The passage falls into two main parts:

1. Glaucon and Adeimantus’ challenge to Socrates (to 367e)
2. The beginning of the response (which, with digressions, fills the rest of the book)

1. The Challenge

1. What is challenged? "Justice"; but see Lee’s footnote, p. 7. Think of interpersonal morality, centering on a concept of fairness. "Justice" is a state of character ("personal quality"), expressing itself in behavior typified by holding back from aggressive favoring of one’s own individual interest. ("Just" figures in both "just person" and "just behavior.")
2. On what basis? Glaucon and Adeimantus ask to be shown that "justice" in and of itself gives reasons (for cultivating the state of character or behaving in the associated way). See the classification of three kinds of good (357b-d). Goods are things worth having or pursuing (things there is reason to have or pursue). Glaucon wants Socrates to show that "justice" is worth cultivating ("just" behavior is worth going in for) in and of itself – as against moral skeptics, who think there is reason for these things only insofar as society artificially attaches bad consequences to "injustice" and good consequences to "justice."
3. A slogan for this skepticism: 367c, from Thrasymachus (whose argument, from earlier in the book, Glaucon and Adeimantus undertake to revive): "justice is what's good for someone else, the interest of the stronger party." If you follow "justice," you hold back from aggressive pursuit of your own interest; others, strong people, grab all the goods. Everything that could make life worth living (goods: things worth having or pursuing) ends up in the hands of someone else. "Justice" is for losers.
4. What conception of human nature underlies this skepticism? A human being's natural course is to pursue her own individual interest. So human nature is a bundle of motivational pressures towards the kind of thing the skeptics think makes up a good human life: wealth and what it brings, power and privilege, etc. Society sets up sanctions and rewards with the result that the individual interest of most people comes into line with the supposed dictates of "justice" (Glaucon's first point, on the origin and nature of "justice"). But suppose someone is clever and strong enough to avoid being subject to the artificial costs that society imposes on immoral behavior (the story of Gyges' ring gives a magical counterpart to this). Such a person has no reason for moral behavior. And the rest of us have reason for moral behavior only insofar as we are too weak (not cunning enough) to evade the consequences (we are losers). "Justice" has no claim on us in and of itself.

1. The beginning of the response: hold over to next lecture.

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