Observability Affects Attention and Choice in Social Allocation Decisions

Abstract:

To study the effect of social image on attention and choices, subjects made binary choices in three types of distribution games. All payoffs are initially hidden and can be clicked open. We introduce a novel screensharing technique: One of the subjects receiving the allocation can observe the decision maker’s clicks (but not choices). This change increases the possible impact of social image concerns on expressed social preferences. We find that this observability increases the time subjects spend looking at the potential payoffs to the observer and makes their choices less selfish.

I. Introduction

In Plato’s Republic, a character called Glaucon tells of a myth about a ring that can turn a person invisible. Plato’s Glaucon insists that in general even a good person could not resist the temptation to behave at least a bit antisocially when cloaked in invisibility (and see Baker, 1995). Put the other way around, knowing that we are observed puts us on our best behavior. As Plato writes (Jowett, 1941):

“If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.

(2.359a–2.360d)

Glaucon’s claim that people behave less badly when being observed is a hypothesis about one way that human nature deviates from simple selfishness. While the model of pure material self-interest will always prove to be a useful benchmark, social and natural scientists are now establishing a model of human nature that is richer, but also predictive. Such useful models include concerns for the distribution of rewards to other people (Bolton and Ockenfels, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002) and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In these models, whether a person is observed by others does not make any difference.
However, in other models, people sometimes help others to increase their own “social image” (e.g., “manners” in Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Rotemberg, 2008, 2014; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). In these models, people derive utility when others believe they adhere to a norm of pro-sociality or are genuinely altruistic.

Some evidence from psychology and neuroscience indicates that being observed can influence behavior, including prosociality (e.g. Guerin, 1986). For example, an early small-sample study showed that people washed their hands in bathrooms twice as often (80% vs 40%) when they knew somebody was watching them (Munger and Harris, 1989). This kind of behavioral change in response to public observation indicates that some hand-washing is done to appear like a hygienic person, rather than to actually be hygienic.

Changing what other people know or see about a person’s decisions, and measuring whether the person’s decisions change, is a method that can discriminate social image models from distributional or reciprocity models most clearly.

Our experiment contributes new evidence of observability effects. Subjects choose allocations of money for themselves and others. All the monetary payoffs are hidden in boxes on a computer screen. When a cursor moves into the box area subjects can see the monetary payoffs (a method called Mouselab). In the Baseline condition, other subjects don’t see the payoffs the decision maker is looking at. In the social image (SI) condition, an observer whose payoffs will be determined by the decision maker’s choice gets to see—through screen-sharing—exactly what payoffs the decision maker is looking at. In both cases, the affected other subject does not observe the actual choices made by the active subject until the end of the experiment (when one choice is implemented at random).

Other studies have experimentally changed social observation (see the next section). Our study is the first to vary actual social observation of a person’s attention and behavior, by a social observer who is affected by the person being observed. This design can establish how social observation affects both attention and choice at the same time.

This paradigm measures three interesting empirical properties of observability and social image: (1) Are people more prosocial when they are observed? (2) Does their visual attention to payoffs change when they are observed? And (3) do people deliberately control social attention when they are observed, and in
which direction? That is, do they look more at others’ payoffs to improve social image, or do they look less to create deniability or “moral wiggle room”?

Learning more about the answers to these questions is important for economics and social science for three reasons.

First, in recent decades a lively debate has arisen in economics about which models of social preference are best for various empirical purposes (Camerer, 2003; Cooper and Kagel, 2016). Social image modeling is newer and more complex than the earlier alternatives. Knowing more about the importance and properties of social image effects is essential to advance the debate about whether the social image models are a workable improvement over simpler ones (Rotemberg, 2014).

Second, if social image concerns are important, and observability therefore matters, then institutional details of how social information is organized and broadcast will affect choices (and presumably welfare). One class of effects is how observation of actions enhances social image. An obvious example is how charities use publicity in acknowledging donors— naming buildings, or putting their names on a plaque that is prominently displayed— to advertise their generosity. Other studies indicate that social observation changes voting, education, and consumption decisions (DellaVigna et al., 2017; Bursztyn, and Jensen, 2015; Bursztyn et al., 2017). Social signaling has also been used to motivate prosocial choices such as deworming (Karing and Naguib, 2018).

