February 2018 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

Physics and Metaphysics: a Modest-ambitious Manifesto
Vincenzo Fano, Visiting Fellow
University of Urbino, Italy
Friday, February 2, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: I move from the recent devastating criticism to the new analytical metaphysics project pursued by Lewis, Lowe, Schaffner, Fine and many others. Indeed Hofweber, Ladyman, Price inter alia showed convincingly that this program is not related to Quine and it is completely unjustified. I will attempt to save something, moving from a semantic view of scientific theories, emphasizing that metaphysical claims are strictly correlated with our best scientific theories and accepting esoteric metaphysics if it is regimented in logical term. Even revisionary metaphysics is possible, but it has to face indirect empirical control.

Data (Long) Before Big Data
Chris Meyns, Visiting Fellow
Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Tuesday, February 6, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Was there a concept of data before the data revolution? Scarcely any work has been dedicated to the philosophical (pre-)history of the concept of data. Rosenberg (2013) has argued that the concept develops in the early modern period, naturalizing in the mid-eighteenth century as a “rhetorical concept”, signifying whatever in a given dialogical context is agreed beyond argument. In this paper I challenge this picture on two fronts: (1) I argue that relevant philosophical use of the concept of data can already be found earlier than Rosenberg suggests, namely in the seventeenth century; and (2) the concept of ‘data’ in these early modern debates is no more (merely) ‘rhetorical’ than any of the other core concepts in its vicinity, such as ‘fact’, ‘probability’ or ‘objectivity’.

Causation as Production and Dependence
Dmitri Gallow, University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, February 13, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Many contemporary theories of singular causation (alternatively: token causation, or actual causation) are formulated within the framework of structural equations modelling (or causal modelling). These theories say whether a variable value C=c caused another variable value E=e only given a particular causal model. And the majority of these theories are model-variant in the following sense: they will say that C=c caused E=e in one model; but, when we remove an inessential variable, they change their tune and say that C=c didn't cause E=e. In this talk, I develop a theory of causation which is capable of securing the intuitive verdicts in a wide range of cases from the literature and which is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C=c caused (didn't cause) E=e in a causal model M, then it will continue to say that C=c caused (didn't cause) E=e once we've removed an inessential variable from M. According to this model-invariant theory, causation is a hybrid of production (understood as the local propagation of deviant, non-inertial variable values) and counterfactual dependence.

Reviving the Hopeful Monster: Richard Goldschmidt and Saltational Evolution
Michael R. Dietrich, University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of History & Philosophy of Science
Friday, February 16, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Beginning in 1932, Richard Goldschmidt championed a saltational theory of evolution that integrated developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and genetics. While Goldschmidt’s efforts won him a reputation as a “scientific heretic,” his approach was not forgotten after his death. In fact, a small but growing group of biologists have maintained an interest in Goldschmidt’s ideas and approach. This interest in Goldschmidt’s saltational ideas of hopeful monsters and developmental macromutations has become even more pronounced during the recent surge of research in evo-devo. In this paper I will survey Goldschmidt’s saltational ideas and their subsequent fate in the biological community. I will argue that contemporary researchers who invoke Goldschmidt’s saltational ideas do not seem to be trading on his reputation as a heretic in the same way as had earlier “neo-Goldschmidtians.” That said, the contemporary revival of Goldschmidt’s views does not indicate that his ideas have been proven correct. Rather, the invocation of his work is no longer intended to shock, but to mark a re-emerging field of research.

Anomalies and the Range of Applications of an Empirical Theory: Two Case Studies
Ulrich Gähde, Visiting Fellow
University of Hamburg, Germany
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: How is the range of applications of an empirical theory to be determined? One natural answer is to first mark out a class of paradigmatic applications of a theory and to then insist that these applications – as well as any other systems that are sufficiently similar to them – can be successfully described with the help of this theory. However, the term “sufficiently similar” is obviously underdetermined in numerous respects. The talk focuses on a specific aspect of this underdetermination: whether two systems are sufficiently similar depends crucially on the theoretical perspective under which they are regarded. The implications of this fact for the determination of a theory's range of applications are to be analyzed in two case studies. Both of them refer to systems for which the following two statements hold: 1) numerous largely similar systems (as seen from the perspective of the theory in question) were successfully analyzed with the help of this theory in the past. 2) Attempts to apply that theory to a new system of the same type leads to the occurrence of striking anomalies. In the first case – which refers to anomalies concerning a system of binary stars in the constellation of Herculis – after decades of unsuccessful attempts, these conflicts between theory and data could be removed within the framework of that theory. In the second case – which refers to the much better-known case of the anomalous advance of Mercury’s perihelion – all corresponding attempts to remove the anomalies within the framework of the established theory failed. The comparison of these two cases reveals substantial problems in determining the range of applications of an empirical theory, as well as in formulating the empirical claim associated with it.

Bridging Non-Human and Human Economic Decision-Making
Armin Schulz, Visiting Fellow
University of Kansas
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether and when data from (non-human) animal decision-making can be useful for understanding human economic decision-making. It focuses on the debate about the most compelling economic theory of choice—especially among classical rational choice theory, prospect theory, regret theory, and the theory of simple heuristics—and establishes three overarching conclusions. First, it shows that what the economic debate among these different economic theories of choice comes down to is the questions of (a) whether economic decision-making is constituted by a monistic or a pluralistic decision-making mechanism, and (b) of what the nature of this mechanism is. Second, it develops a methodological framework for relating data on animal economic decision-making to these questions. According to this framework, mirroring among human and animal economic decision-making speaks in favor of a pluralistic view of economic decision-making, and can suggest the domains of application of the different components of this pluralistic economic decision-making machinery. By contrast, the discovery of significant human uniqueness speaks in favor of a restricted form of pluralism—or even monism. Third and finally, the paper shows that, so far, many of the data about animal economic decision-making suggest that humans and animals make decisions in very similar ways, thus favoring a pluralistic view of economic decision making. Further, these data suggest that prospect theory-like decision-making—which is especially pronounced in humans—is focused on property decisions, and that simple heuristics-like decision-making—which humans share with birds (among others)—is not focused on social decisions. All in all, therefore, the paper shows that data about animal thinking and acting can be useful for making progress in economics—even if only in a limited manner. However, it also shows that these data need to be interpreted appropriately: relating them to the disputes about human economic decision making is far from straightforward.