

### Week 7 Notes

On “Fetishism, Anti-Authoritarianism, and the Second Enlightenment:  
Rorty and Hegel on Representation and Reality”

#### Introduction:

Generations of German philosophy students were taught early on that they face a stark, ineluctable, existentially defining choice: “**Kant, oder Hegel?**”

“*Verstand* oder *Vernunft*?”

Is your favored way of communicating understanding something

- a **definition**, because your paradigm is understanding things that have **natures** (like gravity or haploidism), or
- a **narrative**, because your paradigm is understanding things that have **histories** (like skepticism or justice)?

(And where would you put things like propositional attitude ascriptions or mereology?)

A useful way to understand the basic principle animating the two books in which Rorty first found his distinctive philosophical voice—*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) and *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982)—is as **applying a sophisticated form of this “Kant oder Hegel?” framework to then-contemporary analytic philosophy.**

RR: “I still believe most of what I wrote in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.

But that book is now out of date. ...

I vaguely sensed that **the trouble with analytic philosophy was that it had never advanced from Kant's eternalization of the intellectual situation of eighteenth-century Europe to Hegel's historicism.** But I had not yet made myself sufficiently familiar with the post-Hegelian European philosophers who had resisted the temptation to go “back to Kant.” [ibid. 13]

Rorty would applaud the **broadly naturalistic, sociological, historicist** impulse he saw Hegel as having bequeathed to the nascent nineteenth century, and speculate about how much farther we might gotten by now if at the end of that century Russell and Husserl had not, each in his own way, once again found something for philosophers to be apodeictic about from their armchairs.

At least equally radical and surprising as the re-imagined and revived pragmatism that he developed as a constructive response is **Rorty’s remarkable diagnosis of the ills of analytic philosophy as resulting from uncritical, undigested Kantianism. For Kant emphatically was not a hallowed hero of that tradition.** Anglophone philosophers thought that the “Kant

oder Hegel?” question simply didn’t apply to them. After all, Russell and Moore had read Kant out of the analytic canon alongside Hegel—believing, correctly as it has turned out, that one couldn’t open the door wide enough to let Kant in without Hegel sliding in alongside him before it was slammed shut. Both figures were banished, paraded out of town under a banner of shame labeled “idealism,” whose canonical horrible paradigm was the British Idealism from which those codifiers of the analytic paradigm were recoiling. So in diagnosing 20<sup>th</sup> century analytic philosophy as constrained by conceptual bounds put on it by Kant, *PMN* was taking a remarkable and original line—offering a retrospective reconceptualization that was both disquieting and disorienting.

I think Rorty came to be dissatisfied with the *PMN* strategy of arguing against representationalist paradigms in semantics on the basis that they force an epistemological choice between skepticism and foundationalism. He never wavered in his view that finding oneself in that epistemological predicament demonstrates the need for radical conceptual revision of one’s semantic model. And he continued to believe that the concept of representation was so burdened by epistemological baggage that a new start was needed. But his strategy for delegitimizing representational semantic models changed. During the last decade of his life he formulated a new line of attack: “seeing **anti-representationalism as a version of anti-authoritarianism.**” This more overtly political line both drew on, and, in an important sense, brought to a logical conclusion, the evolution of his thought in the intervening decades.

This is the argument and the development I want to consider in more detail. We looked at it last week, but I want to drill down and subject it to closer critical scrutiny.

### **The Girona Lectures: The Occasion**

He introduced the new idea in his June 1996 Ferrater Mora lectures at the University of Girona, entitled “Anti-Authoritarianism in Epistemology and Ethics.” In connection with those lectures, he was encouraged to invite discussants of his choice. I was privileged to be among them, along with my colleague John McDowell, and Bjorn Ramberg, whose sympathetic yet penetrating reading of Davidson had deeply impressed Rorty.

### **[Distribute 2020 Catedra Ferrater Mora invitation.]**

10 lectures, over 5 days, one morning, one afternoon, with 4-hour lunch/siesta breaks in the middle.

[◊: Tell the Rorty story about Edmund Burke’s prose, to illustrate the table-talk.]

Recall that 1996, when the lectures took place, was just two years after the appearance (in 1994) of both my *Making It Explicit* and John’s *Mind and World*. And Rorty’s 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> lectures are devoted to a discussion of those works.

Our memorable extended discussion during those happy, halcyon days led to a consensus among us about how three of our positions should be understood in relation to one another.

[See the fuller discussion of this point in FAASE.]