A second class of effects is how observation of the information used by decision makers reassures economic agents that their interests are being considered (buttressed by the decision makers’ desire for a good social image). For example, in business and management, law, and politics there are often rules about disclosure, transparency, and how the impact on people should be considered in decisions. These institutions include: Public corporate shareholder meetings, the right of the accused to physically face one’s accuser in court, freedoms of the press, “sunshine laws”, the Freedom of Information Act, widespread reliance on face-to-face personal interviews in selection and hiring, etc. These rules all promote the right of a person who is affected by decisions to get a chance to socially observe a decision maker— by directly confronting decision makers, or by seeing their paper trail. Some of these rules are required by law to mitigate agency problems, but others are voluntary actions designed to enhance image (e.g., WalMart donating goods to Hurricane Katrina victims).

Many studies in social psychology and organizational behavior suggest that workers will more readily
accept unpleasant outcomes—such as layoffs and pay cuts—if they believe their interests are considered during a “procedurally just” process. (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Taylor et al., 1995). A related empirical example is that “apology laws”—which exclude apologies as evidence of guilt in malpractice cases—reduce litigation (Ho and Liu, 2011a,b). These studies suggest that if observers see that a subject is looking at their payoffs, those observers will more readily accept selfish actions (which could lead subjects to act more selfishly).

Third, technology has rapidly made social observation easier (e.g., through Facebook and other social media). That is, the information that people pay attention to and the options they weigh may have become more apparent to others while their final choices often remain private and unknown to anyone else. This boom has made image-cultivation a bigger business and changed the modern workplace. Understanding the underlying motivation for both observation and image are necessary to understand the development and welfare consequences of these technologies, the market activity they catalyze, and the new management challenges and opportunities they have created.

II Background

Previous social image studies fall into three categories: (1) Presentation of abstract cues of observation; (2) Actual observation by disinterested people; and (3) deliberate image management by subjects (through endogenously choosing what others know about their choice set and choice).

Abstract cues: Several experiments show prosociality is increased by indirect cues to being watched or heard (“surveillance cues”, in evolutionary psychology language). Cues in the form of stylized or abstract human eyes, or a vaguely human-like robot, have shown modest effects on prosociality in dictator games (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Burnham and Hare, 2007; Rigdon et al., 2009), in a workplace pay-what-you-want setting (Bateson et al., 2006), and in moral condemnation of crimes and villains in vignettes (Bourrat et al., 2011). However, there have been many failed replications. For example, Fehr and Schneider (2010) found no effect in a trust game. Most effects also appear to be interactions between a trait or state variable and surveillance cues.

Effects have been found when the eyes are in 3D rather than 2D (Krátký et al., 2016), and when eyes look directly compared to being averted (consistent with heightened biological activity from direct eye contact) (Manesi et al., 2016). There is also substantial evidence of effects from short exposure (<1min) and no effect at longer exposures (several minutes) (Sparks and Barclay, 2013).
A field experiment on voting measured the effect of sending a postcard encouraging voting ("Do your civic duty and vote!") with three background images—eyes, an American flag, or a palm tree. The eyes increased turnout by 1-2%, but the effect was only significant among Republican voters (Panagopoulos and van der Linden, 2016).

As a whole, these results demonstrate the intriguing possibility that even simple observation cues could have an effect, but the effect is not well-established (and could be inflated by publication bias if non-effects are either unsubmitted or rejected).

Human observers: Several studies have found that the presence of actual human observers influences prosociality (broadly interpreted). Izuma et al. (2010) shows heightened activation in well-established reward regions (ventral striatum), and more giving, when subjects are watched while giving to charity; autistic adults show a diminished observation effect (Izuma et al., 2011). Coricelli et al. (2010) find that having your picture displayed to others deters an experimental version of tax evasion (and arousal, measured by skin conductance response, increases more during an experimental “audit” when your picture is displayed).

An effect of human observers on anti-social cheating was measured by a natural experiment in Italy, explicitly randomizing adult examiners to classrooms, as Italian 2nd and 5th graders took tests (Bertoni et al., 2013). The examiners watched for cheating and transmitted answers when the students were done. In classes with examiners, test scores were about 5-8% lower. The effect is probably due to reduced cheating, because students did not report feeling more anxious.

Endogenous image management: Experimental subjects sometimes exhibit a preference to limit whether or not they are socially observed when they are making prosocial choices. Limiting social observation can create deniability or “moral wiggle room” to then act selfishly without the emotional burden (perhaps guilt) of being watched. In a modified dictator game, Lazear et al. (2012) and Dana et al. (2006) found that many people deliberately opted for a choice which had no scope for prosociality but gave them less money, in order to avoid a choice in which they could earn more but another person would know they had acted selfishly.

