

Plan for Week 8
Reconciling Two Images

- I. Related but Distinguishable Metaphysical Divisions (Potential Dualisms):
- Space of Reasons Nonnaturalism (§36) vs. Scientific Naturalism (§42).
 - Antidescriptivist Bifurcation (Huw Price): Prescription vs. Description.
 - Norms vs. Causes.
 - “The World” in Wide vs. Narrow Sense, dependence/independence w/res to discursive activities.
 - World of facts vs. World of Particulars (ontological realism vs. nominalism).
 - Manifest vs. Scientific Images.
 - Appearance vs. Reality in Kantian sense of phenomena/noumena.
- II. The Manifest Image (MI):
- Traditional world of common sense. Life-world. *Zuhandensein* vs. *Vorhandensein*.
 - Correlational-observable vs. postulational-theoretical methods.
 - Framework of *persons* (normative space).
 - Internal development of MI, on the way to modern natural science, is *de-anthropomorphizing* (disenchantment, Weber’s *Entzauberung*).
 - Sellars is putting forward a theory of *modernity*, in terms of the rise of science.
Compare Hegel on modernity: from the status-dependence of normative attitudes to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.
 - Two kinds of philosophy: perennial and modern.
 - Perennial philosophy explicates and systematizes the MI.
 - Modern philosophy’s central question is how to understand the *relations between the MI and the SI*. PSIM and SM are Sellars’s contribution.
- III. The Clash of Images:
- Parity* of Manifest Image (MI) and Scientific Image (SI):
 - Each image aspires and purports to be *complete*, and to *include* the other as a proper part.
 - Further, for us moderns, each is *indispensable*.
 - Primacy* of SI over MI in dimension of describing and explaining what there (really) is.
 - Eddington’s Table.
 - Scientia mensura* (note preamble and nominalist subtext).
 - Biggest issue is reconciling: the *indispensability* of MI framework of norms-and-persons with the *primacy* of SI as descriptively, and so ontologically, authoritative.
 - Sellars also raises an idiosyncratic version of the “hard problem” of consciousness, focusing on the *homogeneity* of visual sense impressions.
- IV. Three Strategies for Reconciling *Parity* of Images with *Primacy* of Scientific Image:
- Conceptual irreducibility and causal reducibility (O’Shea, based on SSMB).
 - Ideology vs. Ontology (Cf. sense vs. reference), in a nominalist, world-of-particulars framework.
 - Fusion of Images: Replacing descriptive/explanatory conceptual resources of Manifest Image with those of the Scientific Image, within the vocabulary of norms and persons.

Introduction:

In PSIM, Sellars defines the task of philosophy as saying
“how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.”

This is often cited as a folksy, informal way of indicating the scope of philosophers’ metaphysical ambitions.

Once we are sensitized to Sellars’s ontological nominalism, though, we can hear it as a specification that has much more specific resonances.

By “‘things’, in the broadest sense of the term,” he means *particulars*, the particulars that are what there *really* is “in the narrow sense” of the term.

And by “‘hang together’, in the broadest sense of the term,” he means combine into ones-in-many of a kind that is nominalistically acceptable: not sharing properties or standing in relations, not as the subject-matter of facts—not even forming mereological wholes.

For him, particulars “hang together” in the narrow sense only by forming *groups*, picked out by *plurals*: we can talk not only about Leo and Leona, but about *lions*—precisely because we can construe talk of ‘lions’ as *not* referring to something *over and above* the particulars Leo, Leona, and their kin.

First section of PSIM on philosophers as *researchers* for whom being *intellectuals* is essential.

For intellectuals worry about how the parts of the culture (especially the high culture) “hang together”, and the research area of philosophers is precisely this.

But, apart from the implicit ontological nominalism, it turns out that Sellars has something *much* more specific in mind: how two perspectives on human culture hang together.

He pretends that it is Eddington’s two tables that need to be reconciled.


Really it is C.P. Snow’s two cultures.

I. Related but Distinguishable Metaphysical Divisions (Potential Dualisms):

We have now addressed half of the diagram, proceeding clockwise:

the green half, the left-hand and top quadrants, the Western and Northern directions.

(The lands of the Munchkins and Gillikans in OZ, with the Winkies and Quadlings yet to come.)



- a) Space of Reasons Nonnaturalism (§36) vs. Scientific Naturalism (§42).
- b) Antidescriptivist Bifurcation (Huw Price): Prescription vs. Description.
- c) Norms vs. Causes.
- d) “The World” in Wide vs. Narrow Sense, dependence/independence w/res to discursive activities.
- e) World of facts vs. World of Particulars (ontological realism vs. nominalism).
- f) Manifest vs. Scientific Images.
- g) Appearance vs. Reality in Kantian sense of phenomena/noumena.

1. Rehearse material from Week One on:
 - Kant’s replacement of mind/body with norm/fact distinction.
 - 19th century German neoKantianism, from Kuno Fischer through the Marburg and Southwest nKs, to Cassirer.
Using the normative to distinguish philosophy from natural sciences.
 - But is the contrast term ‘fact’, ‘description’, or ‘cause’?

Or is it ‘laws’ vs. ‘our **conceptions** of laws’?

This latter has an **an sich** vs. **für sich** Hegelian flavor in the way it shows up in PSIM in the form of the emphasis on **how our *being persons depends on our understanding ourselves as persons.***

- C.I. Lewis, giving neoKantianism a *pragmatist* twist,
- Carnap, as viewed by Sellars.

2. As I told the story (and as Sellars sees it), the big challenge posed by the Kantian revolution was to keep the norm/fact distinction from becoming a dualism, as the Cartesian mind/body distinction had.

