For the Sake of His Own Generation: Rorty on Destruction and Edification

> *Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir…*(Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, paragraph 6)

1. "Great systematic philosophers, like great scientists, build for eternity. Great edifying philosophers destroy for the sake of their own generation." [1] Thus Richard Rorty expresses one of his well-known meta-philosophical oppositions. How well does this opposition fit Rorty's own practice? Did Rorty edify? If he did, was it through destruction? And such edifying destruction as he was able to wreak—was it achieved in so far as Rorty eschewed construction? Is there really, in his writing, no assemblage of interconnected thought of positive and lasting (even if not eternal) value? Pressing such questions may seem to be an attempt to squeeze substance from what is only a rhetorical trope, a characteristically Rortian exaggeration, an idealized polarization. Perhaps this is so; but perhaps these questions nevertheless are worth asking, in so far as Rorty's greatest contribution to intellectual life is his imaginative, profound and radical vision of what philosophy might be. That vision is shaped less like a doctrine than a struggle, a dynamic interplay of tensions in Rorty's conception of the point and aspirations of his own intellectual activity, and this struggle comes to expression precisely in Rorty's rhetorical oppositions of styles and kinds of philosophical thought.

As Rorty articulated and sought to come to grips with, let us say, two basic intellectual impulses—with what we may call, respectively, the existentialist and the utilitarian impulse[2]—he forged a conception of philosophy that faces up to commitments and beliefs with an undeniable corrosive force, provoking accusations of relativism, cynicism and

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irresponsibility. In so far, though, as these commitments and beliefs resonate with his readers, Rorty's struggle, even, or perhaps especially, considered as a *private* struggle for a vision of his own intellectual activity that offers a degree of justification and may support a sense of pursuing, in an individual life, something worthwhile, will have interest beyond the rhetorical and the biographical. Such readers, as I imagine them, are alive to the nihilistic worry that their philosophical theorizing may be little more than a self-indulgent game, while at the same time they suspect themselves of harbouring this same nihilism because, though it threatens to rob their activity of substantive point, it also promises to absolve them of the charge of serious immorality, or at least to mitigate their sense of misspending their time and resources in the face of what civic-mindedness and solidarity in our age require, by amoralizing – aestheticizing – a persistent experience of guilt.

Readers with such uneasy relations both to their own theoretical commitments and their own intellectual practice might take from Rorty's magnificent struggle not only intellectual inspiration, but also reassurance—even, perhaps, comfort. For contrary to common criticism, articulated also in this volume,[3] Rorty's Nietzschean pragmatism is rooted in an exquisite sensitivity to the complexity of the relationship between private intellectual striving and public intellectual service that the pursuit of philosophy characteristically embodies. *Edification*, I will here suggest, becomes, in the end, Rorty's term for the achievement of a cultivated ability to manage this complex relation judiciously in the conduct of one's own intellectual life.

To set the stage, let us consider the idea of destruction as a philosophical strategy. What might that be? Could it, flourish and hyperbole aside, amount to anything but the production of a devastating argument against some position? The question points toward the last chapter of Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, "Philosophy without Mirrors," where the connection between edification and destruction is first made. This chapter opens with a discussion of hermeneutics. Gadamer's *Truth and Method*[4], Rorty tells us, distils from German Idealism just what he at this point is looking for; an idea of self-creation that does not rely on a conception of human essence—does not rely, that is, on a specifiable template, a set measure, or a predefined goal. As Rorty explains, Gadamer thereby provides an essential service to the line of thought developed in PMN so far:

He…helps reconcile the 'naturalistic' point … [made] in the previous chapter—that the "irreducibility of the *Geisteswissenschaften*" is not a matter of metaphysical dualism—with our "existentialist" intuition that redescribing ourselves is the most important thing we can do. (PMN, 358-359)

At this late point in PMN, after 350 pages of genealogical and analytical criticism of epistemology-based philosophy, Rorty unveils the fundamental message of the book; it is what we can make of ourselves, not what we may come to know, that requires our attention. It is our capacity to create ourselves, rather than our ability to reflect the world, that makes us creatures of moral worth and dignity. And so it is the elaboration of possibility, not the legislation of constraint, which should be the basic concern of humanistic reflection. As a first pass at articulating the spirit of a philosophical conversation thus oriented, the brief third part of PMN—incomplete, coarse-grained, suggestive—sets Rorty's philosophical agenda for the next three decades.

However, also the critical part of PMN—the bulk of the book—is in service of that same agenda. For why should we not respond to Rorty that epistemology-based philosophy is exactly the elaboration of human possibility, in the most general way possible? Imagining ourselves different in various ways from our past and from our present selves is well and good, but unless our imaginary efforts are disciplined by knowledge of such intransigent constraints as there may be on what we as thinking, acting beings are, then our efforts of imagination are idle, worthless fantasies. What is really humanly possible is a subject of theoretical knowledge. Such knowledge is just what philosophy has sought since its Greek inception, and what it continues to seek.

Now, this response rejects a basic contrast animating Rorty's entire oeuvre, one that constitutes, to put it oxymoronically, the essence of his pragmatist view of philosophy; the contrast, that is, between the elaboration of human possibilities and the determination of general constraints on human thought and agency. Rorty's programmatic goal is exactly to persuade philosophers to give up on the latter *just so that* we may in full awareness focus our efforts on the former. A fundamental aim, then, of the deconstruction of the epistemological tradition that occupies the bulk of PMN—a task, also, to which Rorty returns at various points in later writings—is to undermine the idea that the imaginative elaboration of possibility, on

the one hand, and the rational determination of general constraint, on the other, are simply two sides of the same coin.

"The rational determination of general constraint" is a description of vast scope—in fact, it should to be taken as more or less coextensive with "metaphysics." And it is with respect to metaphysics that the concept of destruction has application in PMN. There will be no devastating arguments against metaphysics, for metaphysics, vagueness of the concept aside, just is not the sort of thing you argue against. By the time you have specified what you argue against sufficiently clearly to frame an argument, the game is up; you are doing metaphysics.[5] Opposing metaphysics, as Rorty does, may well requite arguments against specific metaphysical theses (and one finds such arguments in PMN), but the upshot had better not be support for an alternative metaphysical thesis; the upshot must be that the particular framework of assumptions within which a set of pro-et-con arguments are mounted gives way. We should think of this not as a matter of our being brought to abandon specific theses, to change our minds about truth values, but, in accord with Rorty's romanticism, of coming to doubt the point of determining the truth values of a range of propositions that earlier mattered to us.