DellaVigna et al. (2012) found that some households, when notified that a charity would be visiting the next day, did not answer the door at the scheduled visiting time, presumably to avoid observability by the
charity solicitor of the household’s explicit decision to give nothing. Dillenberger and Sadowski (2011) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have formal models of these preferences.

Two other field studies looked at reactions of shoppers to solicitors asking for charitable donations outside of stores. One was the familiar red kettle of Salvation Army at Christmas holiday times. Not surprisingly, to anyone who has shopped and seen solicitors, about a third of shoppers avoided the likely guilt from not giving, by walking an average of 70 feet extra to go through a door with no solicitor (Andreoni et al., 2016). In a similar experiment in Alaska, when the temperature dropped below 0°F, the avoidance disappeared, indicating that avoidance is sensitive to its price (Trachtman et al., 2015).

All these studies are important for showing how observation can matter. However, they are generally limited on one of two dimensions: (1) Basic internal validity—i.e., we cannot be certain that the experimental treatment was applied as intended (i.e., that subjects knew they were being observed). In the abstract cue studies, subjects were typically not asked if they noticed the eyes or the robot picture (and their attention was not measured in any subtler way). (2) Are the observers financially interested in the outcome? Observability effects might work differently—presumably more strongly—if the observers care about how the subject treats them.¹

Our design is different on both of these dimensions. The decision makers know that the observers see exactly what they themselves see (as if the observers are standing over their shoulder looking at the screen). They also know that the observers’ payoffs will depend on what they choose. We measure attention of the subjects making choices to self and other-payoffs directly (which no study has done).

III. Hypotheses

There are four plausible hypotheses about how observation of attention to payoff consequences changes both choices and visual attention:

¹ Studies by Dana et al. (2006) and Lazear et al. (2012) are important exceptions because they have strong internal validity and do have financially-interested observers. They clearly show that some subjects have a preference for avoiding social observation and choosing selfishly. Our design goes further by exogenous manipulation of observation, implementing direct observation of information gathering through screen-sharing, and recording visual attention.
1. No effect: There are no changes. For example, if social image concern is weak compared to altruism, the effect on social image could be too weak to change either choices or lookups.

2. Deniability: Observed players look less at payoffs of others, to reduce internal guilt and external shame, and they consequently choose equally or even more selfishly.

3. Lip service: Observed players look more at payoffs of others, but make choices which are not more prosocial. Keep in mind that in the experimental design, subjects do not know what choices others actually made after each trial (except for one outcome at the end). Thus, observed subjects may attend to payoffs of others more carefully but not choose any more prosocially, to (deceptively) signal their interest in the consequences of their choices for others.

4. Social image influence: Observed players look more at payoffs of others, and make more prosocial choices.

Two remarks are in order:

First, notice that the “no effect” and “lip service” hypotheses could not be distinguished from choices alone, since they both predict no effect of observation on choices. But they have different predictions about the subjects’ attention to observer payoffs. Furthermore, in the lip service case, it may be that social observers derive utility from knowing that their possible outcomes were considered (i.e., visually attended to by the chooser), and/or that choosers see the observers’ utility as enhancing their social image (as in the procedural justice literature). There would be no basis for this conclusion without the visual attention data from mousetracking.

Second, the deniability and lip service hypotheses can be understood as reflecting a subjects’ simultaneous optimization of attention and choice depending on whether choices and payoff attention are perceived to be complements or substitutes in the production of social image. If choices and attention are complements, then if a subject looks at others’ payoffs, she prefers to make prosocial choices to gain social image (since attending but not choosing will lower her social image). And if there is complementarity she may also prefer to not look and also to choose selfishly (hence, the deniability hypothesis). Lip service is the presumption that choosing prosocially and attending to others’ payoffs are substitutes in production of social image. Since prosocial choices are financially costly, and paying attention is cheap, she will look at others’ payoffs but (essentially) ignore them in making choices.
II. Experimental Design and Procedures

Subjects were recruited via email at CASSEL in UCLA except for a small number of Caltech students (n=6) at the SSEL lab. There were four Baseline sessions with 66 subjects in total and three Social Image sessions with 62 subjects in total.\(^2\)

There were three types of allocation games, each offering a choice between two possible allocations. (The full set of allocations is shown in the Appendix). We use allocation games from Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004) as well as some variants of those games.

In the first type, S2O, the decision-maker (DM) decides between two allocations to herself and two other people. In the second type, S1O, the DM chooses between two allocations to herself and one other person. Finally, in the third type, 2O, the DM chooses an allocation for two others only; the choice does not affect DM’s payoff.