- Fred Beiser is right that this is the conceptual issue that sank the 19th century neoKantian movement.
- The Anglophone tradition by and large ignored this issue for the first ¾ of the 20th century.
- A corresponding issue about specifically *moral* normativity was live during this whole time, but it was not appreciated how the concerns extended to all of our discursive activity.
- The later Wittgenstein had this issue as one of his principal concerns.
- Starting in the ‘80s, Kripke raised a version of the issue as a reading of Wittgenstein, under the heading of “the rule-following considerations.” But it was seen as a narrowly *semantic* issue, not in its full Kant-Wittgenstein dimensions.
- In the ‘90s, *Mind and World* and *Making It Explicit* did raise the issue in full generality. But it remained in a niche.

3. Sellars takes the issue head on in PSIM (and then *SM*).

It is at the center of his philosophical concerns. That is why he said the he hoped the effect of his work would be to “**move analytic philosophy from its Humean to its Kantian phase.**”

4. Of course he didn’t think he could in PSIM *solve* the problem of getting the normative and the matter-of-factual into a single vision.

He was

- setting a problem,
- indicating the most important puzzle pieces, constraints on or criteria of adequacy for a solution, and
- gesturing in the direction he thought most promising for assembling those pieces so as to satisfy those criteria.

5. Rehearse briefly the differences and similarities between the alternatives:

- a) Space of Reasons Nonnaturalism (§36) vs. Scientific Naturalism (§42).
- b) Antidescriptivist Bifurcation (Huw Price): Prescription vs. Description.

- c) Norms vs. Causes.
- d) "The World" in Wide vs. Narrow Sense, dependence/independence w/res to discursive activities.
- e) World of facts vs. World of Particulars (ontological realism vs. nominalism).
- f) Manifest vs. Scientific Images.
- g) Appearance vs. Reality in Kantian sense of phenomena/noumena.

II. The Manifest Image (MI):

- a) Traditional world of common sense. Life-world. *Zuhandensein* vs. *Vorhandensein*.
- b) Correlational-observable vs. postulational-theoretical methods.
- c) Framework of *persons* (normative space).
- d) Internal development of MI, on the way to modern natural science, is *de-anthropomorphizing* (disenchantment, Weber's *Entzauberung*).
- e) Sellars is putting forward a theory of *modernity*, in terms of the rise of science. Compare Hegel on modernity: from the status-dependence of normative attitudes to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.
- f) Two kinds of philosophy: perennial and modern.
 - Perennial philosophy explicates and systematizes the MI.
 - Modern philosophy's central question is how to understand the *relations between* the MI and the SI. PSIM and *SM* are Sellars's contribution.

1. Surface treatment of PSIM:

Two images:

- i. **Manifest Image (MI):** Two forms of MI: original and eventual, with the transition being a process of *depersonalizing*, *Entzauberung*, disenchantment—but WS's version is more specific about this. 'Manifest/Latent' is **Freud's** language for two levels of content in dreams.
 - ii. **Scientific Image (SI)** distinguished by *postulational*, as opposed to merely *correlational* methods of description-and-explanation. Cf. Chapter 2 of Foucault's *The Order of Things*.
2. Correlational vs. Postulational way of characterizing MI/SI. This is to distinguish them *methodologically*.

Q: Why should *anthropomorphic* conception (everything is a person) go with *correlational*? Why should postulational arise only with demise of anthropomorphic?

3. Sellars tells his just-so story about successive, cumulative de-anthropomorphism in order to emphasize that the concept of the person is at the center of the MI.

4. Two kinds of philosophy: **perennial** and **modern** (WS does not name the second one).

a) Here we get two sorts of characterization, which do not *obviously* line up:

- i. Perennial is within the MI. Its job is to articulate, explore, and develop the MI. Modern is concerned rather with the *relation* between the MI and the SI. In this sense, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel are all modern philosophers.
- ii. Perennial uses only the resources of the MI, hence, at most *correlational* methods. Modern also uses *postulational* ones. It is *theoretical, systematic*, in a way the perennial philosophy is not. Note that Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel are also, I would think, modern philosophers.

Yet WS says that all these thinkers are (also?) perennial philosophers. Note that WS himself is doing perennial philosophy in describing (a-i) how original led to traditional-modern MI.

b) Reminder: Wittgenstein “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.” He means to be resisting exactly the move from “correlational” to “postulational” methods *in philosophy*. This is the “logical behaviorist” line that Sellars rejects, on behalf of “methodological behaviorism” or “scientific behaviorism” in telling the story of the genius Jones in the second half of EPM.

c) *Mind and World*: A perennial philosopher addresses the question distinctive of *modern* philosophy. But he does so very much in the terms Sellars reserves for perennial philosophy when he says that it restricts itself to the resources of the manifest image to do that. For his characterization of the SI is *extremely* minimal. Try going upstairs to HPS and offering as a criterion of demarcation of the scientific that it is the “realm of law.”

a. Traditional world of common sense.

Husserl’s “life-world.”

Heidegger’s *Zuhandensein* vs. *Vorhandensein*.

Heidegger calls the *zuhanden*, ready-to-hand, ‘equipment’. It is things like hammers. Things with their normative significances. Cultural *affordances*.

His claim is that to get to things that are merely *present* one must *abstract*, (Husserl’s ‘bracketing’).

One should not think of *zuhanden* things as merely present things that have been *imbued* with normative significance. It is the other way around.

This is important for later claim of MI to *include* the SI—which, after all, grew out of MI.

b. Correlational vs. postulational is a bold hypothesis about what is unique about the SI, identifying it with the postulation of theoretical entities.