Rorty thought that if it were possible for **the concept of experience** to be rehabilitated, if it could be purged of its Cartesian contagion, then surely Dewey would have brought it off.

I was entirely of his mind as far as the concept of experience is concerned.

But by contrast to the concept of experience, it seemed to me then, and seems to me still, that things are otherwise with the concept of representation.

It seemed to me in Girona, and still does today, that a suitable pragmatist explanatory strategy, beginning with social practices of using expressions to give and ask for reasons, could unobjectionably both underwrite theoretical attributions of representational content to some locutions and also underwrite the viability and utility of the commonsense distinction between what we are saying or thinking and what we are talking or thinking *about*—that is, representing or describing *by* saying or thinking that.

So it seemed to me that a distinction should be made between **the reprobate, irremediably tainted concept of experience**, which should be banished from careful philosophical discourse, and **the prodigal, errant, and potentially dangerous concept of representation**, which might still be tamed, rehabilitated, and reintroduced to carefully supervised productive labor in a new, hygienic guise.

McDowell doesn't think that a fence is necessary to avoid the abyss at all.

Rorty and I agree that McDowell brings this off. But we want to say "Kids, don't try this at home. This man is a skilled professional. It is not as easy as it looks."

### **Rorty's new Antiauthoritarian (ultimately *political*) argument against representationalism:**

[We looked at this last week, so I offer only a quick reminder here.]

According to this new way of pitching things, **what pragmatism aims at**—beginning already, if only incipiently, with the classical American pragmatists—**is nothing less than a second Enlightenment**—or, rather, the *completion* of the first Enlightenment: extending its treatment of the *practical* dimension to the *theoretical* or *cognitive* dimension of human life.

**Fetishism** is mistaking the products of our own practices and practical attitudes for features of the objective world that are what they are independent of and antecedent to those practices and

attitudes. Marx's favorite example was the traditional conception of the *value* of precious metals, which thought of the value of metals the same way it thought of their density—so that there was a correct answer, independent of any of our activities, to the question of how many ounces of silver are *really* worth as much as one ounce of gold.

Rorty's call for a second Enlightenment is an Hegelian extrapolation of the original Kantian understanding of Enlightenment, extending the application of that conception from ethics to encompass also semantics and epistemology.

As I want to understand Rorty's late anti-representationalism as anti-authoritarianism argument, a) his long-standing *social pragmatism about normativity* comes into play because of this b) Hegelian *normative* understanding of representation, in terms of the authority of objective representations over subjective representations of it.

The target notion of representationalism is what I have called "*declarativist descriptivism*," a kind of *global* representationalism.

**Declarativism** insists on giving a *uniform* semantic account of all declarative sentences: not just "the frog is on the log," but "triangularity is a property," "patience is a virtue," "being a mammal entails being a vertebrate," "the word 'red' refers to a color," and "I believe in miracles."

**Descriptivism** then maintains that that uniform semantic account is a representational, descriptive one, the model of which *is* "the frog is on the log."

[I am here bracketing the quibbles about "representationalism" being broader than "descriptivism," because description usually excludes demonstratives, indexicals, and anaphors.]

Note that one of the issues that will occupy us in the second half of the course is whether the reasons there are to deny *global representationalism* are also reasons to be *globally anti-representationalist*, and to deny that representation is the key semantic concept for understanding at least *some* declarative sentences, such as "the frog is on the log."

Rorty and Price insist on drawing this more radical conclusion.

The incipient pragmatist emancipation Rorty is working toward is the **substitution of a pragmatics of consensus for the semantics of representation.**

All we can do is give and ask for reasons with each other.

Authority and responsibility are creatures of those discursive practices.

We should accordingly reject the idea that our discursive practices answer to, are responsible to, need acknowledge the authority of, anything outside those practices and the practical attitudes of those who engage in them.

This is focusing on **social practices of reasoning**—giving and challenging *reasons*, so as to assess them—rather than a supposedly **objective property of truth**.

Thinking in the latter terms is **hypostatizing, reifying**, the **normative constraint** on our claiming and reasoning practices, **projecting it** onto something nonhuman with ultimate authority over our cognitive practices. That is **fetishizing** an aspect of our own practices.

### **Assessing Rorty's Antiauthoritarian Argument:**

But if one rejects Rorty's conclusion—whether because of its consequences or simply because one cannot deal with its outrageous radicality—one then owes a diagnosis of where the argument for it has gone astray. Where, exactly, does the analogy between the anti-authoritarianism of the first Enlightenment on practical matters and the anti-authoritarianism of Rorty's projected second Enlightenment on cognitive matters break down?

