Rousseau second lecture

 

A. "The physical man" (to p. 87). A solitary animal, resourceful and adaptable, and mostly healthy (it's civilization that has made medicine necessary). At p. 82 Rousseau says "Hobbes claims that man is naturally intrepid" (i.e. fearless). Actually fear is central in Hobbes' picture of natural human motivation (it motivates preemptive strikes). But there's a real contrast: in Hobbes the state of nature is warlike, in Rousseau it's peaceable.

 

B. "Metaphysical and moral aspects" (p. 87 on). Two differentiations from other animals:

1. Free will: contrast Hobbes' picture of the human individual as a mechanism (chap. VI). Rousseau speaks of "the human machine" (like what he sees in all animals), but insists on the difference: we determine our actions, not just nature.

2. "The faculty of self-improvement" (inherent in the species as well as the individual, p. 88). The label is partly ironic, since (as becomes clear) Rousseau thinks the effect of this capacity is corruptive. (See endnote (I). Note there that he doesn't conclude that we should wish to return to the state of nature. We can't be ourselves – we can't be fully human – without the corruptive effects of this faculty.) Think of it as plasticity or alterability.

These are capacities or potentialities. The consciousness Rousseau connects with free will (p. 88) looks more sophisticated than the animal consciousness he attributes to human beings in the state of nature. Later there's a strong suggestion that human consciousness becomes more sophisticated with the acquisition of language – which is a result of "the faculty of self-improvement," and a step out of the pure state of nature. Think of the capacity for culture: the potential is built into human nature, but as soon as it starts to be actualized we no longer have purely natural human beings.

 

C. Language would be necessary for the development and preservation of even "the simplest knowledge" (contrasted with "pure sensation" at p. 90). Rousseau puzzles over the origin of language. (How do we get from "the cry of nature" to the ability to express abstract ideas?) It might be less puzzling (though still puzzling) if we didn't think of our prelinguistic ancestors as completely devoid of sociality. Think again of gorillas or chimpanzees; maybe their natural mode of life (which is primitively social) would be a better model for the life that would be natural to human beings given only their animal nature.

 

D. End of Part One, more moves against Hobbes on the state of nature:

1. Would life in the state of nature be miserable? No; it's civilization that makes for the misery that Hobbes projects back into the state of nature.

2. We mustn't, like Hobbes, "conclude that man is naturally evil" (p. 98). Hobbes doesn't (see Leviathan p. 187). But again Rousseau has a point. Hobbes depicts human beings in the state of nature as acting, e.g., aggressively and uncooperatively; that is, in ways that would be morally bad if moral evaluation got any grip on them. According to Rousseau, human beings in the state of nature are peaceable. It's social life that destroys natural compassion. (Compare the Preamble.)

 

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