In the first two baseline sessions, there were 80 and 84 trials respectively. In the first 40 trials, we alternated between blocks of 10 S2O and S1O trials. In the later 40 trials, the alternation was between blocks of 10 S2O and 2O trials.\(^3\) In all subsequent sessions, the 20 S2O, 20 S1O, and 10 2O games that were the most diagnostic out of the 84 (i.e., generated closest to 50% choice) were used.

In the Social Image condition, half of the subjects are decision-makers in the first 25-trial block (10 S2O, 10 S1O, and 5 2O) where in all games with two others involved, Other 1 is the observer. In the next 25-trial block, the other half of subjects are now the decision-makers and Other 2 is the observer. In the third block, the decision-makers are the same as in the first block and Other 2 continues to be the observer. Finally, in the last block of 25 trials, the second group of decision-makers have Other 1 as the observer. With this ABABAB design, all subjects were decision-makers and observers for the same 50 games over 100 trials.

In the baseline condition, all payoffs are initially hidden. The decision-maker can move the mouse and click on any cell to reveal the payoff. Once the mouse is moved from that cell, the payoff becomes hidden again and the decision-maker must click on the cell again if s/he wants to see the payoff. Thus, we can

\(^2\) See Table A1 in the Appendix for a more detailed summary.

\(^3\) In the second session, four more S1O games were added at the end that had the same payoff difference for self but different payoff differences for the other subject.
track the exact sequence and duration of lookups until the choice between the two allocations is made in each trial. The entire payoff table was revealed to the decision-maker at the end of each trial.

The only difference in the Social Image (SI) condition is that in addition to the decision-maker, there is an observer in each trial who can see what the decision-maker has clicked on in real-time through screen-sharing. After the trial, the full payoff matrix is also revealed to the observer but not the choices made by the decision-maker. In the last Social Image session, we do not reveal the payoffs to the decision-maker and the observer after each trial and verified that this change did not affect the looking patterns.

All subjects were paid based on two randomly chosen trials, one in which they were the decision-maker and another in which they were one of the others in the allocation group. Sample instructions and screenshots can be found in the Appendix.

III. Results

1. Choices and preference theories

The first question is what social preferences are generally reflected by choices. Being observed clearly reduces the rate of purely selfish choice. Overall, 74.2% of choices are selfish in the Baseline case (maximizing own payoff), compared to 62.57% in SI. Thus, there is a simple and significant (Mann-Whitney: p<0.01) treatment effect.

Table 1 shows the results of a simple logit specification, at the trial level, which estimates the weights placed on differences in self payoff, total payoff for the group, and the minimum payoff in the group that best explain the observed choices (following Charness and Rabin, 2002). In the aggregate, self payoff and (to a lesser extent) minimum payoff are both significant predictors of choices. Perhaps surprisingly, total payoff is not a significant influence. All the coefficients are also jointly significantly different across the two conditions (Chow test: p<0.01).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Social Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SelfPayDiff</td>
<td>13 (8.25)</td>
<td>5.2 (7.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MinPayDiff</td>
<td>2.0 (8.20)</td>
<td>0.63 (3.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotalPayDiff</td>
<td>0.090 (0.39)</td>
<td>-0.16 (-1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-72 (1.92)</td>
<td>-27 (0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>-1517</td>
<td>-1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2553</td>
<td>2457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another prominent model of social preference is inequality aversion where people weigh and add their own payoffs and measures of “envious” and “guilty” inequality (measured by differences in their own payoffs and payoffs of others).

$$U_i(x) = x_i - \alpha \max \{x_j - x_i, 0\} - \beta \max \{x_i - x_j, 0\}$$

In the three-parameter ($\rho$, $\sigma$, and $\gamma$) specification in Charness and Rabin (2002), $\sigma < \rho < 1$ would be consistent with this model of inequality aversion. The probability of choosing option 1 for player $i$ is:

$$P_i = \frac{e^{[\rho (\sigma + \alpha) x_{ij} + (1 - \rho - \alpha) x_{il}]}}{e^{[\rho (\sigma + \alpha) x_{ij} + (1 - \rho - \alpha) x_{il}] + e^{[\rho (\sigma + \alpha) x_{ij} + (1 - \rho - \alpha) x_{il}]}}$$

where $r=1$ if $x_i > x_j$, and $r=0$ otherwise and $s=1$ if $x_i < x_j$, and $s=0$ otherwise.