It contrasts with mere correlations of observables.

Foucault in the opening chapter of *The Order of Things*, on *signatures*.

This bit has an echo when we look at the two sorts of philosophy:

c. This, I think, is the key: MI is the *realm of norms*.

Sellars focuses on normative *subjects* (persons), but normative *statuses* (commitments, entitlements, authority, responsibility) are equally essential, as well as the practices and practical attitudes towards such subjects and statuses.

d. Sellars puts forward another bold hypothesis about the internal development of at least the Western MI: that its route to giving birth to science goes by de-personalizing: treating things as having fewer and fewer of the properties of *people*, gradually draining off the normative properties to get mere *things*.

- e. Sellars in effect sees a great sea-change in the history of humanity, coming with the advent of modern science, and the beginnings, in the Enlightenment, of attempts to understand it and ourselves in the light of it.

Hegel thinks likewise, but he sees the advent science and the Enlightenment as only the *theoretical* aspect of a much larger change: the advent of *modernity*.

He sees the rise of the new science as of a piece with political and economic changes: the rise of markets and representative government, reflected also in the arts, the rise of Protestantism in religion.

He seeks to understand this whole phenomenon in its unity.

He thereby inaugurates nineteenth-century *social science*, especially sociology, which began as essentially the study of the advent of modernity. But also “political economy.”

- f. Two kinds of philosophy: perennial and modern.

- Perennial philosophy explicates and systematizes the MI.
- Modern philosophy’s central question is how to understand the *relations between* the MI and the SI. PSIM and *SM* are Sellars’s contribution.

Seeing modern philosophy as centered on the philosophy of science is a neo-Kantian idea (Kuno Fischer).

What do we learn about the world, about knowledge, and about ourselves from the fact that science is the best way for us to learn about the world?

On Sellars’s rendering,

LW is a perennial philosopher, and so is McD.

Aristotle is the paradigm.

But how can one say that Plato and Aristotle did not postulate unobservables—ideas, forms, essences...?

Summary of PSIM at its midpoint:

Summary: I devoted my attention in the previous sections to defining what I called the ‘manifest’ image of man-in-the-world. I argued that this image is to be construed as a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world, in short, came to be man.

BB: Becoming Dasein by asking the question of the Being of Dasein.

I pointed out **that in any sense in which this image, in so far as it pertains to man, is a ‘false’ image, this falsity threatens man himself, inasmuch as he is, in an important sense, the being which has this image of himself.** I argued that what has been called the perennial tradition in philosophy—*philosophia perennis*—can be construed as **the attempt to understand the structure of this image, to know one’s way around in it reflectively with no intellectual holds barred.** I analysed some of the main features of the image and showed how the categories in terms of which it approaches the world can be construed as progressive prunings of categories pertaining to the person and his relation to other persons and the group. I argued that the perennial tradition must be construed to include not only the Platonic tradition in its broadest sense, but philosophies of ‘common sense’ and ‘ordinary usage’. I argued **what is common to all these philosophies is that acceptance of the manifest image as the *real*. They attempt to understand the achievements of theoretical science in terms of this framework, subordinating the categories of theoretical science to its categories.** I suggested that the most fruitful way of approaching the problem of **integrating** theoretical science with the framework of sophisticated common sense into **one comprehensive synoptic vision** is to view it not as a piecemeal task—e.g. first a fitting together of the common sense conception of physical objects with that of theoretical physics, and then, as a separate venture, a fitting together of the common sense conception of man with that of theoretical psychology—but rather as a matter of **articulating** two whole ways of seeing the sum of things, two images of man-in-the-world and attempting to bring them together in a ‘**stereoscopic**’ view. [386]

BB: Here WS is doing what he almost *never* does: giving us a map to the structure of his essay—what he has done, what he is going to do, and why.

III. The Clash of Images:

- a) *Parity* of Manifest Image (MI) and Scientific Image (SI):
 - Each image aspires and purports to be *complete*, and to include the other as a proper part.
 - Further, for us moderns, each is *indispensable*.
- b) *Primacy* of SI over MI in dimension of describing and explaining what there (really) is. *Scientia mensura* (note preamble and nominalist subtext).
- c) Biggest issue is reconciling the *indispensability* of MI framework of norms-and-persons with the *primacy* of SI as descriptively, and so ontologically, authoritative.
- d) Sellars also raises an idiosyncratic version of the “hard problem” of consciousness, focusing on the *homogeneity* of visual sense impressions.

a) Natural science aims to be a *comprehensive* story.

But in what sense?

(WS: reference, not sense, and ontology, not ideology.)

- b) So does a story about our discursive practices aim at comprehensiveness, among which practices natural science takes its place as one distinctive, cognitively and practically hugely successful, form or instance.
- c) Historical ways of construing this reciprocal inclusion:
 - i. Heidegger: *Zuhandensein* and *Vorhandensein*. The implicitly normative *vorhanden* is more comprehensive.
 - ii. Hegel’s “in-itself” and “for-itself (picked up clumsily by Sartre *en-soi* and *pour-soi*).
- d) Price’s object-naturalism and subject-naturalism.
- e) My preferred way: what can be specified in deontic normative pragmatic metavocabulary and what can be specified in (alethic modal) representational semantic metavocabulary.
 - i. Can codify the *use* of representational semantic metavocabularies in normative pragmatic metavocabularies.
 - ii. Can one specify how the use of a normative pragmatic MV represents things as being, how it describes things?