Throughout his counter-metaphysical writings, Rorty directs his destructive effort at essentialism in its various guises, in so far as essences are just the sort of things that may (in principle, one might wish to add) be definitively described once and for all. In PMN the particular point is to show that neither the world, nor the mind, has features that are both perfectly general, and yet of sufficient substance such as to provide real constraints on what we may know and how we may come to know it. In the later essays on truth, the point is to get us to consider the notion of truth in light if its conversational purposes, and abandon the idea that it is a substantive relation, something with a nature about which discoveries may be made such that inquiry may be improved or virtues bolstered.[6]

Pragmatism, however, even in Rorty's variety, is not principally a destructive philosophy. A fundamental aspect of Rorty's contribution to philosophy in the spirit of pragmatism consists in drawing up, and attempting to implement, proposals for how we may, using language, do various things differently from the way we have been doing them up to now. Thus we may want to treat democracy as a commitment to the continuous expansion of a circle of contingent solidarity, a kind of continually self-transcending ethnocentrism, as Rorty suggests

in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*.[7] So conceived, democrats will be committed not to a specifiable albeit idealized institutional arrangement, but to an open-ended process of institutional reform, the direction of which will be determined by the actual encounters, always to be sought out, between people, groups and communities whose practices diverge and whose descriptions may clash.

These two philosophical strategies—the destruction of essentialist conceptions and the elaboration of alternative depictions and proposals—both trade on the hermeneutical point that Rorty, in PMN, extracts from Gadamer. It is what Gadamer calls *the historicity of understanding* that Rorty deploys against the very idea of the kind of knowledge that epistemology-oriented philosophy seeks to establish.[8] And it is through the lens of this same historicity that Rorty conceives of philosophical innovation as *redescription*. Indeed, it is only against the backdrop of historicism that the conditional, practical, and experimental nature of what we may still call a constructive form of philosophizing avoids ending up either as an irrationalist shirking of the responsibilities of thinking, or, alternatively, as a garden-variety form of fallibilism. This is because historicism requires a conception of philosophy that construes it neither as sheer, self-sufficient innovation, nor as an attempted gradual approximation of a good or a truth that lies already in wait.

In PMN, Rorty proposes *edification* as the name for this conception. The idea of edification as a goal of philosophy may be understood—putting the point in hermeneutic terms—as a *task of redescription available to historical consciousness*. I elaborate the point below. I then go on to suggest that the philosophical story offered in PMN, culminating with the idea of edification, is developed significantly in CIS. Here a change in focus and scope, and a development of Rorty's conception of his purpose, provide material for a richer notion of edification. In CIS, the central opposition is between the desire to make something of one's particular self, to take responsibility for oneself as an individual, and the desire to be a member of and a contributor to a just community. Rorty's working out of the complex relation between the *private* and the *public* as purposes for redescription lead to an understanding of the opposition between *destruction* and *construction* not just as an element in the articulation of a historicist response to the pretensions of metaphysics, but as a tension of intellectual activity conceived in practical-ethical and personal terms.

2. Let us proceed, in appropriately circular fashion, by returning to Rorty's appropriation of Gadamer. For present purposes, there are two key ideas to take from Gadamer's account of understanding. The first is the idea that "prejudices are the conditions of understanding" (TM 277ff). *Prejudices* here must be taken to encompass those cognitive resources that are not (at least not as they are active or activated) under reflective or deliberate control, and by virtue of which we experience the world and what goes on in it as meaningful. These resources, moreover, are those that are bestowed on us as we are acculturated into the particular languages, practices and vocabularies that make up our cultural-historical situatedness; they are cultural particulars. Gadamer's point is that prejudices are not something we need to get rid of, as the negative to critical reflective reason's positive, but rather a condition for there being any form of understanding at all. Another way of putting the point is to say that there can be no understanding, no experience, of anything except against the background of expectations, and that expectations can never be fully rounded up by reflective reason.

The second idea is that *application* is a critical moment in all understanding. The point is quite general, but it is easily made in relation to Gadamer's own illustration; the nature of the knowledge possessed by Aristotle's practically wise agent. This is someone whose knowledge of what is good—in part, at least—consists in the ability to judge rightly in concrete situations. So descriptions of the virtue that the *phronimos* possesses will be inescapably circular as long as they abstract away from reference to actual judgements made. What for Aristotle is true of moral precepts is true, for Gadamer, of any meaningful structure; meaning comes to be in the historical unfolding of actual appropriation or use. Hence, the question for any particular appropriation or interpretation cannot be whether it gets the already available meaning of the object right, but whether it is a good, or useful, or interesting application. Evaluation of an interpretation inevitably refers back to the purposes that we want a particular interpretation to serve. Well-known and much discussed criticisms of Gadamer such as those originating with Jürgen Habermas and with E.D. Hirsch, focussing on the notion of validity in criticism and interpretation, have targeted exactly the *semantic historicism* (as I will call it) characteristic of his conception of meaning.