Is the difference that makes a difference the difference in **directions of fit (DoF)**?

[Quick explanation of how Anscombe explains this difference.]

Is antiauthoritarianism appropriate for the mind-to-world DoF, and not the world-to-mind DoF?

The argument against Rorty here (I think Searle—who makes great use of the DoF point—argues this way) is that what RR takes the Enlightenment view to be is appropriate for the mind(or vocabulary)-to-world direction of fit, but not for the world-to-mind DoF. The thought is that we *should* spurn the so-called authority of nonhumans over what *we*, as intenders, as intentional agents, have authority over. But we should *not* spurn the authority of the world in the world-to-mind direction of fit cases.

But I would say to this argument:

Rather than undercutting Rorty's analysis, invocation of Anscombian direction of fit seems to support and confirm the analogy he relies on in projecting the need for a second Enlightenment to complete on the cognitive side the anti-authoritarian work the first accomplishes on the practical side.

For Anscombe, too, focuses on the essentially **normative significance** of the *representational* semantic dimension of doxastic or epistemic relations.

That is enough to give Rorty's social pragmatism about norms a grip and prepare the ground for his anti-authoritarian claim that objectivizing or naturalizing those essentially normative representational relations, reifying epistemically authoritative represented facts or reality, is falling into fetishism.

The basic issue is how to understand **social pragmatism about norms**.

The underlying idea is that normative statuses are ultimately social statuses. Normative significances, such as having authority or being responsible, are instituted or conferred by playing a distinctive kind of role in social practices.

I endorse that Enlightenment idea, which both Hegel and the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations*, each in his own way, developed and exploited.

Rorty's argument starts with

- a) Social pragmatism about normativity. This is the claim that all normative statuses (such as authority and responsibility) are ultimately *social* statuses, conferred by the role something plays in social practices.

This premise is then combined with

- b) The Kantian understanding of representation as a fundamentally *normative* concept, articulating a distinctive kind of *authority* that *representeds* have over *representings*, which count as *representings* of those *representeds* just insofar as they are *responsible* to those *representeds*, which supply a standard of success or correctness governing normative assessments of the *representings as representings*.

To get the full antiauthoritarian argument however, Rorty needs something stronger than just the social pragmatism about normativity in (a). He takes it that a *consequence* of that thesis is:

- c) nothing *nonhuman* can exercise authority over us, that we cannot be responsible to any nonhuman authority.

The justification for (c), I take it, is

- d) Authority is rational authority only insofar as it involves a correlative justificatory responsibility—a responsibility to provide *reasons* for exercising that authority in one way or on one occasion rather than another. Nothing that cannot fulfill that justificatory responsibility should be understood to exercise genuine authority within and according to our reason-giving practices. We should acknowledge the authority only of what we can critically interrogate as to its reasons. He concludes that only parties to our conversations, only participants in our practices can have normative statuses.

This a new principle, which builds on but goes beyond social pragmatism about normative statuses. Its slogan is “**No authority without correlative responsibility.**”

There is *something* right about this line of thought.

But even if it is correct for the most fundamental type of normative status, being one of *us*, a discursive practitioner, a *self* (what Hegel will take to be instituted by practical attitudes of *reciprocal recognition*), it does not rule out the intelligibility of *derivative* normative statuses, that are parasitic on the more basic kind.

Consider *omens and oracles* as examples where the community has invested normative significance in things that can't give and ask for reasons.

What I think is right about this line of thought is that *some* normative statuses—indeed, those that are fundamental, those without which there could not be any others (“*sina qua non*”)—must be of the “no authority without rational answerability” type.

But does it follow that, in the context where *some* are like this, *all* must be.

I don't think so.

## **Response to the Rortvan Argument:**

Kant (and Hegel follows him on this point) is right that the most basic sort of normative status is a kind of rational authority that essentially involves correlative justificatory responsibility. Unless there were normative statuses of this sort, there would be no norms at all.

But I do not think that *all* authority must be of this sort.

Once implicitly normative social practices are up and running, derivative sorts of normative statuses, parasitic on the basic ones that characterize discursive practitioners, become possible.

Consider the **omens** and **oracles** examples of social practices *conferring* normative significance on things that *cannot* give reasons justifying their exercises of authority, or respond to challenges by offering such reasons. This might be, indeed is, a derivative, parasitic kind of normative status. But it *is* a normative status. And, in complete accord with social pragmatism about normativity, it *is* instituted by the role something plays in social practices. It is a *social* status. It just is not the social status of being a practitioner, a giver and challenger of reasons. We need to have those. But once we do, second-class, auxiliary normative statuses *can* be conferred on other things.