The two specifications can be easily extended to accommodate the three player case. Table 2 shows that subjects in the baseline condition display “envious” but not “guilty” inequality aversion. For the Social Image treatment, there is no significant evidence of either type of inequality aversion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Social Image</th>
<th>CR2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.13 (4.26)</td>
<td>-0.10 (1.28)</td>
<td>0.42 (25.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>-0.0044 (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.30)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>0.013 (7.70)</td>
<td>0.0039 (5.08)</td>
<td>0.014 (11.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>-1543</td>
<td>-1646</td>
<td>-528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2553</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Three-parameter logit specification in Charness-Rabin (t-statistics in parentheses; SEs clustered at individual level)

The $\rho$ and $\gamma$ coefficients are significantly different between the Baseline and the SI condition and all the coefficients are also jointly significantly different across the two conditions (Chow test: $p < 0.01$)
2. Overall duration and click statistics

This section reports basic statistics about attention to payoffs. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes overall statistics on how long subjects look at different types of payoffs (denoted “duration”) and how frequently they click different payoff boxes in the three types of games and the two information conditions.

On average, subjects look up each box 3-4 times per trial. The lookup patterns and durations per lookup are very regular across game types. Durations are 250-300 msec per click. In most trials the subjects clicked on all payoff cells at least once.

It does appear that the number of clicks is about 10-15% lower in the SI condition than in the Baseline condition games. However, this difference can be largely attributed to learning effects, since the SI condition has more trials, and later trials have faster lookup durations. Furthermore, most of the analyses below focus on relative differences in looking at payoffs for oneself and for others, which are robust to any learning-based decrease in looking.

The persistence and duration of attention to self and other payoffs across information treatments is evidence against the deniability hypothesis. Subjects do not appear to purposely avoid looking at the payoffs of others, in order to make a selfish choice without creating guilt or harming social image. In fact, there is substantial evidence that they look more at payoffs of others in the SI condition. For example, in S1O games, the ratio of average lookup times in other and own payoff cells is higher in SI than in Baseline (1.25 in SI vs. .97 in baseline; t-test: p<0.01).

Keep in mind that nothing in the instructions, design, or technology forces subjects to pay attention to payoffs of others at all. A subject could just look at her own payoffs and choose selfishly. Indeed, in the first baseline session there was one (Caltech) subject who made 100% selfish choices, and did not look at the potential payoffs of others at all for 56% of the S2O and S1O trials. Thus, the textbook economic agent who is selfish and highly inattentive to how his choices affect other people, actually does exist—

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4 Recall that in the baseline sessions 50 trials are used for analysis, and can therefore be compared with the first and second blocks of 50 trials in the longer 100-trial SI sessions. The average total durations in the first block of 50 trials for the baseline and SI conditions are 2847 msec and 2684 msec (two-tailed t-test: p=0.07). The average total duration in the second 50-trial SI block is significantly lower at 2114 msec (compared to 2684), showing learning curve effects. Thus, while there is a small difference in total duration (around 200 msec) between the two conditions even in the early block of trials, most of the difference in durations is due to the different number of trials. Furthermore, a regression of total lookup durations on trial number shows an estimated reduction in duration per trial of 22 msec and 18 msec for Baseline and SI, respectively (a drop that is highly significantly positive).
but there was only one such subject.\(^5\)

Table A3 in the Appendix shows the average number of transitions between payoff boxes of different types. There are generally more within-choice row transitions than within-column transitions, but the difference is small and is not present in all type-condition combinations. Given that there is no clear guidance from theory about which transitions are more likely, the data suggest there are multiple lookup routes to similar judgments.

However, inequality-aversion models do make a specific algorithmic prediction: If working memory is constrained, there should be a lot of Self-O1 and Self-O2 payoff box transitions (since each payoff difference enters the utility function separately, and cannot be computed from an O1-O2 comparison alone). There should be essentially no O1-O2 transitions (since this comparison plays absolutely no role in inequality-aversion computations). Contrary to this tentative hypothesis, there are very few Self-O2 transitions. Instead, most of the transitions are between adjacent payoff cells and there are many O1-O2 transitions. A strong bias toward adjacent-payoff transitions is, of course, not surprising as this kind of visual search is common in reading, online shopping, and many other activities.

