The Large-Scale Structure
of Inductive Inference
JOHN D. NORTON
This volume is a sequel to
The Material Theory
of Induction.
2021
This draft first mounted on March 6, 2021.
Individual chapters updated as marked.
Contents
Looking for the earlier volume, The Material Theory of Induction? It's here.
Preface | draft |
Table of Contents (again) | draft |
Prolog | draft |
1. The Material Theory of Induction, Briefly | draft |
The material theory of induction is introduced
and its application to a range of types of inductive inference is
illustrated. The theory asserts that there are no universal rules
or schema for inductive inference. Instead, inductive inferences
or relations of inductive support are warranted by facts specific
to the domain of application. |
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Part 1. General Claims and Arguments | |
2. Large-Scale Structure: Four Claims | draft |
The main claims concerning the large-scale
structure of inductive inference are introduced and defended: 1. Relations of inductive support have a non-hierarchical structure. 2. Hypotheses, initially without known support, are used to erect non-hierarchical structures. 3. Locally deductive relations of support can be combined to produce an inductive totality. 4. There are self-supporting inductive structures. The remaining chapters provide further defenses of the claims and illustrations of them. |
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3. Circularity | draft |
The non-hierarchical relations of inductive support in science admit circularities of large and small extent. These circularities are benign. They do not force contradictions or assured undetermination of facts in the structure. In this regard, they are no different from benign circularities common elsewhere in the sciences, where there is no presumption that the mere presence of a circularity dooms the structure. | |
4. The Uniqueness of Domain-Specific Inductive Logics | draft |
Might a single body of evidence support
factually competing theories equally well? The result would be
inductive anarchy, since the competing theories would warrant
competing inductive logics. This anarchy is precluded by an
instability in the inductive competition between such theories. A
small evidential advantage by one secures more favorable facts
that amplify its advantage at the expense of competing theories. |
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5. Coherentism and the Material Theory of Induction | draft |
The circularities among relations of support in
the material theory of induction are similar to the circularities
of justification in a coherentist theory of justification in
epistemology. This similarity is superficial. The coherentist
theory concerns beliefs and the mental operations that connect
them. Inductive inference concern logical relations among
propositions independent of our thoughts and beliefs. Contrary to
my initial expectations, the resources of coherentist epistemology
prove to be of little help or relevance to the material theory of
induction. |
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6. The Problem of Induction | draft |
The problem of induction lies in the failure of
universal rules of induction to be justified. They must either
justify themselves or enter into an infinite regress of
justification by distinct rules. The material theory of induction
dissolves the problem since it has no universal rules of
induction. Attempts to resurrect the problem in the regresses and
vicious circularities within the non-hierarchical relations of
support fail. |
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Part I1. Historical Case Studies |
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7. The Recession of the Nebulae | draft |
Hubble’s 1929 finding that nebulae recede with a velocity proportional to their distance may appear to be a simple generalization from measurements of specific nebulae to a generalization over all nebulae. However, Hubble’s 1929 analysis did not respect any hierarchy of generalizations. Since he lacked distance measurements for nearly half the nebulae in his data set, he needed a complicated set of intersecting inductive inferences to recover his result. | |
8. Newton on Universal Gravitation | draft |
Newton’s celebrated argument for universal
gravitation contains two cases of pairs of propositions such that
each deductively entails the other member of the pair. While the
individual inferences of this arch-like structure are deductive,
its overall import is inductive and it is the more secure for
being constructed form deductive component inferences, rather than
inductive component inferences. |
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9. Mutually Supporting Evidence in Atomic Spectra | draft |
Atomic emission spectra were observed in the
nineteenth century and early twentieth century to be grouped into
distinct series. By means of the Ritz combination principle,
evidence of the structure of some series supports the structure of
others; and vice versa, forming many relations of mutual support.
The Ritz combination principle itself initially supplied
evidential support for the nascent quantum theory. Soon, the more
developed quantum theory provided support for a corrected version
of the Ritz combination principle. |
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10. Mutually Supporting Evidence in Radiocarbon Dating | draft |
Historical artefacts can be dated by
traditional methods of history and archaeology or by the method of
radiocarbon dating. The results of each method were used to check
and calibrate the results of the other method. When the two sets
of results are well-adjusted, they mutually support each other,
illustrating the arch-like structure of relations of support. |
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11. The Determination of Atomic Weights | draft |
It took over half a century after Dalton
proposed his atomic theory of the elements for chemists to break a
circularity in molecular formulae and atomic weights and establish
that water is H2O, and not HO, or HO2, or H4O,
and so on. Their analysis employed relations of inductive support
of bewildering complexity at many levels, from that of quite
specific substances to that of general theory. Their efforts
illustrate the complex, non-hierarchical character of relations of
inductive support. |
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12. The Use of Hypotheses in Determining Distances in Our Planetary System | draft |
As late as the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, astronomers still struggled to provide exact values for
distances within our planetary system. Triangulation also called
parallax in astronomy, was the only direct method available. It
was too weak. Since antiquity, astronomers were only able to
arrive at definite results by supplementing their analyses with
hypotheses that would in turn require subsequent support. Early
hypotheses failed to find this support. Copernicus’ heliocentric
hypothesis succeeded. |
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13. Dowsing: The Instabilities of Evidential Competition | draft |
The instability of competition among competing
theories is illustrated by the rivalry between proponents and
critics of dowsing. Over four centuries, they competed at the
level of theory, advancing different conceptions of the processes
at issue; and at the level of phenomena, disputing whether the
downing successes were pervasive or illusory. Mutually reinforcing
evidential successes by critics eventually led to securing their
position at the expense of the dowsers’, whose views were reduced
to a pseudoscience. |
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14. Stock Market Prediction: When Inductive Logics Compete | draft |
Four systems are routinely used now to predict
future prices on the stock market, each comprising a small
inductive logic. Each is based on a factual hypothesis concerning
stock price dynamics. Since the hypotheses disagree in factually
ascertainable matters, their competition is unstable. Only one
would survive if investors and pundits fully pursued and took
proper notice of the evidence. |
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Epilog | draft |