Conclusion:

Social pragmatism about norms says that the practices of the community are the *fons et origo* from which all normative significance flows. But **that is compatible with those practices conferring normative significance, for instance, the status of having authority, on things other than the community members whose practices they are.**

I think we are led by these considerations to a **problem in social engineering.**

Once we see that the possibility is not ruled out in principle, we must ask whether there is a structure or configuration of practices that deserves to count as granting to things specifically *representational* authority over our thought and talk.

This raises a question of *social engineering*: Can we describe practices in which communities *confer* authority over the correctness of their claimings on what they thereby count as talking *about* (representing, describing)?

Indeed: can we make sense of such authority being *objective*, in the sense of attitude-transcendent?

## **A Social Story:**

Seriously addressing the social engineering question requires doing some real work.

When I pitched this course, I didn't absolutely *promise* not to do any technical philosophy of language.

But that's what's called for now.

So hold on tight.

### ***A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing***

1. In ordinary language we distinguish between:

- a) **what is said or thought**, and
- b) what it is said or thought **of or about**.

2. Assessment of what people are talking and thinking *about*, rather than what they are saying about it, is a feature of the essentially *social* context of *communication*.

3. A social-perspectival version of the classical JTB account:

For it to be **knowledge** that a scorekeeper takes another to have, that scorekeeper must adopt three sorts of practical attitude:

--First, the scorekeeper must *attribute* an inferentially articulated, hence propositionally contentful *commitment*. This corresponds to the **belief** condition on knowledge.

--Second, the scorekeeper must *attribute* a sort of inferential *entitlement* to that commitment. This corresponds to the **justification** condition on knowledge.

--Third, the scorekeeper must *undertake* the same commitment attributed to the candidate knower. This corresponds to the **truth** condition on knowledge.

4. **The primary explicitly representational locution of natural languages is *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitudes.**

5. Ascriptions *de dicto* attribute belief in a *dictum* or saying, while ascriptions *de re* attribute belief about some *res* or thing.

6. An example with tense:

two readings of *The President of the United States will be a woman by the year 2024*.

7. Ambiguous: *Henry Adams believed the popularizer of the lightning rod did not popularize the lightning rod*.

8. De Dicto: *Henry Adams believed **that** the popularizer of the lightning rod did not popularize the lightning rod*.

9. De Re: *Henry Adams believed **of** the popularizer of the lightning rod **that** he did not popularize the lightning rod*.

10. **It is *de re* propositional attitude ascribing locutions that we use in everyday life to express what we are talking and thinking of or about.**

11. In asserting an ascriptional claim of the form

*S believes (or is committed to the claim) that  $\Phi(t)$ ,*  
one is doing two things, adopting two different sorts of deontic attitude:



- a) one is *attributing* one doxastic commitment, to  $\Phi(t)$ , and
- b) one is *undertaking* another, namely a commitment to the ascription.

12. The distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* should not be understood to distinguish two kinds of *belief* or belief-contents, but two kinds of *ascription*—in particular two different *styles* in which the *content* of the commitment ascribed can be *specified*.

13. Prosecutor: *The defense attorney believes a pathological liar is a trustworthy witness.*

14. Defense attorney: *Not so. What I believe is that the man who just testified is a trustworthy witness.*

15. Prosecutor: *Exactly, and I have presented evidence that ought to convince anyone that the man who just testified is a pathological liar.*

16. De Re: *The defense attorney claims **of** a pathological liar that he is a trustworthy witness.*

17. **The expressive function of *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude is to make explicit which aspects of what is said express commitments that are being *attributed* and which express commitments that are *undertaken*.**

18. What is made explicit by *de re* specifications of the contents of the beliefs of others is an essential element of *communication*.

19. De Dicto: *He believes malaria can be prevented by drinking the liquor distilled from the bark of that kind of tree.*

20. De Re: *He believes of quinine that malaria can be prevented by drinking it,*

21. *It is true that Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals,*

22. De Re: *It is true **of** the popularizer of the lightning rod that he invented bifocals.*

23. **The representational dimension of propositional contents reflects the social structure of their *inferential* articulation in the game of giving and asking for reasons.**

### **A Historical Story:**

[And I also didn't promise not to talk about Hegel.]

