reconciliation between the two sides, and consider the wider lessons for the philosophy of biology. We end up, I suggest, with a better understanding of the explanatory role played by abstract principles like "Hamilton's rule" in evolutionary theory, and a better understanding of the explanatory roles fitness concepts are called upon to perform in explaining adaptation.