Now as readers of Gadamer will know, his reflections on the historicity of meaning and consciousness foreground not what consciousness does, but rather, what happens to it—what goes on in and with consciousness behind our backs, as he puts it, beyond our saying and doing. In Gadamer's story, a central strand in the recovery of what is of lasting value in

German Idealism is the rejection of subjectivism, and this means that he counters subject-based epistemology by offering a description of understanding that is, in his terminology, *ontological*. Rorty, of course, disparages ontology, he wishes people would "just forget about it." And so we may wonder to what extent Rorty is able to take on board this dimension of *wirkungsgeschichtliches bewusstsein*. The contrast, however, that Gadamer wishes to highlight is not the appearance-reality distinction that Rorty criticizes, and which shores up our traditional idea of ontology. Rather, Gadamer is undermining the idea of the deliberating, reflective consciousness *facing* the world, with direct and immediate access, if not to the objective world, then at least to its own cognitive resources. His account, developing Heidegger's depiction of understanding as primarily a matter of *involvement*, gives us a subject that comes upon itself as already immersed in the world, discovering not only that world but also itself through the application and modification of its prejudices. When Gadamer calls his account of the hermeneutic subject *ontological*, he is emphasizing the fact the dimension of meaning itself is historicized, coming into being in time, along with the subject. If the subject is "always more being than consciousness," this means that reflective consciousness can never catch up with the presuppositions of its own activity; it knows itself only indirectly, as it encounters itself through its experience of a meaningful reality. Indeed, the hermeneutic subject lacks cognitive self-sufficiency in a profound way—even as it attains a degree of reflective self-knowledge, an awareness of its own modes of understanding, the very application of its own cognitive resources in this fragile achievement renews, alters and extends the force of the prejudices that Gadamer calls *tradition*. Semantic historicism implies that the world of meaningful phenomena encountered in understanding evolves and grows inseparably from the expansion of human understanding.

Far from being at odds with Rorty's critique of philosophy as metaphysics, however, this historicization of thought that Gadamer articulates as ontology, reverberates at the core of Rorty's work. Critics of Gadamer have typically responded to his thoroughgoing historicism as a limitation of the scope of reason, bringing against him charges of relativism. Rorty, however, takes Gadamer to be making in historicist terms the same fundamental point that Donald Davidson urges in his rejection of the scheme-content distinction.[9] The process of understanding or of attaining knowledge cannot be broken down into a traceable interplay between subjective resources and objective contents. In Gadamer's account of the hermeneutic subject, this is expressed as the impossibility of separating the process of self-

discovery from the process of developing further the meaningful structures of the world in which we operate.

As I have already emphasized, the specifically historicist aspect of this point that is at the core of hermeneutics—and not found in Davidson—is of great significance to Rorty's campaign against metaphysics understood as the most general form of exploration of human possibility. For semantic historicism ties the very content of our concepts to unfolding practice. Conceptual abilities, too, are place-time bound, temporally plastic. Thus semantic historicism denies that we can rely on our conceptual abilities to gain knowledge of significant truths that must apply substantively to any possible way of being human. Concepts, for the semantic historicist, in any actual application, always carry with them an indeterminacy in the form of an unrealized potential for different applications in the future.

A central claim for Rorty in PMN, then, is that for the historicized hermeneutic subject, metaphysics *cannot* take the place of the imaginative exploration of possibility, nor eliminate the openness, the risk involved, in allowing new descriptions to guide practice. Indeed as I read Rorty, it is hard to over-emphasize this point. This openness and ineliminability of risk in redescription is at the heart of Rorty's vision of the practice of philosophy. It holds out the promise of a vision of human beings as responsible to and for *themselves*, and of a view of responsibility as something that *cannot* be discharged through a purely theoretical comportment but as something that must be exercised through cautious experimental practice. This is because, so claims the semantic historicist, only commitment in action—praxis— brings about the semantic enrichment of concepts that we rely on also in philosophical theorizing.

This emphasis on the inability of theoretical reflection to fully illuminate, exhaust or account for the commitments that we make in our practical living in the world is centre stage in the account Rorty develops CIS, as we will see. However, the antimetaphysical import of the Gadamerian lesson is clearly in evidence already in PMN: "The importance of Gadamer's book," Rorty comments, "is that it manages to separate off one of the three strands—the romantic notion of man as self-creative—in the philosophical notion of spirit from the other two strands with which it became entangled. Gadamer…makes no concessions either to Cartesian dualism or to the notion of "transcendental constitution…" (PMN: 358) Rorty then

goes on to apply this idea of self-creation as he introduces his notion of *edification*; the "project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking." (PMN: 360)

 3. In PMN this hermeneutic notion of edification is offered as "an expression of the hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled—that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt." (PMN: 315) Presenting the idea of edification, Rorty offers three contrasts: that between normal and revolutionary philosophy; between constructive and therapeutic philosophy; and between systematic and edifying philosophy. The first contrast is an application of Thomas Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Rorty's revolutionary philosophers are those whose innovations destroy existing patterns of commensuration—whose efforts recast questions in such a way that there is no longer agreement as to what counts as settling a particular issue. Revolutionary philosophers, in other words, shake up our concepts to such an extent that they change what it is we think we are asking by the philosophical question we pose. The pair of remaining contrasts Rorty in PMN treats in effect as interchangeable. Here is what he says:

> For my purposes, what matters is a distinction between two kinds of revolutionary philosophers. One the one hand, there are revolutionary philosophers who […] see the incommensurability of their new vocabulary with the old as a temporary inconvenience, to be blamed on the shortcomings of their predecessors and to be overcome by the institutionalization of their own vocabulary. On the other hand, there are great philosophers who dread the thought that their vocabulary should ever be institutionalized, or that their writing might be seen as commensurable with the tradition. (PMN 369)

What Rorty provides in this telling paragraph is a vision of two forms of destruction. A successful revolutionary philosopher always brings about the destruction of a vocabulary in which straight philosophy, the pursuit of truths of an agreed-upon kind, has been pursued. But some destroyers—perhaps most—are also constructive and systematic; they are, as they indeed aim to be, sources of new, stable vocabularies for normal philosophical discourse. Such systematic philosophers preserve epistemology by changing it, Rorty maintains, while edifying philosophers, by contrast, take their point of departure from suspicion about the very pretensions of epistemology. "These peripheral, pragmatic philosophers are sceptical

primarily *about systematic philosophy,* about the whole project of universal commensuration." (PMN 368) So their form of destruction is different:

> all we can do is to show how the other side looks from our own point of view. That is, all we can do is be hermeneutic about the opposition—trying to show how the odd or paradoxical or offensive things they say hang together with the rest of what they want to say, and how what they say looks when put in our own alternative idiom. This sort of hermeneutics with polemical intent is common to Heidegger's and Derrida's attempts to deconstruct the tradition." (PMN 364-365)

This stance is, as Rorty emphasizes, paradoxical (PMN 370); these writers are, as Rorty reads them, philosophers who do not want to argue. They "are reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms. They know their work loses its point when the period they were reacting against is over. They are *intentionally* peripheral." (PMN 369) Their vehicles of attack must be quick enough to evade the argumentative guns being wheeled in and slowly trained on them as metaphysicians mount logical lines of defence against these doubt-inducing assaults. But it is of course hard to convincingly argue the claim that you are not comical or ridiculous, or pathetic, or pointless. If only the claim were that you were wrong! But edifiers— philosophically abnormal, as Rorty puts it, at the meta-level (PMN 370)—would not be caught dead making *that* charge. So metaphysicians will typically respond by restricting the notion of philosophy such that these annoying satirizers are excluded from the set of those to whose challenges one is professionally obliged to respond.