### **Summary of where we are going:**

- **Essentially self-conscious creatures**—those for whom what they are *in* themselves depends on what they are *for* themselves—are subjects of a distinctive kind of transformative, **self-creative process**.
- For changing what they are *for* themselves changes what they are *in* themselves.
- As essentially self-conscious, they are consequently essentially *historical* beings. In the place of *natures*, they have *histories*.

- For if you want to understand what they are *in* themselves (as close as they have to natures), you must rehearse the cascade of changes in what they were *for* themselves, which occasioned changes in what they were *in* themselves, followed by new changes in what they were *for* themselves, and so on.
- The **form of this retrospective understanding of historical beings** as having histories rather than natures is **Hegelian recollection** [Erinnerung].  
Applied to *Geist* as a whole, it is *phenomenology*.  
Hegel's original conception of a distinctive kind of **recollective rationality** is the key to understanding his account of the **representational dimension of conceptual content**, and how it satisfies the constraints operative in Rorty's final anti-authoritarian argument for global anti-representationalism. [FAASE 33]

[C]ommitment to social pragmatism about normativity is built deeply into Hegel's understanding of the advance modernity makes over traditional ways of understanding ourselves. It shows up as the realization of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. In fact it takes the specific form of the idea that normative statuses are *instituted by* practical normative attitudes. [FAASE 33]

### **Hegel's version of social pragmatism about the normative:**

Normative statuses are instituted by **reciprocal recognition**.

Kant: To **respect the dignity** of others as free beings in this normative sense is to attribute to them the authority to commit themselves, to *make* themselves responsible by *taking* themselves to be responsible....This is the **Basic Kantian Normative Status**.

Hegel's radical idea is that that attitude of respect or **recognition** by others is as constitutive of the status as the subject's own commitment-instituting attitudes are. [FAASE 35]

Consider the status of being a **good chess player**.

So as I read him, Hegel endorses all three of the premises of Rorty's anti-authoritarian, global anti-representationalist argument for the conclusion that we should reject as fetishistic the idea of the ultimate authority of a represented nonhuman, natural objective reality over our *cognitive* practices—as and for the same reasons that we reject as fetishistic the idea of the ultimate authority of a nonhuman, supernatural being over our *ethical* practices.

- Both have ground-level commitments to **social pragmatism about normativity**: the idea that norms and normative significances are instituted by playing roles in our social practices, and the constellations of practical attitudes they make possible.
- And Hegel's particular model of the social institution of normative statuses by reciprocal cognitive attitudes builds in Rorty's insight that part of what the Enlightenment was

rejecting about traditional understandings of normativity was the idea of *authority* not balanced by complementary *responsibility*.

Genuine authority must be *rational* authority, in the sense that we are obliged to acknowledge the authority only of what we are in a position to hold responsible for providing *reasons* for its exercises of that authority...

- And Rorty and Hegel agree with the Kantian analysis of **representational relations** as fundamentally **normative** relations of authority and responsibility between representeds and representings. [FAASE 38]

Hegel thinks there is a substantial tension between norm-governedness in this sense and the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of norms. Seeing the norms as products of our attitudes can make it impossible to see those attitudes as genuinely governed by the resulting norms, in this dual sense. As Wittgenstein puts his version of the point: “One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.”

Alienation is losing our grip on the intelligibility of norms as genuinely binding on us, as a result of understanding them as instituted by our attitudes. [FAASE 40]

*Alienation* in this sense is pretty much what Rorty’s *pragmatism* both endorses in theory and adopts in practice. [FAASE 41]

Hegel disagrees. He thinks what is needed is a post-modern reconciliation of the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with a suitably unalienated reappropriation of the traditional *sittlich* insight into the status-dependence of normative attitudes. The aim of such a synthetic reappropriation is to re-establish the intelligibility of the bindingness—the *rational* bindingness, the authority—of norms that, though instituted by our practical attitudes, nonetheless transcend those attitudes sufficiently to normatively govern them. [FAASE 42]

The general form of Hegel’s strategy for overcoming alienation and reaching *Sittlichkeit* by reconciling the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with the traditional insight into the status-dependence of normative attitudes is to appeal to the *historical* structure of the constellation of reciprocal authority and responsibility that relates attitudes and statuses. He understands *past* attitudes as having instituted norms that govern our current and future attitudes. The engine of his account is the idea of a new sort of rational activity: *recollection* [Erinnerung].

Recollection is a retrospective rational reconstruction that selects and assembles from the series of attitudes that have actually been adopted by practitioners an ***expressively progressive trajectory*** through them.

