Mark Sprevak
King’s College, United Kingdom
Fall Term 2009
Real Computation: An analysis of the notion of computation in cognitive science

Mark Sprevak is currently a Junior Research Fellow at King’s College Cambridge. His Ph.D. was awarded in February 2006 by the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge.

Mark’s research is focused on philosophy of the cognitive sciences, and in particular recently, on two major projects. The first, on philosophical issues arising from the use of computation in cognitive science—for example, whether computations are, or can be, objective features of the world. The second, on extended cognition—the claim that one’s cognitive processes can, and often do, extend outside one’s head to include objects in the environment like notebooks and computers. His recent publications include “Extended cognition and functionalism”, The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming), and “Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).