These are lively, suggestive images, and Rorty's point is easily missed if one takes them too literally. The phenomenon he is diagnosing is not primarily or even very interestingly regarded as a matter of fitting individual philosophers into one box or other. The point rather, applies more convincingly to patterns in the development of *wirkungsgeschichte*—history of effect—in particular to competing possibilities of reading *oeuvres* such as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Augustine—or Plato. Metaphysical reading is the extraction of doctrine. Edifying reading is the extraction of doubt—at Rorty's meta-level. Really interesting philosophers are rich sources of both. The charge against metaphysics, then, is not that it is metaphysics. Rather, the charge is that by co-opting whatever is counted as philosophy metaphysics turns philosophy into a self-reproducing practice that distances itself from the very sources of renewal that might preserve its openness and its freshness and its relevance to human concerns.

In contrast to this diagnosis of metaphysics, edifying philosophy is supposed "to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings." (PMN 360) However, in PMN the scope of this transformation process is in one sense quite narrow: edification, if successful, will make us into new—non-epistemological—philosophers. As Rorty presents the notion of edification in PMN, the salient contrasts are between forms of philosophizing—revolutionary/normal, therapeutic/constructive, edifying/systematic. The great edifying philosophers praised in that book are, in Rorty's version, reacting to epistemology; they are attempting to leave us with ways of regarding philosophy that will help us avoid being epistemological philosophical creatures. The notion, and the distinctions Rorty designs around it, are deployed in Rorty's own exercise of "hermeneutics with polemical intent" (PMN:365) deployed on behalf of the Romantic idea that what matters most is which vocabulary we employ and against the representationalist idea that there is an idiom where truths may be stated that are prior to any optional or contingent evaluative stance or commitment. Still, the potential of the idea of edification remains undeveloped. The oppositions that are meant to flesh out Rorty's notion of hermeneutic philosophy in PMN certainly are not without content, but as I have already intimated, their use is primarily retrospective, as categories for constructing narratives of philosophy, of conceptual change and development. They are useful, too, for making us think of philosophy as a scene of intellectual struggle that ever since Plato has been providing us, whatever its billing at any given time, with "new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking" and not as a search for a commensurating super-vocabulary. But just as the opposition between the edifying and the systematic needs to be abstracted away from the individual writer and applied at the level of the constitution of authoritative canons, so it cannot be bluntly applied to distinct styles of philosophy or particular kinds of projects, either. The sense of any work, no matter how systematic, constructive and commensuration-seeking it purports to be, and however silent about its own historicity, is beholden to a tradition. And on the other side— short, perhaps, of pure satire, if such a thing exists—therapeutic, reactive philosophers are invariably trying to show us something as yet unglimpsed, something that they really want us to see, to appreciate.

 4. We might sum up the points I have just been making this way: in PMN the notion of edification remains subservient to an attempt to say something about what philosophical culture may be like when conducted without mirrors, without the aim of producing a super-

vocabulary of commensuration. Rorty develops an answer shaped by his commitment to Gadamerian semantic historicism. This conception produces a different account of what philosophers have been up to, and what their achievements have been, than the story we tell if we take the representationalist project on its own terms. Rorty insists, moreover, that if we take onboard this conception, we will find ourselves not only reading differently the achievements of the past, but also doing philosophy differently; "edifying philosophy aims at continuing a conversation rather than at discovering truth." (PMN: 373) Still, in PMN Rorty does not tell us much about what that difference may actually amount to. The hermeneutic subject, no longer able to think of her task as getting herself into correspondence with something which is there, complete, waiting to be known, must take herself to be doing something different—striving for ever new descriptions, "better, more fruitful" and so on, that is, for edification. But this notion of thinking remains abstract, programmatic, negatively defined.

In CIS this changes. Here, Rorty is no longer asking what philosophy without representationalist assumptions amounts to. That question, the set-up for part III of PMN, is in an important sense a dead end; by asking it, we run the risk of taking for granted assumptions that made general epistemology seem like a pressing task in the first place. As long as we are considering philosophy as such, the only to way safe-guard against this risk is to refuse to assign any particular content at all to the conversation that we should want to continue. This is exactly Rorty's position in PMN. So it really is no wonder that Rorty here is open to the criticism that he offers only hope and gestures, and nothing of substance, when he talks about the philosophical conversation after epistemology. What should philosophy be like when it is no longer authoritarian? Rorty is of course perfectly cognizant of the treacherousness of that question. Yet in PMN, a critique of the vocabulary of metaphysics, he gets himself into a position where this question arises. His response is to describe what he sees as the salient features of the responses of others who have faced, at a high level of reflective awareness, the very same conundrum.

In CIS, by contrast, the priority that structures the account of edification in PMN is reversed; an account of intellectual maturation, both individual and historical, is worked out now explicitly in terms of the Romantic idea of self-creation. This is the primary concern and point of entry. No longer is Rorty held captive by the notion of edification defined in terms of a reactive attitude to epistemology. How can historically situated hermeneutic subjects make

sense of their lives? How should we best arrange a society of such creatures? These are now the driving questions. Rorty's attempt to provide answers also gives an elaboration of the idea of edification, of *Bildung*, which was the hermeneutic virtue put into metaphilosophical service in PMN. To the extent that there remains in CIS a question whether philosophers are doing what they ought to be doing, this is addressed in political and sociological terms, and is in fact quite disconnected from any concern with defining the nature of philosophy. A result of this shift is that we are offered in CIS an account of the point of edification of greater complexity and more substance than any that the explicitly polemical abstractions of PMN could yield, abstractions that remained anchored to the level of generality at which Rorty's reactive anti-representationalist case was made. The clearest indication of this reversal is the development of the fundamental element in Rorty's constructive legacy, his historicist reinterpretation on behalf of a liberal polity of the traditional distinction between the private and the public. To get there, though, we need to consider the emblematic self-creating figure in CIS, the *ironist*.