To say that it is expressively progressive is to say that the reconstructed path has the shape of the gradual **emergence into explicitness of a norm** that can be seen to have **implicitly governed** the process all along.

Recollection turns a mere *past* into a *history*: the past comprehended as normatively significant. Recollection confers normative significance on the sequence of past attitudes (applications of concepts) by exhibiting it as having the distinctive norm-instituting recognitive structure of a *tradition*.

That is a quite specific constellation of **authority of the past over the present and future** and **authority of the present and future over the past**.

It is a kind of active *making* (institution of norms) that has the form of a *finding* of a norm as already governing the prior attitudes.

The content of the norm is recollected as constant throughout, with each included episode of applying the norm by adopting an attitude serving to reveal a bit more of that content, further expressing it by making explicit aspects that had hitherto remained implicit.

[FAASE 43]

A helpful model is provided by the evolution of legal concepts in Anglo-American **common law**.

[**Tell this story.**] [I have told this story in many places. One, which uses the way I understand Hegel in connection with judges at common law to address issues in the philosophy of law is "'A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges' Chain Novel" available, as almost all my texts are, on the "Texts Available" page of my website.]

a special kind of *historical* narrative: a recollection.

One must tell a retrospective story that rationally reconstructs an idealized expressively progressive trajectory through previous changes of view that culminates in the view being endorsed after the repair of the most recently discovered anomaly.

In the first stage of the experience of error, the previous conception of how things are, what played the role *to* consciousness of what things are *in* themselves, has been unmasked as appearance, and has accordingly shifted status. It now plays the role *to* consciousness of being only what things were *for* consciousness: an erroneous view of how things really are.

To justify endorsing a new view as veridically representing how things really are in themselves, one must show how, assuming that things are that way, one did or could have come to *know* that things are that way. [FAASE 46-47]

This recollective story about the representational dimension of conceptual content an *expressive* account of it. It explains how what was, according to each recollection, always *implicit* ("an sich," what things are in themselves), becomes ever more *explicit* (for consciousness). The recollective story is an *expressively* progressive one. The representational relation between senses and referents is established by displaying a sequence of appearances that are ever more

adequate expressions of an underlying reality. In general Hegel thinks we can understand what is implicit only in terms of the expressive process by which it is made explicit. That is a recollective process. The underlying reality is construed as implicit in the sense of being a norm that all along governed the process of its gradual emergence into explicitness. [FAASE 48-49]

Hegel understands the *social* fine-structure of normativity as *communities* synthesized by reciprocal *recognition*. He understands the *historical* fine-structure of normativity as *traditions* retrospectively synthesized by *recollection*. Along both dimensions norms precipitate out of, are instituted by, attitudes. That is the attitude-dependence of normative statuses that is the principal discovery of modernity. [FAASE 51]

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Hegel offers an account both of how normative statuses are instituted by reciprocal recognition, and how they become recollectively visible as having genuinely binding force over attitudes. In this way he reconciles the *modern* appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with a reconceived version of the *traditional* commitment to the status-dependence of normative attitudes that that shows us that alienation from our norms is not an inevitable consequence of the modern insight. That central implicit insight of modernity, we have seen, just is social pragmatism about normativity. So Hegel shows how pragmatists need not be normative nihilists. Because it is the sort of conceptual norms recollection determines that provide reasons for judgments and actions (not only in courts of law), it also shows that pragmatists need not be irrationalists. Both of these are conclusions Rorty argued for and sought to defend—though not by wheeling in the heavy metaconceptual machinery of recognition and recollection that Hegel deploys. [FAASE 52]

The model of expression as recollection—the story about what one must *do* to count as thereby making explicit something that was implicit—is in many ways the keystone of the edifice. It explains the representational semantic and cognitive relation between how things appear “for consciousness” on the *subjective* side of *thought* and how things really are “in themselves” on the *objective* side of *being*. It explains the constitutive reciprocal relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses: how attitudes both institute norms and answer to them. And it explains the relations between those two stories: how *normative practices* bring about *semantic relations*.

(In Hegel’s terms, explaining how *cognition* presupposes *recognition* is explaining how *consciousness* presupposes *self-consciousness*.)

Hegel extends Rortyan (and Deweyan) pragmatism by explaining how what one is practically *doing* in recollecting (the *process* of producing a retrospective recollective rational reconstruction of a course of experience as expressively progressive) provides the basis for an *expressive* semantic account of normative *representational relations* between the human and the nonhuman. [FAASE 53-54]