Tuesday, 28 February 2006
Explanation and Information
Peter Machamer & James Bogen,
U. Pittsburgh, History & Philosophy of Science
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  Information-talk has become ubiquitous across many of the sciences, especially in biology, neuroscience and cognitive science.  Yet the concept of information, or we shall show, concepts, are notoriously ill-defined, vague or downright stupefying.  In this paper we try to delineate three (four) different, possibly legitimate, uses of information that are used:  Mathematical (Shannon-Weaver), mechanical information (information that controls an output & information that represents an input), and information for rational use (usually inferences.)  We shall provide brief legitimate examples of each type and make some remarks about how such informations work in explanations.

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