The ironist recognizes the contingency of the cultural and historical situation that informs her prejudices, her hermeneutic horizon. She "spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game," she fears she may have been "turned into the wrong kind of human being." But the notion of *wrong* here is up for grabs—"she cannot give a criterion of wrongness." (CIS: 75) The only strategy available to such a subject in the face of perpetual doubts about the virtue of her own cognitive resources, her own habits of mind, her own *ethnos*, is to try to expand her own vocabulary, acquaint herself with alternative patterns of evaluation, other standards of significance. She cannot step outside her language and her horizon, but she can set out to refine, expand, or modify them, in an on-going effort to compare and contrast, to see herself from other points of view, and thereby change herself. It is this process—not a mastery of, but a recognition of and an assumption of responsibility for, the contingency of one's hermeneutic situatedness—that is the kernel of Rorty's concept of self-creation.

The point of the ironist's struggle for autonomy is not, evidently, to locate and give expression to an inner reality, or essence, but to reshape herself by generating a vocabulary that is not simply the language that she is socialized into, the common language of the tribe. The self-creating—self-generating—ironist is after a vocabulary that allows things, including herself, to appear in ways not yet seen. She recognizes that this is not primarily a matter of

reflection, of working out the consequences of what she already knows, but of *exposure*, of *experience*. In hermeneutic terms, the ironist is someone who takes to heart Gadamer's dictum that application is an indispensable element of all understanding. She has come to see that in the meaning-producing friction and resistance that results from application of her vocabulary to what is new, concretely different, there lies also self-understanding, and self-modification.

Rorty's principal image of this idea is the artist, the strong poet. This is someone who succeeds in forging a vocabulary that makes even her own predecessors, the material out of which she moulds her own poetic expressions, appear in new ways, as subject to reactions and evaluations that were not previously available. However, while the archetypal image of the self-creating ironist is the poet, the philosopher, the artist, the idea has wider application. As hermeneutical subjects, we are all "incarnated vocabularies." (CIS:88) The desire to be an individual, to find our own expressions, our own personal mix of tastes, attitudes and priorities, does not depend on artistic or philosophical expression, but on the general possibility of giving shape to one's means of expression. The longing for the *sublime* (as Rorty calls it, alluding to Kant) is the desire to trace one's own contours "by breaking out of some particular inheritance (a vocabulary, a tradition, a style) that one feared might bound one's entire life."[10] That would seem pretty precisely to describe Rorty's relationship with metaphysics.

To create oneself in this sense, while it may well be a matter of writing original interpretations of ones predecessors, as Rorty did in PMN, may also be, for instance, a matter of breaking away from—or returning to—the religious tradition in which one was raised. It might be the steady pursuit of a skill. It might be sobering up afters years of substance abuse. Or it might be finally to be able to forgive, to let go of the bitterness that locked one's life in tight circles around some experience of grievous injury. Whatever form it takes, such a tracing of a self as emerging out that which one has been, but with which one is no longer wholly identical, should not be confused with a search for self-sufficiency. The creation of a self is not a matter of uncoupling oneself from the social realm, but of allowing oneself to be altered by the forms of description that some other community, some sustained dialogue, some batch of powerful narratives, has made available to one—indeed a matter of *searching* for such change. It is a matter of continually striving to *stand for* one's community memberships, one's habits of speech and thought, the narratives one relies on in making sense of one's life, by trying them out in new ways.

Rorty's elaboration of self-creation as the ironist's response to the contingency of her own perspective has implications for our understanding of edification as an intellectual goal. Framed in terms of the effort of self-conscious hermeneutic subjects to become responsible for the selves that they are, Rorty's call for new descriptions, for a pluralizing of perspectives, for making available to oneself a wide range of alternative points of view, is given an existential content. This very content, though, brings in its trail the main challenge that Rorty poses in CIS; the striving for autonomy, thus conceived, is an activity with significant destructive potential. Moreover, just because edification now becomes linked to the worth of the individual, its destructive potential can no longer be handled with the insouciance of PMN.

As we saw, the destructive aspect of edifying discourse is certainly acknowledged in PMN, in the description of the dynamics of therapeutic and constructive philosophy and of edifying and systematic philosophy. However, the point that Rorty convincingly makes there is that any significant philosophical innovation, in so far as it changes the vocabulary we are working in, will kill off projects and problems; rather than resolving problems, philosophical innovation as Rorty conceives of it leaves them lifeless, uninteresting and pointless. But just as these oppositions between kinds or styles of philosophizing are abstractions from what is a much messier and multifaceted actual practice, so the destruction thus characterized is in an important abstract; it is victimless, because it is *impersonal*. Indeed, to note the destructive potential of therapeutic or edifying philosophy is really just a dramatic way of being a naturalized Hegelian; to insist that progress in the development of ideas is not linear and cumulative, nor defined by any particular point of arrival.

Once autonomy by redescription is construed as a task of self-realization of the individual, however, and it is acknowledged also that for any one of us, the possibility of relative success hangs on the availability of resources of which none of us is in control, then the destructive aspect of redescription becomes real and ominous, and of ethical and political significance. This is because historically situated subjects for whom edification is an existential task, for whom autonomy is attained through redescription, are unlike philosophical projects and paradigms in that they have quite specific vulnerabilities—they are susceptible, precisely as self-creating beings, to humiliation; self-creating creatures may both humiliate and be

humiliated. A central line of argument of CIS (as I read it, CIS does argue, and there are several lines) is a response to this fact.