6. Descriptive-Explanatory Primacy of Natural Science. Cf. *scientia mensura*.

- a) Sellars does not address the norms implicit in discursive practice as posing the largest challenge for descriptive-explanatory primacy of natural science.

Millikan does, and teleosemanticists generally do.

One might hope to begin with Gibsonian affordances, or Tomasello’s comparative developmental psychology.

Jarda Peregrin’s new book: *Normative Species: How Naturalized Inferentialism Explains Us*.

Primacy vs. Parity:

Modern is characterized in two different ways:

- α) as committed to the *primacy* of the SI (*scientia mensura*)
- β) as committed to the *parity* of the MI and the SI, in the guise of a “synoptic vision” that comprises the two.

The *surface* issue is: How can one reconcile the *primacy* and the *parity*?

- a. *Primacy* of the SI vs. *Parity* of the images. Passages:
 - i. (43) [386]
 - ii. (44) [386]
 - iii. (47) [388]

The primacy thesis is referred to at (79) [406].

At end of §41 of *EPM*, get the *scientia mensura*: **“In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.”**

- b. The parity thesis is the need for a “synoptic vision”, e.g. at : (34) [385], (43) [386], (44) [386] (77) [405]

A key point for WS is **the claim to *completeness* that each image/conception makes**. (Cf. (47) [388] and (44) [386].) [W]hen we turn our attention to ‘the’ scientific image which emerges from the several images proper to the several sciences, we note that although the image is *methodologically* dependent on the world of sophisticated common sense, and in this sense, does not stand on its own feet, yet **it purports to be a *complete* image, i.e. to define a framework which could be the *whole truth* about that I which belongs to the image**. Thus **although methodologically a development *within* the manifest image, the scientific image presents itself as a *rival* image**. [388] [BB: Here is a critical claim about the claim to *completeness* on the part of the SI. The perennial philosophy (PP) makes a corresponding claim on behalf of the MI. (44) [386]

- b) Instead, Sellars takes a screeching turn into what looks like a by-way or detour:
 - i. Sellars takes the biggest challenge to be a version of Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness.
 - ii. It is a distinctive and idiosyncratic version, which does not seem to have been much taken up by contemporary philosophers of mind interested in consciousness. It concerns sense impressions. Recall from *EPM* that they are to have properties “structurally analogous” to the properties of actual sensible objects. Sellars is impressed that those observable (sensible) properties include the structural *homogeneity* of colors: the fact that no matter how small an expanse of color one takes, that expanse is still *homogeneously* that color. His example is a translucent pink ice cube. (Which Jim O’Shea’s book uses as the cover.)

Looking ahead: There are *two levels of supervenience* (reducibility, token-token identity, etc.) **claims** that one can consider, and it is important to keep them distinct:

a) *Particular, ground-level* supervenience (etc.) claims, which say that, for particular values of ‘ ϕ ’ and ‘ ψ ’, ψ -vocabulary/facts supervene (etc.) on ϕ -vocabulary/facts. In this sense, one might be a scientific naturalist of the physicalist sort about, say, intentional vocabulary, but *not* about moral normative vocabulary (perhaps because one has an *error theory* [Mackie] about it, or one takes it not to be *descriptive* or *explanatory*, but to perform some different linguistic function).

b) *General, metaphysical* supervenience (etc.) claims, to the effect that *everything real* (all values of ψ) supervenes (etc.) on, say, the fundamental physical (ϕ). Sellars’s *scientia mensura* is a claim of this sort: “In the dimension of describing and explaining, science is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not.”

Claims of the second, grander, sort must, it seems, be motivated by some form of the *trans-domain hegemony inference*:

- i) *From Intramural excellence*: the exhibition by the favored ϕ of some kind of special (presumably *unique*) privilege within its own domain (paradigmatically, causal or explanatory *completeness* or *closedness*, a distinctive kind of explanatory *adequacy* or *success*);
- ii) *To Extramural Authority or Privilege*: the possession by the favored ϕ of a *different* kind of special (again presumably *unique*—i.e. no *other* vocabulary has *this* sort of privilege) with respect to *other* domains, for instance that facts statable in other vocabularies must *supervene* on, or be *reducible* to the ϕ -facts.

The challenge for those making claims of this grander, metaphysical or ontological sort (and there is also a *methodological* or *epistemological* version that says that the *methods* of natural science have proven themselves so successful within their own domain that they deserve to be thought of not just as especially good or promising, but as the *only* methods for delivering genuine (empirical?) *knowledge*) is to specify a kind of *intramural excellence* in (i) that genuinely justifies the specific sort of claim to *extramural authority* in (ii).

Compare the political analog: Our system (that say, of the English in the days of the British Empire, 21st century U.S. Republicans, evangelical fundamentalist Muslims...) works so well at home (exhibits virtue of type (i)) that that system ought to govern (to possess authority of type (ii) over) other domains.

IV. Three Strategies for Reconciling Parity of Images with Primacy of Scientific Image:

- a) Conceptual irreducibility and causal reducibility (O’Shea, based on SSMB).
- b) Ideology vs. Ontology (Cf. sense vs. reference), in a nominalist, world-of-particulars framework.
- c) Fusion of Images: Replacing descriptive/explanatory conceptual resources of Manifest Image with those of the Scientific Image, within the vocabulary of norms and persons.

