Outline of Force and Understanding:

I. Overview [132]-[135].

II. Force [136]-[142].
   a) Force and its Expression [136]-[137].
   b) Independent Opposing Forces [138]-[140].
   c) Reciprocal Action, the Play of Forces [141]-[142].

II. Law, the Supersensible World, and Explanation [143]-[155].

This introduces the First Supersensible World (FSW): the “calm realm of laws.”

III. The Inverted World [156]-[160].

This is the Second Supersensible World (SSW) and the First Inverted World (FIW).

IV. The Infinite [161-165].

This is the Third Supersensible World (TSW) and the Second Inverted World (SIW).

Stages in the argument:
1. From sense universals (observable properties) we turn to “forces”, which stand in allegorically for theoretical entities generally.
2. Understanding the status of theoretical entities turns out to depend on understanding the status of laws of nature relating them.
3. Understanding what laws are turns out to depend on understanding the role they play in practices of inference and explanation.
4. The progression is to ever more radical holism, culminating in a holistic picture of the relations between the subjective and objective poles of the intentional nexus (“Infinity”, objective and conceptual idealism). This final conception rationalizes the expository transition to considering self-consciousness as our next topic.

Three views about the status of theoretical entities:
1. Instrumentalism.
2. Invidious Eddingtonian Realism (this is the one Hegel concentrates on).
These are criticized for running together the observable/theoretical distinction with the appearance/reality distinction (though the two views line these up in complementary ways).
3. The distinction between observable and theoretical entities is methodological and epistemological, not ontological.

From force to law (modality):

Sellars: Although describing and explaining (predicting, retrodicting, understanding) are distinguishable, they are also, in an important sense, inseparable. It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects, even such basic expressions as words for perceptible characteristics of molar objects, locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. The descriptive and explanatory resources of language advance hand in hand. [CDCM §108]
Sellars: [O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an ungrudging recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not inferior, just different. [CDCM §79.]

Hegel considers a final way in which the representational semantic model deployed by empirical consciousness conceiving itself as understanding can be applied to yield a construal of the relations between law and the world of empirical appearance (the “play of forces”). This is what he calls the “inverted world” [verkehrte Welt]. According, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is like in the first world is unlike to itself…Expressed in determinate moments, this means that what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. [PhG 158]

The inverted world is not a kind of world: it is what you get if you “invert” a world.

The First Inverted World is equivalent to contemporary possible worlds semantics, paradigmatically as conceived by David Lewis.

From the idea, then, of inversion, which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the supersensible world, we must eliminate the sensuous idea [Vorstellung] of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element; and this absolute Notion of the difference must be presented and understood [darstellen und auffassen] purely as inner difference…

Certainly, I put the ‘opposite’ here, and the ‘other’ of which it is the opposite there; the ‘opposite’, then, is on one side, is in and for itself without the ‘other’. But just because I have the ‘opposite’ here in and for itself, it is the opposite of itself, or it has, in fact, the ‘other’ immediately present in it. Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched [übergriffen] the other world and has it within it; it is for itself the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as inner difference, or difference in its own self, or difference as an infinity. [160].

What is wrong with the inverted world [verkehrte Welt] is not the inversion, but the reification of it into a world—just as what was wrong with the conception of a supersensible “calm realm of laws” was the reification of laws into superfacts.

From law to explanation (and objective idealism):
The alternative he is recommending in place of descriptivism is a distinctive kind of expressivism. Modal claims, it is true, do not simply describe the actual. (Laws are not superfacts.) But that is not because they describe something else. It is because they express something implicit in the actual. They express the exclusive differences in virtue of which any actual state of affairs is the state of affairs it is.
At this final stage, “what is, for the Understanding, an object in a sensuous covering, is for us in its essential form as a pure Notion.” For that reason we can see that “the Understanding experiences only itself,” not something experienced as other than itself. [PhG ¶165]. Since this Notion of infinity is an object for consciousness, the latter is consciousness of a difference that is no less immediately cancelled; consciousness is for its own self, it is a distinguishing of that which contains no difference, or self-consciousness. [PhG ¶164]. “Infinity” [Unendlichkeit] is Hegel’s term for a distinctive structure of identity constituted by necessary relations among different “moments”, each of which is what it is only in virtue of its relations to the others and its being comprised by the whole it is a moment of. It the final form of understanding consciousness.

The principal lesson we are to learn from the final experience of understanding consciousness is that this holistic structure of identity and difference that results from this progressive process of making explicit what is implicit in empirical consciousness is the structure of self-consciousness. It is this discovery that the key to understanding empirical consciousness lies in self-consciousness that motivates for us the expository narrative transition from the Consciousness chapter to the Self-Consciousness chapter.

What is wrong with the inverted world [verkehrte Welt] is not the inversion, but the reification of it into a world—just as what was wrong with the conception of a supersensible “calm realm of laws” was the reification of laws into superfacts.

Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in one way or another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of that determinateness, this no doubt has been all along the soul of all that has gone before…but it is as ‘explanation’ that it first freely stands forth… [PhG ¶163].

Two questions about the status of laws:
1. Should Newton’s second law, F=ma, be understood as
   a) analytic and a priori, because definitional of force and mass, or
   β) an empirical synthetic claim?
2. Are laws descriptions? Do they state superfacts?

In the law of motion, e.g., it is necessary that motion be split up into time and space, or again, into distance and velocity. Thus, since motion is only the relation of these factors, it—the universal—is certainly divided in its own self. But now these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not in themselves express this origin in a One; they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another, space is thought of as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity…and thus are not related to one another through their own essential nature. [PhG 153]
His response begins with the idea that understanding the sense in which force and mass are distinct but necessarily related by Newton’s second law requires thinking about how statements of the law function in explanation, to begin with, in inference. [T]he law is, on the one hand, the inner, implicit in-itself [Ansichseitende] being, but is, at the same time, inwardly differentiated…this inner difference still falls, to begin with, only within the Understanding, and it is not yet posited in the thing itself. It is, therefore, only its own necessity that is asserted by the Understanding; the difference, then, is posited by the Understanding in such a way that, at the same time, it is expressly stated that the difference is not a difference belonging to the thing itself. This necessity, which is merely verbal, is thus a recital of the moments constituting the cycle of the necessity. The moments are indeed distinguished, but, at the same time, their difference is expressly said to be not a difference of the thing itself, and consequently is immediately cancelled again. This process is called “explanation.” [Erklären] [PhG §154]

By contrast to representational thinking:
Speculative [begreifendes] thinking behaves in a different way. Since the Notion [Begriff] is the object's own self, which presents itself as the coming-to-be [Werden] of the object, it is not a passive Subject inertly supporting the Accidents; it is, on the contrary, the self-moving Notion which takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement the passive Subject itself perishes; it enters into the differences and the content, and constitutes the determinateness, i.e. the differentiated content and its movement, instead of remaining inertly over against it…[A]nd only this movement itself becomes the object. [PhG ¶60].

The argument of the closing passages of Force and Understanding has three phases.
- It starts with a characterization of the lessons to be learned from consideration of the final form of the supersensible world understanding takes itself to confront: the inverted world.
- The second phase consists of remarks about the structure of identity in and through difference that Hegel calls “infinity.”
- The concluding phase is the claim that we can see (though it cannot yet) that in conceiving its object on the model of such an infinite structure, understanding consciousness has put itself in a position to recognize itself in its object.

I understand this last as the lesson of objective idealism: the reciprocal sense-dependence of the concepts

On the objective side, ontological categories:

law, fact, particular/universal.

On the subjective side of practical discursive activities:

Explaining-inferring, asserting-judging, referring/classifying.