5. Self-creation is the working out of an answer to the question: What is the point of me? Humiliation is a resounding: Not much! And the challenge we face is that the very act of self-creation through redescription may be buying autonomy for oneself at the expense of the humiliation of another. An ironist may be *cruel*: redescription of a common vocabulary, in an effort, perhaps, to break its unreflective hold on oneself, may by the same token leave others with words that suddenly seem less important, with goals and narratives that suddenly look boring or pathetic. Now, there is no way in general to neutralize this aspect of self-creation, in so far as no language is private, and any attempt to get out from under the habits of thinking or the immediate evaluations that are embedded in some vocabulary will often be an attempt to get away from how *some people are doing things*, ultimately, how some people are conducting their lives. And typically, as I strive to expand and develop my own final vocabulary, these people will be ones of whom I have been one. As I change myself, I distance myself from ways of being that I will, in the usual case, have shared with others. No doubt it possible to do this in ways that are respectful of others, but the *potential* for humiliation is built right into the notion of edification as a project of individual self-creation.

Rorty's response to this challenge is to identify a specific moral and political ideal, borrowing Judith Shklar's notion; "liberals are the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do." (CIS:XV) For such people, the chief virtue is *solidarity*. This entails the willingness, certainly, to stand by the material needs and interests of others. But it implies also recognition of the right and need of each to make sense of their own life without being subject to humiliation. Recognizing the fragility of the project of self-creation, liberals will be disposed, at least, to a certain restraint of style in their experimentation with final vocabularies; a liberal attitude is an openness to what is new and different, rather than a disparaging of what is old. This line of thought seems to anchor liberalism at some distance from the explicitly political. However, not only individuals but also political institutions may humiliate. A liberal will be concerned to minimize the systematic humiliation that institutions always risk imposing on citizens in so far as they demand uniformity and conformity, or in so far as they sustain material conditions that leave groups without the resources required for a life not confined to the struggle to satisfy basic needs.

The liberal political ideal is one where political institutions and the stewardship of common interests leave as much room as is possible for individual self-creation. This vision requires a clear distinction between the role of the polity in securing the conditions required for the flourishing of citizens and the actual pursuit of meaning in the lives of individual citizens. This is where Rorty imposes the distinction central to his understanding of a liberal polity, one where a culture of edification may flourish: "The vocabulary of self creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument. The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative exchange." (CIS: XIV)

This simple and seemingly very rough move has provoked a great deal of critical discussion. Is Rorty just not interested in the political dimensions of the intricate interrelations between the individual and the social? Is he prepared to ignore the way that socially sustained power relations, economic and others, give shape to and infect what we think of as the private sphere? Is he prepared to impoverish the political to the point of pure procedure? Such worries do latch on the fact that Rorty is indeed suggesting a limitation of the scope of the political, in this specific sense: as liberals we must keep to a necessary minimum the areas and occasions of discourse were commensuration, and submission to the institutionalized vocabulary, is required as price of admission to citizenship. But this of course is itself a political proposal. Moreover, Rorty's distinction floats entirely free of the subtlety and the variety of the ways that social embeddedness shapes private aspirations, inclinations and orientations, the way that our individuality is, if one likes, socially constituted through and through. Rorty rejects the very idea that we should determine the scope of the political by trying to sort out such relations. Rorty's idea of a set of private concerns of the self is at the same time an idea of a self that is a social thing through and through. The proposal must be understood, as Neil Gascoigne emphasizes in his insightful discussion, as subject to what he calls pragmatic justification.[11] That is to say, we should regard Rorty as placing a bet; handling a certain range of any individual's concerns and aspirations such that they are not subject to legislation or institutionalized governance, or to justification in the shared vocabulary that marks our commitments as citizens, is the best way, politically, to ensure the greatest opportunity for most to make meaningful lives for themselves.

In order to as much as place such a bet, however, not to mention to begin to assess its plausibility, one needs to know something about how the line that Rorty proposes should be drawn. Rorty handles this question in CIS not by formulating a demarcation line, or a pair of

definitions, but by reminding us, in a series of discussions of controversial thinkers' literary works, of what is at stake when we decide how far to push the demand for commensuration, for justification in shared, public terms. Rorty seeks in these papers both to create sympathy for thinkers and writers who push far their resistance to this demand, and also to reflect back to us the temptation we always face to go beyond what fairness requires by way of commensuration and push for conformity on moralistic grounds. If he is successful, the reader may be better equipped than before to deal with her own illiberal tendencies. If that happens, there has been a gain precisely in edification.

Edification, in the terms developed in CSI, is the hermeneutic subject's awareness of the openness of and of the risk involved in any redescription, an awareness that takes the form of a practically honed ability to sort commitments and interests in terms of the categories of the private and the public—it is the ironist's judicious handling of ironic capabilities, her own and others'. Edification is the socially responsible and responsive development of the form of autonomy available to historical consciousness, that is, self-creation. In Rorty's insistence on the preservation of a space for self-creation which is not—precisely not—a matter of recognizing oneself as a part of a larger whole, an instance of a worthy kind, or partaker of a valued essence, he is, I suspect, giving expression to a fundamental motivating concern—a *master drive* in Nietzsche's sense. This is Rorty's anti-authoritarianism—his drive to resist, wherever it looms, the obliteration of the individual.

Let us, with that thought in mind, turn back to the initial question of this chapter—what sort of a philosopher is Rorty, a destroyer, and edifier, a builder? I intimated that these categories pertain to Rorty' struggle with his own "blind impresses", they are the categories of his own self-creation. In what remains, I should like to elaborate on this point. In PMN, Rorty at once identifies himself with and observes the paradigms of edifying philosophy that he holds up to the reader. In CIS, he portrays and dissects the self-creating ironist, the liberal and their antitheses, recommending a form of intellectual life, while fairly consistently standing at one analytical remove from it. This suggests the possibility that readers might be able to pull Rorty in rather different directions. The reading I have emphasized so far is a Nietzschean one, which ties Rorty's struggle against metaphysics to his political efforts by way of antiauthoritarianism. However, a reading that brings out Rorty's contribution to constructive philosophical theory, where the project of self-creation disappears to a vanishing point, is certainly and unsurprisingly also available. An effective way to make that point is to

juxtapose Rorty with perhaps the most creative and innovative pragmatist writing today, Robert Brandom