7. O’Shea: Challenge of Reconciling Reducibility and Irreducibility of Normative to Natural.

- a) 3 rough stages in Sellars’s development on this point:
 - i. “Semantical Solution to the Mind/Body Problem”
 - ii. PSIM
 - iii. SM
 - iv. (Then process version, but not different enough to matter for this issue.)
- b) When faced with a contradiction, make a distinction: normative is logically-*conceptually irreducible* to natural, but is *causally reducible* to it.
- c) Under “logical-conceptual irreducibility” he means cannot *define* norms in terms of attitudes, in a sense that would support *intersubstitution, salva veritate* or *salva consequentia*.
- d) Under “causal reducibility”, he means causal explanations entirely in terms of *attitudes*, not normative *statuses*. Harman’s skepticism about moral norms: best explanation of our normative attitudes appeals only to other attitudes (e.g. those of our parents, teachers, and peers).

IF WE USE ‘ETHICAL ASSERTION’ IN SUCH A WAY THAT ‘JONES OUGHT TO PAY HIS DEBT’ IS AN ETHICAL ASSERTION, BUT ‘JONES FEELS THAT HE OUGHT TO PAY HIS DEBT’ IS NOT, THEN WE CAN SAY THAT TO CLAIM THAT OUGHT IS CAUSALLY REDUCIBLE TO IS IS TO CLAIM THAT ONE CAN GIVE A CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF THE HISTORY OF MORAL AGENTS WITHOUT MAKING ETHICAL ASSERTIONS.

(ssmb ¶6: 48–9)

- e) Sellars claims:
 - i. Ethical naturalists and ethical intuitionists (nonreductionists) agree that conceptual and logical reducibility go together—or at least, they don’t make the distinction.
 - ii. Can agree with the naturalists that normative claims are *causally* reducible to non-normative natural ones. Intuitionists thought they needed to deny that in order to hold onto conceptual irreducibility.
 - iii. Can agree with the intuitionists that normative claims are *conceptually* irreducible to nonnormative natural ones. Naturalists thought they needed to deny that to hold onto the causal reducibility.

f) O'Shea claims Sellars holds same view for moral norms as we-intentions: not conceptually reducible, but causally-motivationally, our learning to respond to normative attitudes (intentions as statuses) by *doing* something accordingly is enough for causal-motivational efficacy of normative attitudes.

g) It is important to recognize that Sellars in this sense took there to be available, in principle, a fully adequate naturalistic, ultimately extensionalist account of the nature and force of normative 'ought's themselves (and the same will hold, in this sense, for his views on intentionality and meaning as well; cf. SSIS 439). In the Preface to *Science and Metaphysics*, Sellars makes the following remark in this explanatory spirit, in anticipation of his account of normative 'ought's in the final chapter of that book:
... unless and until the 'scientific realist' can give an adequate explication of concepts pertaining to the recognition of norms and standards by rational beings his philosophy of mind must remain radically unfinished business.

(SM p. x)

h) The central idea is that, on the one hand, the latter behavioral and psychological patterns are what they are primarily as a result of the communally shared 'ought-to-be' norms or rules that have shaped them (together with whatever more basic representational structures the human animal comes equipped with; see Sellars MEV). On the other hand, however, causal explanations concerning the presupposed uniformities or patterns of linguistic behavior and inner processing themselves could in principle be given in entirely naturalistic, non-normative terms.

i) t

I AM NOT CLAIMING THAT TO *FOLLOW* A PRINCIPLE, I.E. ACT ON PRINCIPLE, IS IDENTICAL WITH EXHIBITING A UNIFORMITY OF PERFORMANCE THAT ACCORDS WITH THE PRINCIPLE. i THINK THAT ANY SUCH IDEA IS RADICALLY MISTAKEN.¹⁰ i AM MERELY SAYING THAT THE ESPOUSAL OF A PRINCIPLE OR STANDARD, *WHATEVER ELSE IT INVOLVES*, IS CHARACTERIZED BY A UNIFORMITY OF PERFORMANCE. aND LET emphasized that this uniformity, though not the principle of which it is the manifestation, is describable in matter-of-factual terms.

(TC: 216)

THE SITUATION IS EVEN CLEARER WITH RESPECT TO NORMATIVE DISCOURSE. *WHATEVER* USERS OF NORMATIVE DISCOURSE MAY BE *CONVEYING* ABOUT THEMSELVES AND THEIR COMMUNITY WHEN THEY USE NORMATIVE DISCOURSE, WHAT THEY ARE *SAYING* CANNOT BE SAID WITHOUT USING NORMATIVE DISCOURSE. tHE TASK OF THE PHILOSOPHER CANNOT BE TO SHOW HOW, IN PRINCIPLE, WHAT IS SAID BY NORMATIVE DISCOURSE COULD BE SAID WITHOUT NORMATIVE DISCOURSE, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THIS CANNOT BE DONE. HIS TASK IS RATHER TO EXHIBIT THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN NORMATIVE AND OTHER MODES OF DISCOURSE. iT WILL BE NOTICED THAT IF ONE COMBINES OUR ASSERTION OF the causal reducibility of Ought to Is, with our account of mentalistic discourse, the ethical naturalist gets everything he can reasonably hope for. Yet the fact remains that what is said by 'Jones ought to pay his debt' could not be said in even an ideal [extensionalist] PMese.
(SSMB 66: 82)

Phenomenalism:

THE HEART OF THE MATTER IS THE FACT THAT THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE 'I' WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF FIRST PERSON DISCOURSE ... IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE THESIS THAT PERSONS CAN (IN PRINCIPLE) BE EXHAUSTIVELY DESCRIBED IN TERMS WHICH INVOLVE NO REFERENCE TO SUCH AN IRREDUCIBLE SUBJECT. FOR THE DESCRIPTION WILL MENTION RATHER THAN USE THE FRAMEWORK TO WHICH THESE LOGICAL SUBJECTS BELONG. KANT SAW THAT THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS A FORM OF EXPERIENCE RATHER THAN A DISCLOSURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY. IF PERSONS ARE 'REALLY' MULTIPLICITIES OF LOGICAL SUBJECTS, THAT IS, SWARMS OF MICRO-PARTICLES, ETC., THEN UNLESS THESE MULTIPLICITIES USED THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PERSONS THERE WOULD BE NO PERSONS. BUT THE IDEA THAT PERSONS 'REALLY ARE' SUCH MULTIPLICITIES DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT CONCEPTS PERTAINING TO PERSONS BE ANALYSABLE INTO CONCEPTS PERTAINING TO SETS OF LOGICAL SUBJECTS. PERSONS MAY 'REALLY BE' BUNDLES, BUT THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON IS NOT THE CONCEPT OF A BUNDLE.

