John D. Norton
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small-e empiricism is a version of empiricism adapted to modern science. It abandons the inductive skepticism of Big-E Empiricism and represents experience as a physical process, human or instrumental, that connects continuously with the system of interest.
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e small-e empiricism. Download draft. |
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The consequences of small-e empiricism in philosophy of science and epistemology include: a favoring of the material theory of induction; that the fallibility of inductive inference makes truth opaque, which resolves Gettier problems; a version of realism that mediates between strong versions of scientific realism and antirealism; and the maintaining of traditional empiricist objections to non-empirical metaphysics.
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e Applications of small-e empiricism. Download draft. |
| Small-r realism accommodates the fallibility of inductive inference by positing, as a general principle, that inductive inferences from experience can provide strong support for the truth of the contingent propositions of a scientific theory, but that whether that support has been realized must be left to a case-by-case analysis of individual sciences. | "Small-r realism: How Scientiļ¬c Realism can Accommodate Inductive Fallibility" Download | |
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This short note reviews briefly how the fallibility of inductive inference in small-e empiricism makes truth opaque. Once truth is no longer a condition for knowlege, Gettier cases cease to be troublesome and turn out to be celebrated as important discoveries in science. | "Gettier-like Cases are Successes of Scientific Knowledge" Download |