6. Robert Brandom is a pragmatist and a systematic and constructive philosopher. Brandom's inferentialism portrays the institution of the normativity that makes linguistic behaviour of various kinds into precisely *linguistic* behaviour as entirely non-mysterious in a Darwinian perspective. The norms are us, and there is no temptation to move from theorizing about semantics into ontology, epistemology, or metaphysics, in the senses of these terms that Rorty gives them in PMN.[12]

Moreover, the view of concepts that Brandom provides, as vehicles of material inferences composing the *commitments* we endorse as we use sentences assertively, can be used, as Brandom does in "Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism," to develop one of Rorty's central ideas.[13] Rorty's romantic pragmatism relies on the idea of vocabularies as the things we as philosophers should care about. The reasons for this is by now familiar; both in its innovative and its critical mode, philosophy addresses larger swaths of linguistically infused practice. *Vocabularies* manifest our needs and interests, they are the medium of human transformation. But for all that, Rorty, in CIS, never tells us anything very precise regarding what a vocabulary is. Brandom provides us with a real grip on the notion of a vocabulary and its use.

> Every claim and inference we make at once sustains and transforms the tradition in which the conceptual norms that govern that process are implicit. The vocabulary vocabulary that replaces meaning-belief talk must incorporate and express our realization that applying conceptual norms and transforming them are two sides of one coin […] The only practical significance of conceptual norms lies in the role they play in governing the use and application of those concepts, in concert with their fellows. The use consists largely in making novel claims and novel inferences. And doing that leads inexorably to changes, not just in the claims we are disposed to make, but thereby the concepts themselves. To use a vocabulary is to change it. This is what distinguishes vocabularies from other tools. (VP, 177)

This construal has some consequences that Rorty accepts, even enthusiastically endorses.[14] For one, Brandom deliberately downplays the difference, in practice, between using

vocabularies and renewing them. At the same time, he emphasizes the transformative power of vocabularies—they let us do new things, and become new things, things we couldn't even think of doing or becoming before we developed and used the vocabulary that made it possible. And, significantly, Rorty endorses the vision of Brandom's constructive efforts that is offered in this exchange. "The modest metaphysician," says Brandom,

> sees her task as that of constructing a vocabulary that will be useful for the purposes of the contemporary intellectual: the one who by definition is concerned with seeing the culture whole, trying to make the vocabularies it now seems useful to employ to get various sorts of practical grips on things hang together…The special research interest of the metaphysician, I am suggesting, is to build vocabularies useful for the purposes of intellectuals. The only authority such vocabularies can claim is derived from the success of the various vocabularies they address, and the illumination it can provide concerning them. (VP 181)

And there is more, as I read it: for one might suggest that the critical dimension of philosophy, taking vocabularies as expressions of needs and interests to be assessed and evaluated, is provided with something like a method by the detailed carrying through of the program that Brandom has provided. For it is precisely the particular material inferences that a cluster of concepts builds into our thinking as we rely on them that we need to articulate and make thematic for that kind of criticism to make sense. In recent work, Brandom suggests how to use his version of pragmatism to pry open—make explicit—structures of power, repression and cruelty, to catch them as they do their work in our articulate practices.[15]

Brandom's example suggests that the opposition between therapy and construction was simply given too general a scope—perhaps the point was properly directed at a particular kind of construction only. At the same time, though, there are interesting differences between Rorty and Brandom. There is the proposed rehabilitation of "fact" talk that Rorty objects to in his reply to Brandom. "My fear," says Rorty, "is that countenancing these dangerous idioms will be taken as a concession by the bad guys". (REPLY 187) That may sound like a merely strategically disagreement. But that's not all it is. "These bad guys are the people I think of as "authoritarians"" adds Rorty. And here we are closer to the basic matter. Rorty could not, I think, have launched the constructive project that Brandom has given us. As Nietzsche says; "Every drive wants to be master—and it attempts to *philosophize in that spirit*."[16] And Rorty

is first and foremost an anti-authoritarian thinker. What I suspect Rorty always knew even about philosophizing in the utilitarian mode, what I take to be the thought that always moved him, and moved him on down the road, also in the sphere of public philosophy, is that there is no resting place—no resting conception—for the anti-authoritarian thinker. In Habermasian terms, Rorty sees that there cannot be such a thing as domination-free discourse; there is not a kind of discourse, no particular vocabulary or meta-vocabulary, no specific, work-outable way of understanding what we do when we think and talk, that is so constituted that it can inoculate against the corruption of power or be rendered unserviceable as a tool of oppression or obliteration. Nor, then, is there a conception of philosophy such that it will always be on the side of the struggle for freedom—other than; philosophers, side with freedom! What that might mean, however—what it means to side with freedom—we must discover anew, again and again. Don't forget, Rorty warns us, in the long run, the best we can hope for is *not* victory; the best we can hope for is to continue the struggle, to maintain a continuous discursive fight against subjection and obliteration. And in its most insidious form, in the shape of or own individual will to dominate, the matter must be addressed *privately*—that is, as an obstacle to self-creation, as a challenge to edification.

So while the constructive, utilitarian side of Rortian pragmatism, culminating in the work of Brandom, offers a constructive theoretical approach that may be recommended as a public philosophy for our time, for our generation, it cannot for the self-generating intellectual provide an *answer* to the personal need that philosophizing might serve, it cannot be a resting place, a destruction-free zone. The Nietzschean thought is that edification always stems from a destructive intellectual activity, that the understanding of the significance of the private-public distinction and the stakes involved in implementing it, is always rooted in a private struggle, a fight to break free of the given possibilities that both make us and constrain us. This is what it means to a historical creature; to give up the dream of a human essence, to abandon the thought that we can, at least in principle, know ourselves once and for all, see—at an abstract, general level, at least—what is and what is not humanly possible.