(PHm, IN sPr: 101; IN isr: 345)

ON SELLARS'S NATURALISM WITH A NORMATIVE TURN, THEN, THE NORMATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PERSONS, TOO, IS 'LOGICALLY IRREDUCIBLE' YET 'CAUSALLY REDUCIBLE' TO THE CATEGORIAL ONTOLOGY OF THE IDEAL SCIENTIFIC IMAGE.

Subtextual suggestion (the *latent*, rather than the *manifest* content)

I am going to distinguish (using Quine's terminology) *ontological* questions about what kinds of *objects* (note the pseudo-sortal) *exist*, on the one hand, and *ideological* questions about what is *true of* those objects, what kinds of *facts* involving them (*about* them) obtain.

It is a textual *surface* (meta)fact that Sellars is a metalinguistic expressivist about these latter items.

My suggestion then is that

the primacy of the SI over the MI that he is committed to is at the level of *ontology*, while the parity of MI and SI that he is also committed to is at the level of *ideology*.

"I distinguished above between the unification of the postulated *entities* of two sciences and the unification of the *sciences*. It is also necessary to distinguish between the unification of the theoretical *entities* of two sciences and the unification of the theoretical *principles* of the two sciences." (49) [389] This is the index passage for attributing the ontological/ideological, token-token identity approach to WS.

An important passage for the distinction between *ontology* and *ideology* is (18) [377]:

A fundamental question with respect to any conceptual framework is **'of what sort are the basic objects of the framework?'** This question involves, on the one hand,

- i. **the contrast between an object and what can be true of it in the way of properties, relations, and activities;** and, on the other,
- ii. **a contrast between the basic objects of the framework and the various kinds of groups they can compose.** [377]

See also: “Three lines of thought seemed to be open:

(1) Manifest objects are identical with systems of imperceptible particles in that simple sense in which a forest is identical with a number of trees.

(2) Manifest objects are what really exist; systems of imperceptible particles being ‘abstract’ or ‘symbolic’ ways of representing them.

(3) Manifest objects are ‘appearances’ to human minds of a reality which is constituted by systems of imperceptible particles. Although (2) merits serious consideration, and has been defended by able philosophers, it is (1) and (3), particularly the latter, which I shall be primarily concerned to explore.” [394]

[BB: (2) is **instrumentalism** about postulated, theoretical, merely inferentially accessible entities. Sellars rejects this, since on his conception the observable/theoretical distinction is *methodological*, not *ontological*—a matter of our mode of access to objects, not the kind of object they intrinsically are. But notice that in restricting the question to the *objects*, WS is implicitly putting to one side the *ideological* question in favor of the *ontological* one.]

Again:

Is the manifest image, subject, of course, to continual empirical and categorial refinements, **the measure of what there really is? I do not think so.** I have already indicated that of the three alternatives we are considering with respect to the comparative claims of the manifest and scientific images, **the first, which, like a child, says ‘both’, is ruled out by a principle which I am not defending in this chapter, although it does stand in need of defense.** The second alternative is the one I have just reformulated and rejected. I propose, therefore, to re-examine the case against the third alternative, **the primacy of the scientific image.** [400]

[BB: “Primacy” here means: ultimately authoritative *ontologically*, as determining *what there is*, what *exists*. WS has *not* discussed the meaning of this question. Nor has he clarified sufficiently the relations between an answer to *this* question, and an answer to the question of *ideology*: of what is *true of* those things, and how the various sources of authority on *that* topic relate. Here his *nominalism* is meant to do a lot of work (behind the scenes). Since I am inclined to the first “childish” alternative, I would be very glad to know just how to formulate the principle that he is neither defending, nor, as far as I can see, so much as stating here.]

- c. This is the line that Davidson takes in “Mental Events.” It is one that broadly *functionalist* theories of sapience permanently find tempting.
- d. It is (as Davidson, coming later is well aware), in the context of some categorial collateral hypotheses, equivalent to a *token-token identity theory*.

5. I think this strand of thought is present in Sellars and active in this essay.

- a) We have seen Sellars distinguish between “what is real in the narrow sense” and “what is real only in the broader sense” in which our norm-governed discursive activities are real.
- b) This is a *reism* (**Kotarbinski**)—the world is a world of *things* (particulars), not of *facts*.
- c) This reism corresponds to a fundamental kind of *nominalism*:

what really exists is what can be named, by real names, not onomatoids.

- d) Sellars does give metalinguistic expressivist analyses of the vocabulary that specifies facts, properties, and relations. All names formed by nominalization, including nominalization of common nouns, except for the ontologically hygienic Distributive Singular Terms, such as “the lion,” are onomatoids.
“Naming and Saying” is in the same volume introduced by PSIM.
However: his metalinguistic expressivism goes unmentioned in PSIM.
- e) The *scientia mensura* can be read as giving natural science ultimate authority over *what* there is, but not *how* it is—over *what* there is, *that* it is, but not *what* it is.

