November & December 2017 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

Ockham’s Razor and the Topology of Simplicity
Kevin Kelly (with Konstantin Genin), Carnegie Mellon University, Dept. of Philosophy
Friday, November 3, 2017
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  One of the most pressing questions in general philosophy of science is the nature of simplicity and it’s connection to epistemic justification.  We propose a topological concept of empirical simplicity, and we show that favoring only theories that are simplest in that sense keeps one on the straightest (i.e., most deductive) course to the true answer to the question under discussion.  Although Karl Popper did not mention topology explicitly, our ideas provide a fresh and appealing perspective on many of his proposals.

Public Goods and Epistemic Governance
Kevin Zollman, Carnegie Mellon University, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, November 7, 2017
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma and Tragedy of the Commons are well known problems for the social organization of economic life. In these social situations, individuals who pursue their own self interest will make the group as a whole worse off. While well studied in situations of instrumental rationality, they have been less studied in the context of epistemology and philosophy of science.  In this talk I will explore some epistemic social dilemmas and discuss how various solutions might work in the epistemic setting. Ultimately, I consider whether these problems necessitate a role for "epistemic governance."

Concensus: Sometimes it Doesn’t Add Up
John Beatty, University of British Columbia, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, November 14, 2017
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  Perhaps the most familiar notion of "consensus" involves some sort of counting – e.g., vote tallying – resulting in unanimity or a majority. But consensus is a heterogeneous category. And some important forms, as practiced, are quite different from this. I will consider a form of consensus that is more collective than aggregative; it goes by various names, referring to its various aspects: "decision by interpretation," "apparent consensus," "nemine contradicente," "joint agreement." It is not about counting, nor about unanimity, nor a majority. What especially concerns me here is the manner in which this form of consensus represents the epistemic state-of-play of a community of experts, without revealing differences among the members. Such apparent consensus can therefore mask considerable disagreement. I will discuss contexts and senses in which such decision procedures are, and are not, advantageous. And I will illustrate differences between such consensus practices, and the more commonly analyzed unanimity and majority practices, with reference to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Construct Validity Challenges in Psychiatry Using Human and Animal Models
Kenneth Schaffner, University of Pittsburgh, HPS Distinguished U. Prof. Emeritus
Tuesday, November 28, 2017
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  The concept of ‘construct validity’ in psychology and psychiatry had its origin in the extraordinarily influential 1955 article by Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl (also reprinted in the first volume of the Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science in 1956). Initially formulated in the context of latter-day logical empiricism, the notion has evolved through various versions through to today, where it continues to influence not only its original disciplines, but has also been used by the prominent behavioral geneticists Caspi and Moffitt as an alternative to genome-wide associations studies (GWAS). However, two alternative approaches to validity in these areas have developed almost independently of the Cronbach and Meehl tradition. One of these, most influential in psychiatry, arose from the work of Robins and Guze on “diagnostic validity” in 1970, and was refined and extended by Kendler in the 1980s. This approach in its most recent version was used by the DSM-5 work groups for modifications of disorders presented in that 2013 publication. A third related but distinct approach involving the use of animal models to advance genetic and neuroscience approaches to psychiatric disorders comes from the work of Willner in the 1980s as well as Nestler and Hyman in 2010. More recently this line of investigation has been analyzed using the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework of the National Institutes of Health.  This talk will summarize the major features of these three approaches to construct validity and propose an integrated model of the concept by drawing on these three traditions.

Safe-and-substantive Perspectivism
David Danks, Carnegie Mellon University, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, December 5, 2017
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  This talk will examine the question of perspectivism in science: To what extent are our theories (or models, or…) “perspectival,” or “from a perspective,” or some similar notion? Some of the recent debates about perspectivism have suggested that it is either unsafe (by implying an implausibly strong relativism about scientific theories & knowledge), or else not substantive (by asserting only innocuous banalities about scientific practice). In contrast, I will argue that there are meaningful ways in which our scientific theories are inevitably perspectival, and these very same reasons block any slide to strong relativism (unless we embrace extreme skepticism about the external world). That is, we should embrace a safe-and-substantive perspectivism.