7. I made the claim early in the chapter that we should think of Rortyan pragmatism as having a critical side and a constructive side—the one destructive of intellectual manifestations of the impulses both to master and to submit, the other a working out of proposals for non-authoritarian thinking. However, this distinction has turned out to be an abstraction from an activity that cannot be creative without also destroying. For a hermeneutical subject, to forge

new descriptive options, whether for narrating individual lives or for construing a common good, is to take something and make something else of it. Thus, to redescribe epistemology with Rorty is to go against the self-understanding that gave obvious point to the activity. To come to understand one's moral self in Freudian categories is to undermine the categories of sin and salvation one may previously have applied. Edification, whether of individuals or of communities, always involves understanding what we are in altered terms. In this there will typically also be a loss, a goodbye to what now seems a limited, previous self or a form of social life sustained by a partial or distorted vision of the common good.

So the opposition between the critical and the constructive do not in the end represent two distinct kinds of philosophizing. Rather they are two aspects of philosophy considered from the point of view of semantic historicism. The matter is quite different with respect to the distinction between the private and the public, between philosophy as a search for autonomy and as contribution to public reason. This distinction is above all a political tool designed to enable us to cope with the creative destruction wreaked by intellectuals in a manner that will help us win from their achievements what we can put to good use while securing the survival of liberal norms. The private-public distinction must be applied and interpreted again and again as we, readers, interpreters, Rortyan liberal democrats, decide what to do with the vision that some powerful imagination offers up, or with the new terms that some forceful movement of innovation eagerly presses upon us.

As for Rorty—redescribing himself, creating a vision of himself as a philosopher out of the vocabularies into which he was socialized—he spent his intellectual life tracing, lighting up, and reacting to the authoritarian current that seems always to run intimately intertwined with liberating thought. His painstaking generation of a philosophical self that could tell just this story, was a matter of continuously nurturing and developing a sensitivity to the ways in which the very tools he relied on could backfire in his own hands, and so end up closing off, rather than opening up, space for discursive invention, constructive redescription, expansion of imagination and the positive freedom for an individual to think differently. Coming very publicly to terms with this ambivalence toward the traditions which sustained him, and out of which his philosophical self had to be made, Rorty along the way wreaked havoc on familiar forms of programmatic theorizing that had become self-assured and settled, that were simply "doing the job," "solving the problems." This was a process of self-discovery and at the same time one of self-creation, of "breaking free from…". And that certainly was a process of

destructive power. Was it, however, also a contribution to public reason? Will the possibility of the generation of edified selves, uncoupled from metaphysics, be recognized as genuine social good? That will depend. Certainly Rorty's protracted and provocative act of destruction toward the frameworks of metaphysical thinking has left some of us who grew up reading his writings with new ways of thinking about what a philosopher can be, what challenges she may face, how she may indeed contribute—perhaps only very marginally—to public progress, while never turning away from the existential project of self-creation. For such readers Rorty has offered a sense of intellectual rejuvenation and possibility; an exemplar of edification that we can recognize as also pertaining to the politics of our time. Or perhaps the better emphasis is achieved if we speak of a liberal whose articulation of liberalism flowed out of a struggle for autonomy, for existential responsibility. Other readings, however—hostile, dismissive— abound. Fans of Rorty who attempt, in line with the present effort, to read him also as a valuable public philosopher, we do realize that notions like semantic historicism and the idea of the hermeneutic subject simply may not turn out to be built to last. The idea of edification may come to seem both un-philosophical and without political import. Philosophy may persist in attempting to understand the private and the public and the self and the social in commensurating theoretical terms, rather than as terms marking practical, ethical and political challenges. In other words, pragmatists understand that things just may not go our way; metaphysics may prevail. Perhaps this sense of the fragility of the vocabularies we are trying to read out of Rorty—I have no doubt that this would have been Rorty's view—is a humble beginning of edification.

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[1] Richard Rorty, <u>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 369. This book is henceforth cited as PMN.

[2] In a useful and sympathetic discussion of Rorty, Charles Guignon and David Hiley diagnose "a deep tension between the existentialist and the pragmatic strands in Rorty´s thought [...]" Guignon, Charles and David R.Hiley (eds.), *Richard Rorty* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29. I prefer to reserve the term "pragmatism" and its cognates for what I take to be Rorty's way of handling this dynamic tension.

[3] See for instance Richard Schusterman, "Pragmatism and Cultural Politics: Variations on a Rortian Theme," this volume.

[4] Hans-Georg Gadamer, <u>Truth and Method,</u> 2nd revised edition, New York: Continuum, 1994, henceforth cited as TM.

[5] I elaborate this claim in "Rorty, Davidson, and the Future of Metaphysics in America," (in Cheryl Misak (ed), <u>The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 430-448, and in "Method and Metaphysics: Pragmatist Doubts," in Jeff Malpas (ed.), <u>Dialogues with Davidson: New Perspectives</u> (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, in press).

[6] See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," and "Representation, Social Practice and Truth," in <u>Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers</u>, vol. 1

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 126–50, 151–61, respectively. In these papers Rorty offers what we may call a conversationalist or a social-practice view of truth. In the collection <u>Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers volume III</u> (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Rorty includes eight papers dismissing "various questions and controversies [about truth] as leading nowhere..." Rorty 1998:11)

[7] Richard Rorty, <u>Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity</u>, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Henceforth cited as CIS.

[8] For Gadamer's elaboration of the idea, see <u>Truth and Method</u>, Part II, Section II, Sub-section 1, "The elevation of the historicity of understanding to the status of a hermeneutic principle" (TM 265-307).

[9] Davidson, Donald, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 47 (1974): 5-20. Reprinted in Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001 (1984)), 183-198.

[10] Rorty, Richard, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy." In Rorty, 1998, *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 324-.

[11] For this discussion, see Neil Gascoigne, *Richard Rorty* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 147ff.

[12] The full and detailed working-out of Brandom's inferentialism is given in Brandom, Robert B., 1994. *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[13] Brandom, Robert B., "Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism," in Robert B. Brandom, *Rorty and His Critics* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 156-183. This paper is henceforth cited as VP.

[14] In Rorty, Richard, "Reply to Brandom," in Robert B. Brandom, *Rorty and His Critics* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 183-190. This paper is henceforth cited as REPLY.

[15] See, for instance, Brandom, Robert B., *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas* (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Chapter 4.

[16] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 6