3. Influence of social observation on visual attention to payoffs

In the S2O and 2O games, subjects know which one of the two other players is observing their lookups. Table 3 shows differences in total durations of attention to observer payoffs and non-observer payoffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Observer Payoff Duration</th>
<th>Non-Observer Payoff Duration</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>S2O</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>2O</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>S2O</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>&gt;1014</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>2O</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>&gt;864</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Lookup Duration in Observer vs. Non-Observer Payoff Boxes (p-value based on Wilcoxon sign-rank test)

In both S2O and 2O trials, the decision-makers do look significantly more at the observer’s payoffs than at the non-observer’s payoffs. Keep in mind that in S2O and 2O trials, the identity of the observer was

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\(^5\) Another subject in an SI session only looked at the others’ payoffs in three of the 40 S2O and S1O trials (although that subject did not always choose selfishly).
switched from O1 to O2 regularly within a session, so powerful within-subject comparisons can be made. The preferential looking longer at the payoffs of the observer rather than those of the non-observer is significant in these within-subjects tests in both S2O (t-test: p=0.03) and 2O (t-test: p<0.001) games.6

In S2O games, where being observed could conceivably increase the total duration to payoff cells of both of the other players combined, there is no difference in that total duration. However, there are also differences in observer payoff duration percentages across the Baseline and SI conditions that are small, but statistically significant for all three types of games (Wilcoxon sign-rank at the individual level: p<0.05). Furthermore, the percentage of total attention allotted to non-observer payoffs declines a little in the SI conditions from Baseline (from 29 to 27% of total duration for S2O, and from 50% to 47% in 2O). Thus, the observer influence on visual attention seems to be restricted entirely to looking a little longer at the payoff of the person who is observing you.

This effect is similar to what one might expect (based on the behavioral literature) if a pair of eyes were placed over the observer column only. However, the manipulation here is more clearly understood by subjects, and is more lifelike because it represents actual observation of payoff search by the human observer subject).

4. How durations correlate with choices

In this section we explore further the central question: how does being observed, in the SI case, influence choice? The first next step is to look at the relation between attention to payoffs to others vs. self to selfish choice, at the individual level, and whether SI changes that relation. Table 4 shows a simple linear OLS regression of selfish choice on looking (relative other/self duration), an SI dummy variable, and the interaction. There are strong negative main effects of looking at others’ payoffs and of the SI treatment on selfish choice. However, the strongest effect is a main effect of SI reducing the percentage of selfish choice. Being observed makes people choose less selfishly. The SI condition dummy variable does not appear to strongly modulate the relation between looking and choice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other/Self Duration</th>
<th>%Selfish</th>
<th>% Selfish</th>
<th>% Selfish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other/Self Duration</td>
<td>-0.14 (3.76)</td>
<td>-0.23 (4.01)</td>
<td>-0.21 (3.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Moreover, a counterfactual placebo comparison was done for the baseline condition with dummy observer and non-observer designations that are the same as the ones in the SI condition. Naturally, there are no significant differences in duration in this placebo test (t-test: p=0.37 for S2O games and p=0.72 for 2O games).
We now focus on S1O games at the trial level. Figure 1 shows controls for the fraction of lookup time directed to self payoffs (x-axis) and reports the percentage of selfish choices for each level of self-payoff lookup time fraction (y-axis). Choices are more selfish in the Baseline condition for all lookup bins except one. Thus, the SI condition generally reduces selfish choice.

A more fine-grained analysis, shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, uses all trials in a trial-level logit of selfish choice on the differences in percentage of lookup time spent in other and self payoff cells, a SI condition dummy, and an interaction term between the SI dummy and the payoff lookup difference.

In this analysis the main effect of the SI condition emerges strongly again (it lowers selfish choice), but there is also a strong positive interaction effect, indicating that SI also flattens out the negative relationship between other-self looking and choice. This pattern is consistent with the

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7 Note that the difference in percentage duration is used in the trial-based analysis because the other/self ratios can vary dramatically from trial to trial (while percentage differences do not).
idea that in Baseline, the subjects’ attention and choices are closely aligned (selfish people look at other payoffs much less). In SI, that clear relation is disrupted, since some subjects will choose selfishly but look quite a lot at other players’ payoffs (consistent with the lip service hypothesis). The behavior of these subjects reduces the attention-choice association.

There is no evidence in the S2O games that subjects choose in a way which differentially benefits the other player who is observing them, compared to the non-observer. We suspect the allocation games we chose from the literature, and then extended, are not ideal for detecting such an effect, but better allocations could be created easily.  

Finally, we directly test whether visual attention is a statistical “mediator” of the influence of SI on choice. In general, a mediator carries the influence of an independent variable, partly or fully, on a dependent variable. In this case, the independent variable is the binary dummy variable for the Social Image condition and the dependent variable is either the percentage of selfish choices in S2O and S1O trials at the individual level, or the binary selfish choice dummy at the S1O trial level. The mediating variable is the ratio of average lookup time spent on payoffs of others (divided by two for S2O trials) to lookup time spent on self payoff at the trial level, or the mean of this ratio across trials at the individual level.