This idea is, I think, ultimately unworkable.

We cannot *identify the objects of the MI with any objects of the SI*.

[2023: It is exactly this that he gives up in SM, and works very hard to entitle himself to just such an identification. That is what *picturing* is designed to do, the function it is supposed to realize.]

The key elements of this argument are three:

i) **the incoherence of the idea of a purely descriptive vocabulary that involves no subjunctive or counterfactual commitments;**

The argument here is that

- i. the distinction between mere *labeling* and genuine *describing* is that the descriptive predicates (including common nouns) are situated in a “space of implications” (CDCM); and
- ii. those implications cannot coherently be taken to be wholly counterfactually inert. That is, they must involve making *some* distinction between auxiliary hypotheses that *would*, and those that *would not* infirm the inferences in question.

(This argument in turn depends on the two moves identified as (e-i) and (e-ii) above.) (

ii) **absolutism about identity:**

If a is identical to b, then they share *all* their empirical properties.

What distinguishes the terms is always intersubstitutability in *de dicto* ascriptions of propositional attitudes, and variants and derivatives of these.

Cf. Kripke: There are **no contingent identities**. (Lumpl is not identical to Goliath.)

iii) modal separability of objects falling under different sortals: except under *very* restricted circumstances (cat-mammal, human-woman) **trans-sortal identities** would involve identifying things that have different modal properties.

Here *model theory* is misleading, since *domains* are imagined as specified *without sortals*, by the invocation of *pseudo-sortals pro-sortals* such as “object,” “thing,” or “particular.” They are pseudo-sortals because they don’t include criteria of identity and individuation. They only have place-holders for such criteria. They really are “onomatoids.”

Picking out *objects* (particulars, and the criteria of adequacy for being entitled to use the terms that pick them out) requires *kinds* (*sortal* terms—common nouns—and the criteria of adequacy of being entitled to use the terms that pick them out).

iv) Conclusion: *No ontology without ideology.*

The world of things is not, in the end intelligible. A world of *sorted* objects is a **world of facts**—facts such that Fido is a dog. Wittgenstein was right, in the opening proposition of the *Tractatus*.

Last ‘graph of PSIM articulates the “fusion of images” strategy:

defined as a being that has intentions. Thus the conceptual framework of persons is not something that needs to be *reconciled with* the scientific image, but rather something to be *joined* to it. Thus, to complete the scientific image we need to enrich it *not* with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of community and individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we intend to do and the circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we *directly* relate the world as conceived by scientific theory to our purposes, and make it *our* world and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do our living. We can, of course, as matters now stand, realize this direct incorporation of the scientific image into our way of life only in imagination. But to do so is, if only in imagination, to transcend the dualism of the manifest and scientific images of man-of-the-world.

Working out the third reading: ***Incorporation*** of descriptive-explanatory resources of SI into the MI, **replacement** of the descriptive-explanatory resources of the MI by those of the SI:

- a. The key is to identify **the SI as authoritative about things *cognitive*** (how the world can correctly be described as being, the facts, and explanations relating them), and **the MI as authoritative in the realm of *practical doings***. (So both have an ideology, in my terms.)
- b. The MI provides the *context* for the SI, for in order to talk about concept-use, for instance, we must use its normative vocabulary (which Sellars here parses in terms of community and intention and community intentions). In this sense, if we do not add the MI to the SI, the SI is *incomplete*: it cannot account for the cognitive *activity* (a kind of practical activity) that produces the SI. But it is complete *within its domain* of description and explanation, even though the *activities* of describing and explaining do *not* fall within its jurisdiction.

- c. Description and explanation goes on in the MI as well as the SI. But here, the authority lies with the SI: where they collide or disagree, the SI has ultimate authority. This includes *both* ontology *and* ideology, so long as we are talking about describing and explaining. This is what the *scientia mensura* says.
- d. But (to paraphrase) “In characterizing something as a *person* [the axial concept of the MI] we are *not describing* it. We are placing it in the space of reasons [which is taking up a *normative, discursive* attitude towards it]—of justifying and being able to justify [of forming intentions, which are a kind of *commitment*].” This is how the other *EPM* passage (the left-wing passage) is brought into play—and into harmony with the *scientia mensura*.
- e. The primacy of the SI means that the MI should, in the end, *incorporate* the scientific vocabulary of the SI into the vocabulary it uses—not only for its description and explanation, but also *within* the scope of its specifications of norms and intentions.
- f. His final resolution seems to want us to adopt the scientific language, not just to specify objects, but also to describe them. **The descriptive resources of the MI are to be abandoned.** There really are no such things as tables, stock markets, and so on. These objects must either be identified with scientific objects, or talk of them abandoned.
- g. **This last is a transformation of the MI, as radical as that from the *original MI (where everything was some kind of person) to the current version of MI***—which shows up as a stage on the way to the eventual one, in which *all* the descriptive and cognitive-explanatory (because there is also practical-explanatory) vocabulary is taken from the best science of its time. That first transformation in the framework in which persons-in-the-world encounter persons-in-the-world (and so become persons—*this* kind of consciousness being unintelligible apart from *self*-consciousness) made us a new kind of person. (Compare: Hegel on the difference between persons-in-traditional-society and persons-in-modern-society, looking forward to a third stage of self-consciousness and so personhood.) So will the second.
- h. Sellars asks: is this the way forward to **freedom**? Or the way to a new kind of **slavery** (subjection)?
Clearly his answer is the former—he is in this matter, with Spinoza (and the Enlightenment).
Q: Why should we think that?
A: One way of characterizing **the advance of idealism over romanticism is the intimate, ineluctable intertwining of truth with reason and freedom, rather than truth with beauty.**

Is Sellars calling for the literal **conceptual genocidal suicide**? (The extinction of all persons)
He is at least inviting us to contemplate the possibility.