The hypothesis is that the SI condition is at least partially affecting the amount of selfish choices by shifting the attention to the payoff cells of others. (Note that this hypothesis could not be tested with a mediation analysis if there were no lookup data.) The Sobel test (1982) is used to quantify the significance of the mediator with bootstrapping (5000 replications; Preacher and Hayes, 2008) to correct bias and avoid making any distributional assumptions. The Sobel test reveals a significant mediator with an indirect effect of -0.026 compared to the total effect of -0.12 for the SI dummy. Thus, about 18% of the effect of the SI condition is mediated by its association with lookup patterns. The same analysis at the trial level on S1O trials uses the binary dummy for selfish choice as the dependent variable and other/self lookup time ratio as the mediating variable. The result is that the lookup variable is a significant mediator with an indirect effect of -0.011 out of a total effect of -0.13. Approximately 8.5% of the total effect of the SI condition is mediated through visual attention. Taken together, these results show that adding social

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8 A better design would allow a choice among two allocations $A=(100, 100+x, 100)$ and $B=(100, 100, 120)$ for various $x$. If $A$ is chosen for $x<20$ that would indicate a strict preference to make the observer happy (at the expense of the non-observer).
observation in the SI condition partly influences choices (around 15% on average) by directing attention to payoffs of others.

IV. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper is the first to directly implement observability of visual attention, by an interested observer, as another subject makes choices that affect the observer’s payoff.

The key experimental condition is the Social Image (SI) treatment: Screen-sharing is used to show the observer what payoffs the decision maker is looking at in real time.

In this SI condition, the decision makers are clearly less selfish and also look more often at the payoffs of those who are watching them. This pattern goes in the opposite direction of deniability, which implies looking less often to assuage guilt (and then choosing at least as if not more selfishly in than the baseline condition). Other studies have found such effects (e.g., Dana et al., 2007) without the stronger treatment of knowing that observers are seeing what the decision makers look at. The results also go against a “lip service” hypothesis, because SI subjects do look more often at the payoff of the affected observers, but also choose less selfishly in general.

The hypothesis that best explains the main results is that exogenous social observation affects both visual attention and choice. The mediation analysis suggests that much of the effect just comes from being observed, but part of the effect (15% or so) comes from observation changing visual attention, which changes choice.

Why should economists care about these types of paradigms and results? The answer is that in social image models, what people perceive about what an agent attends to and weighs is an input to the observed agent’s perceptions of what other people think of her. Procedural details therefore matter greatly in these models.

Exploring those models, and eventually testing them carefully, will benefit from new choice designs, and also from measuring attentional data when possible. One can also conceive of field experiments and naturally-occurring data sets which would use similar observability treatments like these.²

² Two examples: (1) Have confederates pose as panhandlers and solicit money from people passing by. The hypothesis is that looking at the panhandlers (probably their eyes, which play a powerful role in facial emotion recognition) is associated with giving. (2) Send email solicitations which include or do not include an “e-ceipt” so
Furthermore, the mediation pattern suggests the possibility that changing visual attention directly, toward payoffs or consequences of others, would increase prosociality. Economists are usually wary of causality claims of this type (reasonably so). If one thinks of visual attention as consciously and endogenously chosen to achieve a goal, then it seems unlikely that involuntarily manipulating attention could change behavior.

However, there is ample evidence that low-level visual attention (and other types of attention, such as auditory) is not completely endogenously chosen, and hence can be easily manipulated, at least briefly and temporarily. Accumulator models in which evidence is gathered or processed by a sensory system (Forstmann et al., 2016) also predict that hijacking attention will influence choice, and there is some evidence that exogenous manipulation of attention changes choice (Shimojo et al., 2003; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2014). Thus, it is at least conceivable that exogenously manipulating visual attention to the consequences an action could have for a particular person could influence prosociality toward that person.

that an experimenter can observe when the email is “read” (or at least opened). Suppose the emails can be constructed so that the likelihood they will be opened is uncorrelated with perceptions of deservingness. Then we predict that requiring an e-ceipt will lead to more opened emails and more giving.
References


### Appendix

#### Table A1. Summary of Experimental Sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th># of Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>6 (Caltech)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Social Image</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Social Image</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Social Image</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table A2. Summary of Overall Mean Durations (in msec) and Clicks

Note: * other=(other1+other2)/2 for S2O and 2O.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Excluding repeated lookups</th>
<th>Within Payoff column</th>
<th>Within Choice Row</th>
<th>S-O1</th>
<th>S-O2</th>
<th>O1-O2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>S2O</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>S1O</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>2O</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>S2O</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>S1O</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>2O</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table A3. Summary of Transition Patterns (repeated lookups are two consecutive clicks in the same payoff cell)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Selfish Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Other - Self Duration) %</td>
<td>-1.48 (5.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.52 (2.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other - Self Duration) % * SI</td>
<td>1.24 (3.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.79 (4.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A4. S1O choices: Trial-level logit regression of selfish choice (0-1) on difference in other duration and self duration %, SI condition dummy variable, and interaction. Note: Other duration % - Self duration % in interaction with SI dummy variable is normalized by subtracting sample mean. (SEs clustered at individual level)
Sample Instructions (Social Image Treatment)

Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive a show-up fee and in addition will be given to earn additional money as a function of your decisions during the experiment.

If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be addressed.

During the experiment you will make 50 independent decisions. The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between participants will take place through the computers. It is very important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment.

The experiment is divided in trials. In every trial you will be paired with two other participants. You will not be told the identity of the participants that are grouped with.

In each type of trial one person in the group will be asked to make a choice between two potential sets of transfers from the experimenter to the members of your group, including yourself. Each option is represented by a row in the table. Each column represents what either you or one of the other two people in the group will receive under each option.

[Screen 1-sample game matrix-you, other 1, other 2]

The diagram illustrates the way the options are described in the experiment. For example, if Option 1 is chosen, then you will receive 3, Other 1 will receive 14, and Other 2 will receives 15. On the other hand, if option two is chosen, then you will receive 9, Other 1 will receive 26, and Other 2 will receive 5.

You will have to make decisions in three types of situations. The following screens describe each type.

[Screen 2-hidden matrix-you, other 1, other 2]

**TYPE 1.** Display 2 shows the first type of situations. Payoffs in the table are now hidden in boxes. This is the type of screen you will see during the experiment. You can see the payoffs by moving your computer mouse into the boxes, left- or right-clicking, and holding down the mouse button. If you do not hold down
the mouse button the payoff will disappear. When you move the mouse away from the box, the payoff will also disappear. If you move your mouse back into the same box, and click and hold, the payoff will appear again. In the experiment, clicking does not affect your earnings and you can click as few or as many times as you wish.

Whenever you are ready to make a choice, you will have to press the Option 1 or Option 2 button to indicate your choice.

[Screen 3-hidden matrix-you, other 1]

**TYPE 2.** In the second type of situation, the options pertain only to you and one other person. The third person in the group is not affected by the choice thus the payoff table has only two columns for You and Other 1.

[Screen 4-hidden matrix- other 1, other 2]

**TYPE 3.** In the third type of situation, the options pertain only to the two other people in the group. You are not affected by the choice thus the payoff table has only two columns for Other 1 and Other 2.

The person you paired with will be observe all of your clicks and see the payoffs that you click on their screen. In type 1, the observer may be Other 1 or Other 2. In type 2, the observer is Other 1. In type 3, again the observer may be Other 1 or Other 2.

No option choices will be revealed at any point.

Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in **points.** At the end of the experiment you will be paid $1.00 for every 100 **points** you have earned. You will be paid based on the decisions that you made in two randomly chosen situations, one in which you made the option choice and one in which another person in a group to which you belong made the choice. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.

[AUTHENTICATE clients]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says mouseclicker. When the computer prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait for further instructions.

[START match]

We will begin with two practice situations so you can become familiar with the interface. You will not be paid for your decision in this situation. If you are making the decision in the situation, please use your mouse button to reveal the payoffs in the different boxes. Familiarize yourself with the click-and-hold method. For the time being do not make any option choices. If you are observing, please look at the screen to see what the decider in your group is clicking on and what the payoffs are.

If your subject ID is odd, choose Option A. If your subject ID is even, choose Option B. Once everyone has made a choice, the payoff table is revealed and we continue to go on to the next situation.

In the second situation, those who were making the decision before are not observers and the observers are now making the decisions. Please follow the same instructions as in the first practice trial.

Are there any questions before we begin with the paid experiment? We will now begin with the real paid trials. Please pull out your dividers for privacy. If there are any problems or questions from this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you.

There are 25 trials in Part 1. You will be assigned a role, decision maker or observer, and keep the same role for all 25 trials. However, you will be re-matched into a different group after each trial.

[END OF MATCHES]

That was the last trial. We will now have you answer some survey questions. When you are finished, please line up to be paid one by one. Thank you for your participation.