That would be transforming ourselves from *persons* into whatever scientific descriptive term for (can I still say “us”?), and thereby changing what we are into those things.

Or, will ‘person’ and all that goes with it, stay, just in concert with the eventual natural scientific vocabulary. He considers the possibility that that would be at most an unstable, transitional situation. We can’t know what the eventual result of such a revolution would be. (He asks: slavery or freedom?)

The **cognitive/practical, incorporation/replacement** reading of where Sellars ends up in PSIM is much more plausible than the priority of SI in ontology, parity in ideology view.

In particular, his way of reading it made much more sense of the combination of parity and primacy (priority) than mine did. It also reconciles the *scientia mensura* passage (central to right-wing Sellarsianism) with the “in characterizing an episode as one of knowing, one is not describing it...” passage (central to left-wing Sellarsianism).

On this attractive reading of PSIM, it is hard to see how the scientific naturalism (epitomized by the *scientia mensura*) and synoptic vision—corresponding to the primacy-of-the-SI claim and the parity-of-the-images claim, respectively) “hang together” with the nominalistic limb of his metalinguistic expressivism. That metalinguistic expressivism also has logical and modal limbs, and *might* have a normative limb.

So what is ideally wanted would seem to be some way of synthesizing the incorporation/replacement reading with enough aspects of the primacy of SI in ontology, parity of the images in ideology, view to make sense of connections between the scientific naturalism (recall: I’m distinguishing this from Sellars’s scientific *realism* about theoretical entities) of this essay and the nominalism about universals that is part and parcel of WS’s metalinguistic expressivism.

This, too, is a terrible idea. The life-world cannot do without its descriptive and explanatory resources.

P. 34, from Section VI of PSIM:

Now if thoughts are items which are conceived in terms of the roles they play, then there is no barrier *in principle* to the identification of conceptual thinking with neurophysiological process. There would be no ‘qualitative’ remainder to be accounted for. The identification, curiously enough, would be even more straightforward than the identification of the physical things in the manifest image with complex systems of physical particles. And in this key, if not decisive, respect, the respect in which both images are concerned with conceptual thinking (which is the distinctive trait of man), *the manifest and scientific images could merge without clash in the synoptic view.*

Here Sellars appeals to *functionalism* about thoughts to argue that we could identify thoughts with neurophysiological states. (The problems, he thinks, come when we try to do this for sense impressions.)

But this is way too quick. This would at most give us token-token identity claims, identifying the *bearers* of functional roles with neurophysiological particulars.

But the real challenge would be to specify the *functional roles* played by those states, in virtue of which they *are* conceptually contentful. For that requires *normative* vocabulary.

p. 36:

the scientific image. There the problem was to ‘fit together’ the manifest table with the scientific table. Here the problem is to fit together the manifest sensation with its neurophysiological counterpart. And, interestingly enough, the problem in both cases is essentially the same: *how to reconcile the ultimate homogeneity of the manifest image with the ultimate non-homogeneity of the system of scientific objects.*

Conclusion Where we end up

The conclusion of PSIM sketches **a reduction of normativity to intentions.** They are intentions of a special kind: **‘we’-intentions.** In pursuing this line in further articles, WS made himself **a hero of the “collective intentionality” subfield of philosophy.**

But this was a **Bad Idea.**

Two reasons it was a Bad Idea are:

- a) Critically: Intentions, like other intentional states, are themselves essentially, and not just accidentally, *normatively* significant. Cf. LW on the request (intention) to “teach the children a game.”

WS is here making a mistake of a piece with **Grice's**. Grice wanted to understand meaning or content (and the kind of normativity it essentially involves) in terms of beliefs and intentions, thought of as having *their* contents antecedently to and independently of the meanings of linguistic expressions. In fact, we need to tell *one* story about the conceptual contents of *both* kinds of item.

WS might be thinking here of intentions as "Rylean." Ryle did not understand his master Wittgenstein's point about the essentially *normative* significance of intentional states. He aspired to offer a **purely dispositional account** of them. In EPM, WS seems to go along with that.

- b) Constructively: It overlooks an alternative that should have been apparent to him, namely *metalinguistic expressivism about the normative*. After all, he is a metalinguistic expressivist about *alethic modality*, and he also claims that "**the language of modality is a transposed language of norms.**"

On such an account, the function of normative vocabulary is to make explicit a fundamental dimension of the *use* of language/expressions/concepts. Normative vocabulary should be understood in the first instance as expressed in and playing a central and fundamental role in *pragmatic* metavocabularies.

(As with other such expressivist claims, we should not assume that playing this role precludes also playing a descriptive/representational role, provided we can understand such a role as parasitic on the primary expressive role.)

Final movement of the story today should be to discuss how to construe the contrast, how to understand what is really at issue, between MI and SI.

- a) Here I want to say that the underlying issue is

**Not the two *tables*, but the two *cultures*—
not Eddington's contrast, but C.P. Snow's.**

Or, rather, it is not the two wings of the high culture, which is what Snow was concerned with, but rather the subjects studied by those two wings.

- b) I think that at the end of the day, the issue is the relation between the *discursive* and the *nondiscursive* worlds. Insofar as there is a "placement problem," this is it. It is to bring together the worlds of the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften*.